I get why farmers do it but what's the societal benefit of letting a rando like me buy and sell (i.e. make bets on) such contracts? Do farmers really prefer that random people do this?
At a basic level, obviously thee needs to be someone assuming the price risk from the farmers, and those people will obviously need to be compensated.
The more something trades, the more likely we will have the right price. When things don't trade as much, we don't actually know what that thing is worth.
This concept is a benefit to society as many things are interconnected and correlated, so the more accurate we can quickly find the current price (and expected future price) the more we can evaluate value.
(Also, they aren't "siphoning money" really it's "value" because the contract isn't actually money)
Is the idea that society gets a net benefit from price distortions like minimum wage, subsidies, taxes, etc. also "weird"? These also make it hard to discover the "right price" for goods, therefore it's... weird to have them?
> but then a bunch of unrelated parties come in and siphoning money from the existing parties.
I think you are trying to argue that markets mean that the value of a purchased contract changes, and that's only if you want to sell the contract again. If you buy the contract you'll get delivery of what you bought at that price? the market moving only affects you if you want to sell again. If I buy a 2009 used dodge charger with 100k miles for 10k, and then the next day someone sells another 2009 dodge charger with 100k miles for 9k, are those unrelated parties siphoning money away from me?
You could go straight to your local wheat farmer and cut a deal directly with them, but they are gonna say "what's the going rate for wheat" and call some friends and look at market data to determine if they want to accept your deal or not.
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If you believe that futures markets are harming society, then what is your proposed solution as to how a buyer and seller should agree on a fair price for wheat?
So who is on the buy-side? Exclusively supermarkets/distributors, while exclusively farmers sell? I suppose that could work, but I assume it would quickly regress into tight relationships like we have (probably regionally variable) for smaller market's, like most vegetables (vs grain) where as I understand it it's largely a direct relationship with the buyer - you probably still sell a future contract, but it's not via a central market and it is 'farm x will deliver to buyer y', i.e. a pre-order if you will, not really a commodity.
And as others say, price discovery, liquidity. What harm does completely open (no obligation) do? And maybe you eat a lot of potatoes and want to lock in the price today. (Or more seriously maybe you're a big baker, but not big enough to be buying direct from farm, your miller is. So grain price affects you, but ypu can't directly control/choose when to take it. Secondary grain futures allow you to hedge risk of it moving against you. In turn this means lower prices or lower risk of shock price increase to your consumers.)
The farmer did want the price certainty that allows the risk of being more leveraged (tractor mortgage). But the farmer was not the optimal person to hold the credit risk of the grocer.
And the farmer might have sold without the intent to deliver. It might be that the delivery specification, or location, or whatever, isn’t perfect for the farmer. But if the farmer is confident that the prices will move together, then it still works.
Problems always appear when market participants try to affect reality to increase their odds, like shorting a position and then releasing some ugly news.
Loans are useful and necessary because businesses need to buy things before they get paid. It can't all be done using Kickstarter! Farming works this way.
Insurance is useful because you get paid when something bad happens to you. On a day when you're glad that you had insurance, it means someone else lost a bet.
Buying insurance you don't actually need is kind of dumb because you'll lose on average, but people do sometimes win in casinos, too. Selling insurance when you can't afford to lose is risking disaster, but sometimes people get away with that too.
But they also do different things:
You need insurance companies for one-off risks. Someone has to go see the house and say, "yep, it burned down." Also, we don't let people bet on other people's houses burning down for good reason.
Other risks are more impersonal, like "what if this company I bought a bond from goes bankrupt" or "what if the price of corn drops in half" or "what if the price of oil doubles." There are lots of people and companies who might want to hedge against those, not just the owner of the property.
Because this is more efficient and useful.
But "like insurance" I think was meant as a broader term. Traditional insurance contracts look a bit like options. But forward purchases or sales are also often used as "insurance". The big gain is that purely cash settled contracts (or contracts where cash settlement is possible as a result of sufficient market liquidity existing to allow closing a position before physical settlement) can be used for risk mitigation in other ways which offer much better liquidity and better cost-efficiency in the right markets.
A good real world example is oil price hedging. An airline might want to mitigate the risk that their future cost of jet A-1 goes up. On the other hand, an oil producer might want to mitigate the risk that their future sale price of a particular blend of their crude goes down. Instead of using insurance or entering into bilateral forward contracts, both can trade futures or options on a standardised crude (which neither of them is ever planning to physically deliver or take delivery of[0]). The contract they are trading will not be a perfect hedge for either of them, but it will mitigate their risk significantly. In fact if they are both large enough, bilaterally the liquidity available to them would likely be insufficient to mitigate the same amount of risk.
Having a "single", transparent price also brings some other benefits beyond simple liquidity. For example, it enables several ways to manage counterparty credit risk which would otherwise be unavailable (daily margining, use of central counterparties or clearing, etc).
[0] although the contract might enable an oil producer to make physical delivery of their own blend with a price adjustment
And what would you rather happen? That you were prohibited?
As others have said, your counterparty won’t know who you are: hedge fund; commercial hedger; rando — unknown.
Do farmers prefer that? Yes, the larger the futures market, the price of selling futures will be closer to optimal. If the market is illiquid, farmers often have to sell futures at a lower prices to market makers.