If you reduce subsidies for wasteful signalling, people will do less of it. Employers will then find signal based discrimination more difficult and expensive, and will reduce their dependence on it.
If you reduce subsidies for wasteful signalling, people will do less of it. Employers will then find signal based discrimination more difficult and expensive, and will reduce their dependence on it.
My point is: (1) this is not an issue we can decide without looking at the data and (2) making a claim one way or another without carefully looking at the data is not justified.
http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2a012/01/the_present_val...
Unless you believe human capital jumps massively between 116 credits and 120 credits, this is strong evidence in favor of the signalling model.
Another big chunk of the measured returns to education are merely ability bias.
http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2012/01/correcting_for.h...