I would challenge the author to explain why is the extra layer of sandboxing a must requirement. Do we know the size of the problem? As in... how many known websites run malicious scripts with real intent to do harm, and how many sites achieve that goal?. Do we know how many users got hacked because the lack of sandboxing in linux when doing typical web browsing?
My view is that the article blows the problem out of proportion. Security relies to a great extent on user behaviour.
User A visits known domains only, and opens emails from known senders only. They only share card and personal details with known and trusted parties. They only install the strictly necessary apps and from known devs only.
User B visits any site regardless of domain. He shares email, phone number and card data at the earliest chance (ie when trying to buy illegal drugs from a clearnet shady store). He installs dozens of apps, often from unknown parties.
Regardless of OS, browser and other context, user A is going to be safe most of the time and it's very rare that they in serious trouble. User B is an accident waiting to happen...
If the above is true, maybe we don't need a technical solution like OS sandboxing. It would be more effective to create a standard for all browsers where the first screen you see is a big message saying: "Welcome to your 3 second online tutorial: Visit known websites where possible. Don't share your real personal details unless strictly necessary. Share details with known and trusted parties only. In case of doubt, don't trust the other party."