This is why it's funny to see people view the war in Ukraine as a "good guy vs bad guy". The geopolitics are incredibly complicated and there is a lot behind the scene the average person doesn't see.
Why? I mean you have a point about geopolitics. But it’s still about as stupid as someone saying the exact same words about Poland 1939..
You have a megalomaniac dictator waging an unnecessary imperialist war of aggression . That should make it pretty straightforward, no?
> a lot behind the scene the average person doesn't see.
the overall goals and interests of all sides seem to be pretty transparent to be fair
Yes, one that was raised by the KGB, and his work possible consisting of coordinating left wing terrorists in the west.
"That should make it pretty straightforward, no?"
Sadly no. Because his character and the general political ideas and red lines of the russian establishment were known.
Ukraine was russias sphere of interest/domain.
So the west going into ukraine, helping with the coup and promising them EU and NATO, while knowing that russia can never accept it - was a clear path to war from the beginning.
Would the US tolerate mexico become a china military ally? Doubtful. One of the unwritten laws.
The geopolitical realities are, that it was known that going into ukraine would likely lead to some war.
Which is why most of the world considers this war a proxy war between Nato russia. And it partly is.
But yes, it is also a war for independence of a small nation against an evil empire. But the empires in the west seldom care about the actual people on the grounds. They care for their interests. And currently ukraines and Natos interests are mostly aligned, which is why they get support.
If china suddenly becomes a bigger problem and now there would be a need to play Putin against them - then Ukraine would be on their own very quickly.
It is already starting now, with the west medias more and more implying that it was indeed Ukraine that blow up north stream. Whether they did it, or not: this is a way of showing them, they can change the narrative in the west quite quickly. War is dirty. And also Ukraine has lots of dirt on their hands now. Showing some of that dirt will make the public change opinion. This is geopolitics in action.
Exactly. The Ukraine situation would be tantamount to Canada or Mexico entering into a military alliance with Iran -- not acceptable and a direct cause of war.
How is it any different to Finland joining NATO? (which they just did).
(also true for border regions with finnland, but way less overall as finnish is a different language family)
Russian nationalism consideres Kiev the root of the russian culture (but they might change that narrative soon).
Also, they are really not happy about it.
I don't think a language matters with a war with NATO.
> Also, they are really not happy about it.
Yet there is no war, shows you that NATO really works as a deterrence to Russia and that it had nothing to do with Ukraine being close to Russia and in NATO.
It's not about pragmatism, it's a sort of nationalistic fervor!
I think they are just inherently unhappy and miserable because they are Russians living in Russia.
Also the only two things Russia has going for it are their energy resources and their nukes. It's a poor second tier/regional power without that (even with the oil/gas/etc. it still has a 2.5x lower GDP than Germany despite an almost 2x higher population).
That USA would in fact tolerate chinese military in mexico?
"It is up to you to reconsider or make yourself comfortable with Tucker Carlson"
And strong disagree. I don't have to make myself comfortable or align with any character or movement, just because most of the world wants only to think in black and white.
This is such a poor rhethorical question. Why play with hypothethicals like Mexico and China, if Europe already has direct Russian nukes in Kaliningrad enclave in the middle of Europe with constant threats of destroying Warsaw and London? And yet, that's tolerated, unlike what people like you suggest and imagine.
Relevant maps: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/23...
And the US diplomatic stance towards EU inofficially was something like "fuck the EU".
I also know how "the west" moved further east step by step. Which is in general very fine by me, as I do prefer living by western standards (and I was born in the east).
So I certainly would not stand in the way, if Ukraine wants to go pro west. If I would not have little children I seriously would have considered going to the war as a volunteer. So much for context of "people like me"
But that doesn't change one thing how the US plays this geopolitics game. Or our governments, sure. They are not better, just weaker.
Doesn't really change anything in the equation. Russian missiles in Kaliningrad can hit key US military installations like Ramstein AFB and RAF Lakenheath with practically no warning. They are a direct threat from a hostile country that keeps making threats about using them, this is far more serious than any imagined Mexican alliance.
And yet, the reaction is... what? Where are B52s bombing Kaliningrad?
>> I also know how "the west" moved further east step by step.
I am sure you do. Can you tell me why Russian apologists always phrase it as if a shadowy cabal in Washington forced countries into international cooperation, instead of portraying as it actually was?
Because it was verbally promised by different high ranking officials, that the NATO would NOT move further east.
This does not create trust.
Not according to the Soviet foreign minister at the time. He also explains why this conspiracy theory is nonsense: at the time when that verbal promise was allegedly given, no-one could even imagine that Warsaw Pact would cease to exist. According to him, NATO status of Warsaw Pact countries was not discussed with Western officials, not discussed within Warsaw Pact, and not within Communist Party circles in Moscow either.
https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-e...
Nor did you answer my question. Why do Russian apologists try to word this as NATO was somehow forced upon Eastern Europe instead of integration into international institutions being their own long-term goal?
And besides that, many years later, but months before former Warsaw Pact countries started official NATO negotiations, NATO and Russia signed a treaty that gave a green light.
So one one side of the conspiracy theory, you have a handful of scraps arranged to look like something, and on the opposing side you have actual written agreements and recollections from key people directly involved in those events.
And all present, past and future politicians in Germany, Poland, US end everywhere else are supposed to be permanently bound by what a former German foreign minister supposedly said before leaving office back in 1992.
Makes perfect sense.
Not surprisingly -- different participants have different recollections of what was said, and in what context. As a counterpart to the above, we also have Baker's assurances, made to the Soviets at the time “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place". And that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.”
Which certainly sounds like verbal promises that "NATO would not move further east". There is also Gorbachev's famous assessment of the whole matter, after the fact: “It [NATO expansion] was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990".
Not that these assurances had the status of signed treaties -- and not that any of this stuff in any way justifies, minimizes or "explain" the current conflict, which as we know has one aggressor and by this point is entirely one-sided.
But the statements above are part of the historical record -- not some conspiracy theory, or the inventions of Russian apologists.
Nobody brought the alleged assurances up when former Warsaw Pact joined NATO either. This narrative didn't exist until mid-2000, by which time NATO enlargement had largely ended.
The spirit that Gorbachev bitterly speaks about is his idea of "Common European Home" that did not come to fruition, as Eastern Europe didn't want to have anything to do with Russians after half a century of oppression and turned their backs as soon as they could choose their own path. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_European_Home
As regards Gorbachev -- what did he say actually, and when?
And why would he say the exact opposite in his RBTH interview in 2014? (Granted, this is RBTH -- but I think we can be reasonably confident that the interview is not a fabrication and that he is being quoted correctly). Here's his quote again, in full context - and it's clear he's not not referring to the Common European Home:
The decision for the U.S. and its allies to expand NATO into the east was decisively made in 1993. I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990. With regards to Germany, they were legally enshrined and are being observed.
If that interview leaves anything unclear, then Spiegel tried to get a "yes, assurances existed" answer from foreign minister Shevardnadze from several different angles, but he replied to every attempt with a "No."
Spiegel: https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-e...
By my reading, Gorbachev's later statement -- "definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990" (referring to NATO's decisive steps towards expansion starting in 1993) -- is more holistic, and seals the matter.
Not that there was "conspiracy" to hoodwink the Soviets from the beginning, per your straw-man argument. But still -- against the spirit of the statements and assurances made at the time, 'twas. Shevardnadze's statements might seem to contradict this, but not really -- Shevardnadze is focusing on the details; Gorbachev is talking about the bigger, "moral" picture if you will.
The facts are simple:
1. Possible NATO status of Warsaw Pact countries was never discussed.
2. There was no assurance from NATO to Soviet Union on possible NATO status of Warsaw Pact countries.
3. Key members of the Soviet leadership explicitly deny any such assurances.
4. Russia never brought up any such assurances when Warsaw Pact countries joined NATO.
5. Russia and NATO signed a treaty greenlighting NATO enlargement before any official talks with Warsaw Pact countries started.
What was discussed in 1990:
1. Integration of East German military into NATO structures.
2. Size and composition of German military after reunification.
3. Placement of NATO forces (that is, from the US, UK, and elsewhere) in East Germany.
This has nothing to do with NATO status of Warsaw Pact countries.
Placement of NATO troops (discussed) and potential members of NATO (not discussed) should not be confused.
Which can't possibly be the CFE - so which treaty (and which specific provisions of that treaty) are you referring to?
Your notion of "conspiracy theory" is plainly at odds with the commonly accepted definition of the term, BTW. But we'll move past that for now.
I see no conflicts with commonly accepted definitions of conspiracy theory: "a theory that explains an event or set of circumstances as the result of a secret plot by usually powerful conspirators" (Merriam-Webster).
How did former Warsaw Pact countries end up in NATO?
According to conventional understanding, former Warsaw Pact countries seeked political, economic and military security through cooperation in international organizations ranging from Council of Europe to NATO.
According to the conspiracy theory, NATO and Russia made a secret deal to divide Europe, but the USA did not keep their side of the deal, intentionally misled Russia and forced Warsaw Pact countries into NATO in order to encircle, attack and destroy Russia.
Official "invitations" to the first round countries (PL, CZ, SK, HU) were issued around 1997 -- but that's the last step in the process. Official "talks" began much sooner. Already the formation of Visegrád Group in 1991 (whose purpose was largely to get these countries ready to integrate into the EU and NATO).
Anyway by 1993 talk of these countries joining NATO was already all over the news (NYT: "Yeltsin 'Understands' Polish Bid for a Role in NATO").
So right there -- you're way off base. The Founding Act itself it pretty long-winded, but I'm not seeing any text that "greenlights" NATO expansion (other than by simply not mentioning the topic).
As to conspiracy theories: the whole point is, what you were referring to was a certain line of (dubious) argumentation or reasoning -- "relying on snippets of facts". Which is certainly very often an aspect of conspiracy theories, but nothing to do with the key substance of the term.
No one (except fully deluded Russian apologists by this point) believes in that particular theory you cite. I certainly don't, and don't feel I need to respond to any ridiculous insinuations that I do.
Anyway, look -- you're certainly quite adept yourself at pulling up snippets of fact. But across the board -- I'm just finding your thinking to be rather muddled; you extremify and hyperbolize a lot; and that you're just not seeing the forest for the trees (in addition to getting a lot of the "trees" themselves wrong). And as a result, this discussion just isn't very productive.
So I'm going to have to bow out at this point, and let you hash these topics over in the privacy of your own thoughts. Which is a pity, sort of (since it seems we would probably agree on a lot of basic things about this conflict that other people seem to be horribly confused about -- such as who the aggressor is, and why they started it).
But at the end of the day -- not really.
Not the last step at all. In July 1997, NATO invited Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to accession talks, to be correct. Talks began in September and took until 1999 to conclude. Full membership was achieved only in March 1999. Invitation to accession talks is by no means a formality or a last step.
>> Anyway by 1993 talk of these countries joining NATO was already all over the news (NYT: "Yeltsin 'Understands' Polish Bid for a Role in NATO").
... and that was considered as far-fetched as Ukraine's ambitions towards EU and NATO membership were in 2021. Something that everyone politely nodded to, but very few believed would happen in any meaningful timeframe. Russian army was still in Poland in 1993. Poland was in a socio-economic disaster then. Energy crisis, insane inflation and organized crime, inability to even pay government employees' wages, let alone participate in international organizations as an equal. NATO membership and American nuclear umbrella were mythical dreams at that time, often ridiculed in the press, as you will discover if you dig deeper into old newspapers. The tone changed during accession talks when it began to look like entry into NATO was really going to happen.
>> The Founding Act itself it pretty long-winded, but I'm not seeing any text that "greenlights" NATO expansion (other than by simply not mentioning the topic).
From the treaty: "To achieve the aims of this Act, NATO and Russia will base their relations on a shared commitment to the following principles: /.../ respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents;"
NATO established this clear understanding with Russia in writing before anyone was invited to accession talks.
>> But across the board -- I'm just finding your thinking to be rather muddled, and that you're just not seeing the forest for the trees (in addition to getting a lot of the "trees" themselves wrong).
The only ones trying to muddy things are those who ignore a decade-long political process in European politics and its huge bureaucratic trail, and try to give a simple alternative explanation that hinges on a handful of out-of-context quotes from Baker and Genschler, because there is nothing else to back it up. It's like quoting some overly alarmist NASA memo questioning radiation shielding of Apollo spacecraft, and using that to "prove" that the Moon landings never happened - ignoring the immense work that 400 000 people and countless institutions and companies all across the world put into it over a decade, and all the trails they left behind.
You have to throw away a decade worth of European diplomacy to subscribe to the Russian talking point about broken promises and encirclement.
I’m sure but I find that this description perfectly fits your reply or the comments you posted earlier.
That does not make it any binding international agreement, sure. But some of those words existed.
East in Germany,
Context is important, how could the German foreign minister ever promise anything about any other country?.
This was about easy Germany and never about anything else except in the fever dreams of people like Putin.
And on that note NATO has too this day kept its promise regarding east Germany even though the country the promise was made to no longer exists.
Who cares. Eastern European countries are sovereign and can do as they please if they consider it to be in their national interest.
> This does not create trust.
It goes both way. Trusting dictators under any circumstances is an exceptionally idiotic thing to do.
Also it might be hard to grasp however politicians in in charge to change every few years and beholding them to some “verbal promises” made by their predecessor is absurd.
The US invaded Grenada so for sure they would invade Mexico.
Also it’s hypothetical and and entirely absurd scenario barely worth discussing.
But I think I was clear that I have no illusions about Putin. He probably still dreams of a eurasian empire led by him. And he respects only raw power.
I still think, it could have gone all very different. For example by sanctioning the russian people in charge and not the whole russian population after 2014. Or not getting involved in Maidan. Or by not invading Iraq, setting a often cited precedent. Putin allmost literally saying: "If the US can just ignore international law and invade a country, so can I"
https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/t2mb0c/the...
I feel people bringing realpolitik into this fail to see the not-so-real politik of what happens when national sentiment is misaligned with their interest.
It's all a sham anyway, as if smaller countries are not worthy of self determination and are just at the whims of great powers. And a nauseous point of view.
And it's a moot point as well, considering that Russia is no longer a great power. Russia can barely keep itself together at the moment.
Which is the reason why they started the war in the first place. They feel cornered. And a smarter politics by the west, would not have pushed them so much.
But I am all for self determination of even the smallest states.
But I do not really see this as the goal or applied politics of the US, nor EU, nor obviously russia.
It can happen as a side product, like when the kurds were supported, when it fit the greater game and dropped when that changed. And now Ukraine is important and get supported and tomorrow that can change again. The determining factors are likely not idealism.
They put themselves in that corner.
> And a smarter politics by the west,
Like allowing Russia to take half of eastern Europe. If anything Europe was way to soft with Russia, they should started moving away from their over reliance on Russian gas in the early 2000s.
They already had it. And they gave up on it voluntarily. But they think they made a bad deal as it was simply considered a sign of weakness by certain hawks. So now they try the hard way again.
(obviously oversimplification, but the topic is full of it anyway)
You can't say they they gave up eastern Europe voluntarily when they didn't have a choice. They could handle a revolution in a single Warsaw pact country not in all of them at the same time and especially not at a time when the internal situation in the USSR itself was quite precarious.
> made a bad deal
What deal? There was a no deal involving entire Eastern Europe (how could there be?). What they did sign was the Budapest Memorandum which only affected Ukraine, Belarus & Kazakhstan. And they broke every single point of that treaty, except the one prohibiting the usage of nuclear weapons against any of these countries. In contrast the other signatories (US and UK) did not violate a single one.
"And they broke every single point of that treaty, except the one prohibiting the usage of nuclear weapons against any of these countries"
Second, much later.
Third, there were russian troops all over east europe. Lots of them. (I remember)
They could have smashed any uprising - but they choose not to. They choose democracy at that time. And it did not pay off for them, which is why they are back to authoritian. But there was a time when they were open for change. In my opinion, the west blew it.
Doubtful, unless you're talking about the soldiers choosing not to. The coup attempt in 1991 proved that the army in general had no interest in propping up the failing communist regime.
Even if they wanted to they failed to defeat Chechnya a couple years later despite it being smaller several than east Europe by several magnitudes.
> But there was a time when they were open for change. In my opinion, the west blew it.
Well most of Eastern Europe ended up doing just fine despite most of the 90s being a disaster there just like in Russia. So it seems like Russia actually blew it themselves (and well to be fair Ukraine and Belarus too).
> First, russia is not a monolithic coherent group.
Well I'm sorry but you're the one who keeps saying "they" and that "Russia wanted X" which implies that they are a single monolithic coherent group (then again one might argue whether that's really the case in Russia currently).
Explain what "smarter politics" means in such a context.
- not eroding and breaking international law by invading Iraq, setting a precedent cited by Putin
- not signing the Den Hague invasion act
- not getting involved in various "revolutions" in the east, like Ukraine
- not targeting all russian people with sanctions after 2014, but only those in charge
You know, in general leading by good example. If we want a international law forbidding countries to invade each other - it only works if the law applies to everyone. This I would consider smart politics.
> Would the US tolerate mexico become a china military ally?
US and China are global superpowers. Without the nukes Russia is a regional power at best.
> But the empires
What empires? Why do you think US cares about Ukraine that much, prior to 2014 it was a sideshow at best. They'd prefer to focus on the Pacific/China but Russia doesen't let them.
> If china suddenly becomes a bigger problem and now there would be a need to play Putin against them
How does that make any sense? Why would Russia side with US/EU if China hypothetically invaded Taiwan? Makes no sense...
> implying that it was indeed Ukraine that blow up north stream
Where do you get these things?
> they can change the narrative in the west quite quickly
Who is "they"? The illuminati? Lizard people?
This is what I wrote.
So I do not see, how you come to that conclusion:
"So you believe that the Ukrainian people are fundamentally incapable of making their own decisions. "
It's a simplistic viewpoint that misses a lot of factors.
You can't really understand the conflict, where it might go and how it might end if you don't under the history of the region, what drives each state, and what their aims are.
It's like saying "iPhone sells well because it's a better phone". That's true, but tells you nothing.
Sure let’s say so, please enlighten us…
> where it might go and how it might
You’re implying that Russia was planning to be in this position it ended up in all along. That didn’t massively miscalculate it’s ability to quickly defeat Ukraine with a decapitating strike?
> end if you don't under the history of the region
I do.
> It's like saying "iPhone sells well because it's a better phone". That's true, but tells you nothing.
Fantastic analogy. Really makes you think..
This war is as clear as WW2 if you don’t see that then I don’t know what to say, it’s plain as day to most people.
I'm not saying they were saints but they were on the same moral plane of the Allies, wishing to set up buffer states instead of absorbing them fully into the USSR. Political repression was a real issue in the eastern bloc countries but it's no where near as bad as what the US, France, or UK did in the post war period with their colonies, segregation, bombings, or coups.
You’re thinking about USSR of 1980s when political repression and some hair cutting was the main issue. But USSR up to mid 1950s was a tad more evil to say the least.
And „debunking double genocide theory“ is fighting a strawman. Let’s talk how USSR started WW2 along with Nazis. Let’s talk Katyn or Rainiai. Let’s talk gulags. Stalin’s purges. Early USSR social reforms and consequences.
Not really - it's quite straightforward, actually
and there is a lot behind the scene the average person doesn't see.
Such as?
Sometimes you're dealing with a Hitler, and you cannot deal with those in terms of "interests", and the interests of the dictator may differ from the interests of the state.
Such is the case with Putin. This invasion was not in the interests of the state. It was in his own interests, but he is dictator, so his interests win out.
Well a significant proportion (the majority?) of Russians don’t really agree with that and I bet there would be close to zero opposition to the war had Russia actually managed to win in the first few months.
Likewise very few Germans didn’t support Hitler when they defeated France and again there was basically no serious internal opposition until Germany started losing the war.
Very different situation from Russia/Ukraine.
That's a bizarrely absurd attitude.
> and invaded Germany first
So if Russia now invaded Poland or the Baltic States and France/US/UK 'attacked' Russia in response that would not be a justifiable thing to do? Because that's exactly what you're saying...
> France had treated Germany horribly
1. Yes. But that happened 20 years ago as a response to a German invasion of France (and Belgium but why would anyone care about the people that get caught in between...). And both countries were on a path towards reconciliation after Locarno. This does not make Nazi actions in any way more justifiable...
> a great casus belli
The world thankfully does not work like a Paradox grand strategy game...
They maintained the blockade for almost a year after the armistice (just in case..). A hundred thousand died in the famine and a generation of children suffered severe malnutrition.
Now maintaining the blockade during the war was understandable but maintaining it after the fighting was over just to get better terms? Well that’s something many people would find hard to forgive..
> France and Poland knew Germany was a belligerent nation, and in 1921
No it had much more to do with the Polish-Soviet war than with Germany. The Soviets were seen (and rightly so) as a much bigger threat to Eastern and Central Europe than Germany in the 20s