Hacker News Reader

The point of an E2E cryptographic design is that you don’t ever need to trust the server — the server can be as malicious as it pleases, so long as you can affirmatively demonstrate that the client never communicates anything that isn’t encrypted with a key the server has no access to.

View on HN

That was the original argument. But Signal has now rolled out functionality (sharing of contact lists and other details with the server through Intel SGX) that does force one to trust the server.

>being “paranoid” - Ask yourself... Do you have absolute trust in your;

- Hardware

- Firmware

- O/S

- app(s)

- ISP

- internet

- Governments (Yours and Others)

Did you answer 'No' to any?

From TFA:

> E2EE is meaningless if the client and the network are the same

Using modern, networked computers does involve a lot of trust.

But as long as it's not one company delivering the whole stack, some attacks require a gradually more unlikely scenario where a lot of parties across the world would have to cooperate, and the cost of an exploit that traverses the software stack becomes so expensive that targeting you is out of scope.

Reply on news.ycombinator.com