http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2012/02/critics-slam-ss...
In short, at least one CA, Trustwave, has issued a "subordinate CA certificate" (which allows another party to issue certs which will be trusted as if they were from Trustwave) to a network admin who used it to create forged certificates and intercept SSL traffic on their internal network.
Anyone clever enough to create a DNS redirector that turns paypal.com into 10.0.0.2 on their closed network could also create an accompanying SSL certificate that they own for paypal.com and you'd be none the wiser as they proxy all of your traffic through their server, logging every bit of it.
The only way an attacker can redirect DNS for Paypal and have a valid-looking CA for Paypal is if they compromise a CA root certificate. That's the point of SSL/TLS.
Before you suggest "but we can't trust the CAs", note two things: (1) if you don't trust the CA, SSL/TLS isn't doing anything for you anyways, and (2) DNSSEC also has a hierarchical PKI in which you are required to trust commercial enterprises --- or governments, explicitly.
The same principle doesn't seem to apply for SSL in browsers where, so long as it's signed by a "trusted" authority, there's no question the certificate is valid.
There has to be a better way than this.