Majority of EU countries support scanning of audio communications
euractiv.com
euractiv.com
I'm not supporting this but if it will happen I would prefer it happening openly within a legal framework.
I don't get the appeal for it being done by secret services instead of civil services. I guess it's about different relationship with the governments.
Yesterday I saw a tweet from Paul Graham calling European AI startups to pre-emptively move to the US because of some EU regulation draft, today top topics here are about OpenAI speaking with the US government trying to scare them into requiring licensing to work on AI.
Maybe the contrast between US/EU is not as stark as the narrative makes it appear.
Thing is: If the strategy is to have total surveillance based on an open legal framework then they should actively market it as that. I _might_ even agree with that. But given they're BSing us with "protect the children" I cannot help but see them as bad actors doing stupid/evil sh*t.
But I am not sure whether it is about jealousy of the US as such, but perhaps more about alleged or real fears about the domestic instability of the US, its commitment to Europe, and the shifting landscape in the great power politics game. Therefore, there are already open proposals to create a "European CIA":
https://ksr.hkspublications.org/2023/04/06/if-you-want-peace...
The EU is just catching up to the US:
On the other hand, I believe the EU has so much potential and is a huge benefit overall
I too went from pro-European to being mostly critical of it. That was years ago though. Some parts do good work, but these attempts are just overreaching.
The EU is no federation and it shouldn't be one. It would be governed by people like this that have basically no accountability. You can argue that it is just the governments of member states, but that doesn't make it any better. The vast majority are not accountable to you in any case.
Of course the EU has a democratic deficit. Although even wikipedia articles about that are already full of propaganda.
Best solution to the current dilemma is to put up technical realities that make such attempts unfeasible.
But it's just the executive branch of the EU itself- "A majority of the EU Council of Ministers". More or less, each government selects a minister to represent them in this council.
The article should really be reporting on how this bill is progressing. I am no legal expert, but I believe the EU parliament, which is actually elected, could reject it. I am not sure what happens if it is found unconstitutional in some of the countries concerned.
That's right; but note that the minister they select depends on what's being discussed. There isn't really a "Council of Ministers" you could list the names of; it changes for each meeting.
That is, the C of M is really a council of member governments. And what government wouldn't like to have the EU mandate maximum surveillance, so when their citizens complain, they can just blame the EU?
The general principle is that EU law takes precedence over national laws, including national constitutions. If a member state finds a law unconstitutional, they have a few options. They could try to convince everyone else to change the law. They could change their constitution. They could leave the EU. Or they could just ignore the law and face the political and financial consequences.
In some sense, the EU is no different from any other legally binding international treaty. It's a package deal, so you can't avoid the aspects you don't like. But because treaties are between sovereign states, it's always possible to leave them.
I am sure that we are not going to bring those to justice that create law that is found unconstitutional.
Well, someone has to take that job. But they shouldn't be listend to and I think these ambitions are clearly in violation of multiple constitutions. Although those that have exemptions for security are more or less worthless anyway.
Well, I'd be curious to see how widespread CSAM is altogether, and especially how much WhatsApp, Messengers, and others are relevant for abusers. One thing I know about this topic is that the offenders are mostly close relatives. The thing I don't know, but intuitively, I'd not think that a close relative would take the risk of sending compromising messages on the smartphone of the victim. Not denying it never exists, but what are the numbers we are talking about? As neutral as I'm trying to think, it's very very hard to see a genuine intention into what the EU is doing
I don't have stats off the top of my head, but it's possible, albeit labor-intensive, to make some inferences. Many child porn cases are prosecuted at the federal level because electronic communications are a kind of interstate commerce. By digging through PACER and similar legal databases, it's not too hard to build a corpus of criminal complaints. The really labor intensive part (although ML and other methods help to shorten it) is parsing the legalistic documents to extract information about which platforms most easily facilitate contact and negotiations between peers (CSAM enthusiasts) and targets (unwary kids preyed upon by unscrupulous adults).
It might also be possible to extract information on prosecutions resulting from a report or fortuitous discovery of CSAM-related activity, and that involving sting operations by law enforcement.
Law enforcement is only a tool for punishment of offenders, it in no way "protects children" because the offense has already occurred.
Anecdotal example, but this is seems to be the opposite of wanting to "protect children": https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-05-06/high-risk-paedophile-...
This shows an ignorance of how law enforcement operates in this space. Sometimes it is retroactive as you say, but often it is preemptive. For example, cops sometimes go looking on social media platforms for people soliciting CSAM, strike up a relationship, and talk people who take the bait into a physical meeting, at which point they pull out the badge and a warrant and examine the target's phone for evidence of existing possession. Another approach when potential crimes are reported (eg by a parent who discovers someone attempting to seduce their kid) is to silently take over the victim's role in the conversation and lure the would-be predator into a meeting, at which point the cuffs come out.
Anecdotal example, but this is seems to be the opposite of wanting to "protect children"
Yes, but what of it? This is a fallacy of composition, which assumes that failures or perverse legal outcomes are all part of some twisted masterplan designed to strip away freedoms. It's just cope, like the arguments in the wake of mass shootings that they are all secretly engineered by the FBI, based on the fact that the FBI or other law enforcement agencies sometimes fail to act on warning signs that seem obvious with hindsight.
Regarding #2, I'm in no way conspiratorial about it, but it's a single data point in the opposite direction, which points to a lack of resources or a well thought out over-arching plan to solve the problem. None of that is conspiracy, it's reality, but it's also embarassing to 'policy', and should be pointed out as such. (I'm in no way saying they're trying to encourage, not at all).
Offenders only ever do it once?
What's interesting is that recently privacy advocates have thankfully also recognized that "think of the children" can be a legitimate argument, and have been using it to fight against horrible solutions. But we really have to move past this and find better solutions, it can't be this endless tit for tat as "both sides" wind up losing.
As big of a problem as CSAM may be, failing to acknowledging that tech can't be the sole solution has to be either a sign of malice or incompetence.
It has always without exceptions been a moral panic encouraged and nurtured by established interests to support their urge for more and more control.
Please think of the children
Oh well
The EDPS recently said that under the Charter, the infamous “Chat Control” would always be illegal in the EU: https://www.euractiv.com/section/law-enforcement/news/eu-wat....
https://aboutintel.eu/ctivd-bulk-datasets-held-by-intel-need...
https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/2023/luxembourg-busines...
This is the case that shut down the public access to Companies House registry, as oligarch’s handyman was complaining access to companies ownership data violates the privacy of his businesses. Might be a net loss for the society in this case.
This could have normally be considered an idle comment.
Unfortunately, in today's world it has become part of a rule: "when any trend emerges, ask yourself: what could possibly go wrong".