Illinois Hospital First to Shut Down After Ransomware Attack
techdirt.com
techdirt.com
These organizations might not be culturally accustomed to have IT at the core of their business/mission, but it very much is. They might not value engineering skills and people in IT, but they have evolved an absolute dependency on those over the years.
The issue here is cultural, not technical. These ransomware attacks, breaches and outages are completely self-imposed. They can end anytime as soon as the hospital wants it. All they have to do is value and acknowledge IT as a fundamental pillar of their organization, comp it appropriately and make sure to run on hardware that's patched and safe to use. Really no different than washing hands before a procedure to stop infections. Else the cycle will endlessly repeat itself.
I'm looking forward to the day that AI replaces the meatsacks in these departments for how awful and poorly run they typically are.
Distinction without difference
Not at all.
Not being able to send bills means potential financial trouble days/weeks/months down the line.
Not being able to perform surgeries means that people will die. Today.
A ransomware attack hit SMP Health in 2021. The attack halted the hospital’s ability to submit claims to insurers, Medicare or Medicaid for months, sending it into a financial spiral, Burt said.
So, they struggled to handle this for two years before they finally shut down.
So again, distinction without difference
You are ignoring all the lives they saved in the intervening two years.
> So again, distinction without difference
Nonsense.
What a Russian ransomware firm can do, sophisticated state actors manage with ease.
Sometimes investigators know the actual actors involved with such attacks. 15 years ago I worked for Microsoft and went to a security presentation where the team had done some brilliant work and collaborated with law enforcement over months and had specifically identified an individual associated with a cyber attack. The individual was out of reach because of weak computer crime laws in the attacker’s country and poor diplomatic relations.
The FBI was co-presenting and touting the staggering amounts of manpower and funds dedicated to this investigation.
I leaned over to a friend of mine and said something to the effect of “with the state of organized crime in that country we could spend a few tens of thousands of dollars for a permanent solution”.
I always think back to that comment. Attribution in computer crime is hard, but attackers get away with impunity because they either hide behind anonymity or behind jurisdictional issues. Should we just let that go or use more pragmatic solutions?
I think both are the same pile of cash. That sort of thing isn't the FBI's style though.
> That sort of thing isn't the FBI's style though. Agreed
I think we'd probably all be shocked at the list if such a list could be produced.
But I think we wouldn't be shocked at which agency is at the top of the list.
True. That's more like something the CIA would do.
It was doable on a budget with some work to put together a vastly improved setup for them with data going to a ZFS system with constant snapshotting and then that too getting further backups in a few ways to off site, but it took way more technical knowledge/metaknowledge then it should have. If I think about all the various components, this could and should be a lot easier. And even with what we went with I still can't say I'm truly satisfied. Like, why don't TrueNAS or everyone else in the space long since have watch dogs for signs of ransomware? Encrypted files are readily discernible from unencrypted files by computers, so why isn't there just a GUI option to "alert on threshold of change in encrypted files|filesystem entropy"? Or even "radical deviation in snapshot size"? The key thing about ransomware is deviation from norms, by definition it must suddenly make changes to a massive set of files in a way totally different from typical patterns. If all of a sudden a NAS/SAN observes any hints of that why in 2023 isn't that universally a red alert? Why is Webauthn not everywhere for admin pages? Hiding everything behind an internal VPN is good practice, but further layers would be good too. Etc etc, no doubt endless stuff I'm not even thinking of or don't know myself.
It's a huge societal drain to lose medical services over such events and fantastically inefficient. The cost to ensure everyone has at least some final fallback WORM recovery or the like, even if a month old, has to be a tiny fraction of the damage that even a single hospital shutdown (or slowdown even) causes. Somehow it's not getting priced in and responded to in a uniform manner. I really feel like I should be long since 100% out of a job on this sort of thing because there should be easy options for non-technical types, and that government should have universal help and guides for all medical providers from sole practitioner on up nationwide to get into a known good state.
Starlink may be a good option for giving rural medical facilities reliable access to cloud services.
Is there anything this miracle technology can’t do?
In some cases, doesn't event violate any laws! :)
Oh, yes! Of course. Criminals.
Life is extremely tough for legitimate businesses in countries such as Nigeria, due to the government's incompetence (some say active collusion) in dealing with fraud. Banks generally won't touch them, and even if they do, transactions are often delayed for weeks.
I guess you have a bank account, but your bank is under sanctions? How does that help you?
I am interested in there actually being a use-case; but i've never actually encountered one which survives contact with reality.
The third party exchanges resell crypto to other Iranians who want to use it to buy sanctioned digital goods.
It is the widespread use of crypto that makes this possible if it wasn't mainstream then there wouldn't be a difference between getting paid in crypto and a Google Play gift card.
Before anyone says paying criminals for illegal drugs is a victimless crime, remember that a significant portion of the illegal drug trade is run by the cartels and other organized crime organizations which do victimize people.
The real crime here is preventing me from opening my third eye!
Crypto isn't magic -- indeed, it's vastly more sensitive to state control, since anyone in control over any local part of the network can completely disable the system.
I'm going to disagree here. A bad glitch isn't likely to encrypted entire systems and prevent any recovery of data. While a bad glitch could cause complete data loss, ransomware attacks are far more common.
Complete data loss of one instance (whether "instance" is a single computer or single site as in the case of a fire/flood). But random glitches, mistakes, or events without any intention behind them are very different from hostile actors. They don't work to spread everywhere. They don't actively work to hide themselves. Random glitches, mistakes, or events don't try to install rootkits and persist themselves.
>If you still don't backup
Ransomware operators aren't stupid either. We've long since passed the point where "just have a backup" naively is enough, ransomware outfits will actively go after backups if it can, trying to move laterally throughout the victim organization, as well as do things like keep a key around long after everything is encrypted so it can stay transparent for awhile. The idea being that even if backups it can't touch are happening, by the time the trigger is pulled and all keys deleted weeks/months of data will still have successfully locked up with the backup systems dutifully backing it up. For many people, individuals even not just businesses, "we can restore but everything for the past 1-2 months will be lost" represents major expense/pain. Particularly in a medical setting.
It's not that there aren't solutions to that too, and yes I'd hope a big organization would cover it, but afaik it's not as easy as I wish it was. I don't think the challenge of malicious for-profit actors should be trivialized in the way you seem to have been doing. And the value function of computers vs crypto is astronomical, I don't think it's reasonable to equate the two as you originally did either.
Yes, it's difficult. Such is the world we live in. It doesn't make sense to blame cryptocurrencies for that, and not the people who didn't do their job. The existence of cryptocurrencies and of ransomware is something that was outside of their control. Their backup policy wasn't.
>And the value function of computers vs crypto is astronomical, I don't think it's reasonable to equate the two as you originally did either.
You misunderstood my point. That, in balance, computers are much more valuable than cryptocurrencies is a matter of opinion (which I agree with). A Luddite could argue that if the hospital hadn't been using computers for billing, the attack would have been impossible, and could have a point that using computers instead of paper ultimately created more problems than it solved. All that changes is that the technology being criticized was computers rather than cryptocurrencies. But both arguments miss the point that neither computers nor cryptocurrencies are the problem, but rather how they're used.
Someone competent intentionally doing as much damage as they possibly can is likely to exceed the damage from even the worst accidental fuckup.
I don’t think you grasp the hodgepodge of obsolete computer systems that are attached to computer networks to run lab equipment, MRI machines, process pharmacy prescriptions, and manage a patient’s chart. Keeping all of this secure and properly backed up is pretty much impossible.
Seriously, I’ve seen machines in use running everything from ancient versions of Sun Solaris to Windows 95.
Second, a ransomware attack isn't going to attack stuff like medical equipment, which wouldn't hold any important files anyway. It's going to attack workstations and servers likely running some version of Windows. If your IT staff can't keep that stuff backed up then you don't have IT staff.
Also regarding the servers and workstations, recovering from ransom ware isn’t as simple as just restoring from a backup. You’re still looking at days of effort restoring backups, reimaging workstations, and validating that everything works.
Yes, restoring a backup requires effort. But surely less effort than losing the data altogether.
> Seriously, I’ve seen machines in use running everything from ancient versions of Sun Solaris to Windows 95.
And yet the parking lot will be full of BMW and Porsches. There's definitely money coming-in; why not spend it on making sure the infra can perform when needed?
You could basically say the spirit of everything you're saying about banks.
Training can only do so much. People have no attention span these days, and all warnings go in one ear and out the other, even in they are well-intentioned people (as this employee was).
Do we need to legislate having big "FRAUD WARNING" signs on every gift card display, just like we need "do not use in bathtub" labels on hair dryers?
The market has provided these without legislation, at least near me.
Also the number of highly compensated tech workers who pirate software on the job. Guys, do not pirate shit at work!
Also: Companies, buy your employees software! It is super hard to talk an employer into spending money on software for productivity.