> Of those 1069 unique keys, about 30% of them were not discoverable on major public keyservers, making it difficult or impossible to meaningfully verify those signatures. Of the remaining 71%, nearly half of them were unable to be meaningfully verified at the time of the audit (2023-05-19) 2.

so...*reject those packages*. if you use a PGP key that isn't properly available or verifiable, reject it. That way every package with a PGP key will have 100% "key is properly discoverable" rate.

it's not really reasonable to just drop this feature because most packages don't use it. Packages with tens of millions of downloads (like mine) make up a small percentage of total packages, but this small number of packages makes up a huge proportion of actual downloads, and package signing is most useful for these kinds of packages.

if the adoption of "proper PGP keys" were ranked by packages/ downloads rather than "packages" alone, these rates would be much different.