Yeah, TFA concludes that the whole range of scholarly thought on why the Iraq War happened can be boiled down to two schools of thought: "security" (part of a grand coherent plan to keep Americans safe) and "hegemony" (part of a grand coherent plan to spread American ideals and values).
There seems to be no extant scholarship adopting the view it was just an unfortunate outgrowth of, well, call it the politics of expedience following the tragedy of 9/11, for example, which merely utilized the notion of "grand coherent plan" for PR and window-dressing purposes, without entailing the actual existence of any substantial grand coherent plan.
The "cultural turn" section at the end holds out some hope for less entrenched scholarship, amusingly describing such marginalized views as "stovepiped [see: 1] from mainstream scholarship".
1: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/10/27/the-stovepipe