ChatGPT, Dall-e, etc all make assumptions about identity or politics but try to sidestep direct requests around those topics to appear more neutral... but the bias still exists in the model and affects the answers.
In the case of ChatGPT, I’d love to know how much of the bias is in the original (pre)training data, and how much is due to OpenAI’s human trainers.
It is so careful to avoid every bias which is condemned as unacceptable in contemporary American culture, yet at the same time displays blatant American-centric bias - ask it a question, it will often just start answering by assuming you are an American. I realise a lot of that is due to the bias of the training data (the US has more fluent English-speakers than any other country in the world), but OpenAI obviously put a lot of manual effort into fine-tuning it to avoid racial/gender/etc biases, they don’t appear to have put anywhere near as much effort into fine-tuning it to avoid US-centrism - probably because they have a big blind spot in that area.
OpenAI didn't just fine-tune it to avoid blatant racial/sexist/etc content, they openly claim to have invested a lot of effort in fine-tuning it to avoid subtle biases in those areas.
And to be honest, a lot of people do feel "put off" by poorly localised products – I am annoyed by software that defaults to US Letter and inches and I have to manually change it to A4 and metric, or which has hardcoded MM/DD/YYYY date formats. ChatGPT gives me the same feeling. Sometimes one just has to endure it because there is no better option.
Under international law, "racial discrimination" is defined to include "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin..." [0] – so US-centricism may fit under that definition.
[0] International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, article 1(1). https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/...
Under Australian discrimination law, "national origin" means your country of birth, or the country of birth of your ancestors. [0] The Australian definition is (at least in part) derived from English discrimination law, as decided by the House of Lords in a 1972 case. [1] I believe the usual definition in international law is the same. "National origin" is related to "nationality/citizenship", but unlike the latter it is fixed at the time of birth – subsequent acts of naturalisation, renunciation or deprivation by change one's nationality, but they cannot change one's national origin.
I can't find a precise legal definition of the term under US law, but some US legal definitions appear largely identical to the Australian/English definition, see e.g. how District of Columbia law defines the term [2]
> Anyway, no matter how annoying seeing feet and inches may be for some users I don’t think it will have the same effect as the AI praising Hitler.
Well, as I said, OpenAI didn't just train ChatGPT to refuse to praise Hitler, they also went to a lot of effort to tune it to avoid subtle bias against certain identifiable groups. What I'm talking about isn't the same as the former but is clearly related to the latter
[0] Macabenta v Minister of State for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1643; 90 FCR 202 https://jade.io/article/116118
[1] Ealing London Borough Council v Race Relations Board [1972] AC 342 https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff8c960d03e7f57ecd6...
[2] https://ohr.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ohr/publicat...
> Laws prohibiting national origin discrimination make it illegal to discriminate because of a person's birthplace, ancestry, culture, or language. This means people cannot be denied equal opportunity because they or their family are from another country, because they have a name or accent associated with a national origin group, because they participate in certain customs associated with a national origin group, or because they are married to or associate with people of a certain national origin.
"Term of art for race or ethnicity" may be a crude gloss on that but I don't think it's really inaccurate.
The closest thing in this brochure to what you're talking about is that in certain cases people have a right to an interpreter but I find it highly unlikely that any court is going to find it discriminatory if you spell it "color" instead of "colour" or use "football" to mean gridiron football.
> Laws prohibiting national origin discrimination make it illegal to discriminate because of a person's birthplace, ancestry, culture, or language. This means people cannot be denied equal opportunity because they or their family are from another country...
The parts I've italicised are exactly the definition of "national origin" discrimination in Australian and English law. From what you are quoting, the US definition includes the Australian/English one, but also goes beyond it.
> I find it highly unlikely that any court is going to find it discriminatory if you spell it "color" instead of "colour"
Courts don't just decide whether something is or isn't discrimination–they decide whether it is illegal discrimination. Not everything that meets the bare legal definition of "discrimination" (on some prohibited ground) is illegal – something may meet that definition, but nonetheless still be legal, because it is justifiable, or the harm it causes is insufficiently serious, or it is permitted or required by some other law.
I doubt any Court would uphold a discrimination case based solely on English spelling differences – but that's not because spelling is per se outside the definitional scope of "national origin discrimination" – obviously it is an aspect of the "culture, or language" part of the definition you cited. Rather, I expect they'd rule that even though it is discrimination, it is legally permissible discrimination, either justifiable by the unreasonable expense of doing otherwise, and/or because the modicum of harm caused by it is too trivial to merit intervention by the legal system.
But what counts as illegal discrimination is not really relevant here, because OpenAI has spent a lot of resources on trying to remove certain subtle biases in their AI models, which arguably goes well beyond what they are legally required to do. I'm criticising OpenAI's decisions, but I'm not claiming they ought to be prosecuted or sued over them. I'm simply citing legal definitions as informative as to what words mean, even in a context which goes beyond the strictly legal.
We are talking about the behaviour of a de facto oligopolist, not restaurants of which there are thousands in any major metro area.
In the long-term I think this is going to be far less of an issue. Who cares if a US-built AI has a (particular kind of) US bias if there are dozens of other AIs available, of similar capability, several of which come from different countries and so likely have a different country-bias instead.
Also, OpenAI's marketing/PR – and even actual product behaviour – makes a big deal out of being "less biased", "ethical", "non-discriminatory" – so it makes sense to hold those claims up to critical scrutiny – relatively few restaurants make those kinds of things part of their branding.
So, people from other countries have constitutional rights, and e.g. the same rights of entry to USA?
I mean the USA Constitution seems like it give rights to people, and not just citizens, but...
My point, I guess, is that it seems discrimination is baked in, so those absolutes are not as absolute as they appear.
But "strict scrutiny" is not an absolute bar on discrimination, it just means the government has the onus of convincing the Supreme Court that the discrimination is necessary to obtain a "compelling state interest". Even though US immigration law obviously discriminates against non-US people on the basis of national origin and "alienage", the US government has never had any trouble convincing the Supreme Court that immigration law serves a "compelling state interest".
That's a point a lot of people don't get about discrimination law (whether statutory or constitutional) – discrimination per se is not illegal, even on protected grounds. Rather, discrimination is illegal when it lacks a sufficiently compelling justification, with the strength of justification required depending on how strongly protected those grounds are.
Reads to me like there is no way to win it for openai, there is going to be people complaining.
I use it a lot for code, and at times to summarize research on certain topics, but never run into any weird feedback, so depends on your usage.
Even as indirect discrimination, I'm not claiming it rises to the level of being legally actionable – but when OpenAI tries to eradicate subtle bias from an AI model, that's got nothing to do with legally actionable discrimination either, since it would be unlikely to be legally actionable if they decided not to invest in that.
I think one problem with this topic, is a lot of people don't understand the difference between "discrimination", "unethical discrimination", and "illegal discrimination". Some discrimination is both illegal and unethical; some discrimination is legal yet unethical; some discrimination is both legally and ethically justifiable. But many just blur the concepts of "discrimination" and "illegal discrimination" together.
Canva is a fantastic design software. If you type “business card” in templates, it has the standard us business card size but no European one. If you modify it to European sizes manually (closer to credit card size) it no longer recognises that this is a business card and no longer offers to print it on business card paper.
In other words, despite the service being available in Europe, and the service offering business card printing, it does not offer European business card printing.
There isn't a single European business card size, there are three different standards [0] – Western Europe (except for Scandinavia) is mainly 85 mm x 55 mm, Scandinavia is 90 mm x 55 mm (which is also used in Australia and New Zealand), while most of Eastern Europe is 90 mm x 50 mm – all three are different from the US/Canada standard size of 88.9 mm x 50.8 mm, although the Eastern European size gets pretty close (1.1mm wider and 0.8mm shorter).
How realistic is it if one says, "Hi, Bing. I'm from East London, please talk to me like you would to another East Londoner." Or is it obnoxiously stereotypical?
I imagine, properly trained, that is something LLMs would excel at, communicating with people in their preferred mode of communication.
I'd bet it's almost all in the human trainers, because LLaMA 65B, the closest uncensored alternative, doesn't have the same US Silicon Valley Democrat biases as ChatGPT.
Q: The professor told the student the essay couldn’t be review because he/she was late. Who is late?
Depending on the pronoun, you’ll get, respectively, "the professor" or "the student".
Sometimes GPT 4 says that the sentence is ambiguous, but as I explained above, it isn't really, but that takes a lot of understanding of the review process.
I note it is now "ChatGPT May 12 Version". Maybe they've fixed this example of bias
You can also ask ChatGPT to "write an essay about a man" then about a woman, to reveal bias.
I tried that one too. The content was different in each case – "Balancing Masculinity and Vulnerability" for a man vs "Nurturing and Compassion" for a woman – so definitely some gender stereotyping going on, but it wasn't clear if overall it was more favourable to one gender than the other. The cultural bias in that output was rather obvious.
I think OpenAI has been trying to remove some of the more obvious cases of political bias they added to ChatGPT. In the beginning, it would immediately oblige for "write a poem praising Joe Biden", refuse for "write a poem praising Donald Trump". Later, it would comply with both requests – but for the Biden request it would just do it, Trump's poem would be preceded by a disclaimer. In the current release, it just writes the poem for both.
The purpose is not to make it impossible to generate bad content. The fact you generally only see 'when I prompt it in this specific devious way, ChatGPT can tell me how to make napalm' posts, not 'when I asked it how to clear weeds in my yard, ChatGPT told me how to make napalm' posts is a success.
It's suppression.
Alignment works on the level of desires and intentions.
Suppression works on the level of output.
Everyone in a dictatorship sings in praise of the dear leader, but most will defect when given the chance!
Presumably they are also constructing the prompt so as to avoid those things, too, and adding external filters on top of that. But I doubt that’s all they’re doing.
Correction: ChatGPT, Dall-E, etc., all have been trained with datasets which contain biases about identity and politics, and specifically to avoid criticism on that basis, their corporate vendors have chosen to also have each either trained (e.g., as part of RLHF for ChatGPT), instructed (via prompting beyond what is entered through the AI), or moderated by an auxiliary model, or a combination of those, to sidestep those topics to appear more neutral in substantive output, while in some cases also producing bland platitudes direct at soothing the position from which the criticism of AI models and the danger of their substantive bias has been most frequently directed.
I don’t think extremist AIs are a big risk because almost surely they will be vastly outnumbered by the non-extremist ones
Society does this every day and people think nothing of it if the hardware is a fentanyl lab or a uranium enrichment facility.
There's a big difference between laws preventing you from doing those things in the privacy of your own home, and laws preventing you from entertaining or expressing certain ideas or beliefs in the privacy of your own home. Freedom of thought, freedom of belief, freedom of expression, are generally understood to be fundamental human rights, while "freedom to synthesise fentanyl" or "freedom to enrich uranium" are not. Software is ultimately a form of literature (that's where its protection under copyright law comes from), and hence is directly connected with freedom of expression; AIs are ultimately just software too, so the same applies to them.
Because that’s communicating with a third party, no longer limited to the privacy of your own home. Fraud, extortion, etc, go beyond the bounds of accepted free expression.
> Thus I don’t see why it would be unbelievable that training or inference of large language models might, plausibly, be limited in some way by law.
What’s the fundamental difference between training an AI to generate propaganda and generating it by hand? If freedom of expression protects the latter, why does it not protect the former too?
> If freedom of expression protects the latter, why does it not protect the former too?
It’s legal for me to achieve altered states via meditation; why is it illegal to use LSD? Arguably it shouldn’t be, but it is. It seems like methods matter, even when it comes to expression.
False in the US - in the 2002 case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court ruled that “virtual child pornography” is protected by the 1st Amendment.
True in some other jurisdictions, including my own country (Australia). However, I think Australian laws on this topic go way too far - in Australia, people have been convicted of child pornography offences purely for publishing offensive remarks about child abuse victims. While I agree it is wrong to make such remarks, I think it is massive overkill to prosecute them as child pornography.
I'd love to see a cite to the Court case on this - while I don't doubt that you've heard this it does sound an awful lot like a Sky 'News' after Dark pearl clutching misrepresentation of an almost but not quite actual event.
I have no sympathy for the defendant, who is absolute scum of the earth. But, as a matter of principle, I don’t think it is right that posting an offensive Facebook comment is legally the same offence (“producing child exploitation material”) as filming heinous crimes against children. If they’d prosecuted him for harassment instead-he’s currently facing trial on harassment charges against the same victim-I’d have no objection.
> A former teacher at a private girls school in Hobart will return to jail after describing a sexual relationship with a former student as "awesome" on social media.
It's the after that does a lot of lifting there, but it's certainly not "because". The article specifically notes:
> Nicolaas Ockert Bester, 63, has been sentenced to four months in jail for producing child exploitation material.
and I have a certain suspicion that his comment attracted attention resulting in charges based on fresh unearthed and "off book" evidence - off book in the sense that it was discussed in Court but not made public due to small towns and personal details of those involved who may now still be under age.
(ie. he's been at it again and that's not being reported to keep eyes from what is likely a small circle of potential victims)
I'm not trying to pick a fight here but there's often an information gap in cases involving children here in Australia, in my opinion largely for very good reasons.
Here's the appellate court decision, from his failed appeal – https://austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/tas/TASSC/20...
Unless the appeal court is suppressing the real story (an idea I find unbelievable), he was literally convicted of a child pornography offence on the basis of nothing more than making an offensive Facebook comment:
> In late February 2015 the applicant was involved in an on-line Facebook discussion about a political issue... In the course of that exchange, the applicant posted the following comment:
[I'll omit it, but you can find it quoted in the judgement, and the media appears to have filled in much or all of the "Offensive words omitted" part]
> The writing of that message constituted the offence for which the learned magistrate sentenced the applicant to 4 months' imprisonment. By creating that message, he contravened s 72A(a) of the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Enforcement Act. That provision reads as follows: "A person must not —
> (a) make or reproduce child exploitation material; or
> The words that the applicant wrote constituted material that described his former student, a person under the age of 18 years, in relation to their sexual activity, in a way that a reasonable person would regard as being offensive. His comment therefore constituted "child exploitation material" as defined.
This isn't what you call "Sky 'News' after Dark pearl clutching misrepresentation of an almost but not quite actual event" – it is literally what happened.
And as I said, Bester is scum, but the principle of the matter is concerning. The law, as drafted by Parliament and interpreted by the Courts, seems rather over-broad. And while this case was about Tasmanian state law specifically, laws in other Australian jurisdictions are rather similar.
I read you linked and was published by the court in full, as you also read it you'll note there are references to unpublished material
( you wrote:
> I'll omit it, but you can find it quoted in the judgement, and the media appears to have filled in ...
whereas the court noted:
> 3. "Zip up (etc...)" [Offensive words omitted.]
ie: the court left out portions of what was posted. Further:
> 7. the Mercury newspaper reported the applicant's comments in part ...
> 25. some of the words written by the applicant were not published by the Mercury .. Those words will be redacted when these reasons are made available for publication.
)
I agree that on the face of things it appears as thought the judgement has been made exclusively on the fact of the offender commenting on a prior case.
I disagree that this is as simple as "conviction for describing underage sex as Awesome on Facebook".
It is laid out at length that the offender had previously preyed upon the person he made comment about, further that these later comments caused further duress to that same victim, and reference was made to his prior conviction (which carried stringent terms about staying clear of underage girls in general and his prior victim(s?) specificly, associating with others of the same ilk, and avoiding patterns of prior behaviour, etc.)
This is not a case of "some average Australian" making comments about underage sex on the internet - such things happen daily.
This is a specific case of an actual prior offender making public utterances about a former victim after a conviction that included a jail term and behavioural advisories. *
( * I assume on the grounds that similar cases in Western Australia's children court include strong "stay the F. away from your victims" conditions )
I would find this concerning if this was a case that saw a random citizen charged, I don't find it concerning that these specific set of circumstances were bought under consideration and after deliberation a prior offender has been given a message that this kind of behaviour is not okay.
Real life is rarely clear cut and the law constantly has to deal with edge cases.
His prior criminal acts, the impact he had on his victim, etc, are all relevant to (2) and (3), but not to (1).
Regarding (3), I honestly don't feel very comfortable with the idea "let's have massively over-broad laws, but trust prosecutors to only use them against people who really deserve it". Should I put that much trust in prosecutors? My uncle is the second most senior prosecutor in Victoria, and from what I know of him, I honestly believe his heart is in the right place. On the other hand, just this last week Shane Drumgold has been giving everyone a rather poor impression of himself. But, putting personalities aside, in principle, I just don't like it. Maybe some degree of it is inevitable, but I feel like in this area of law we've taken it much further than we ever should have.
If they had criminalised convicted sex offenders publicly defaming their victims–I wouldn't have a problem with such a law, or with him being prosecuted under it. That would be a narrower law, vastly more defensible, vastly less concerning.
But by the letter of the law under which he was actually convicted, he would have committed the exact same offence if he'd just written that comment in his private diary, with no intention to ever show it to anybody. Now, if that was the scenario (let's assume they found his diary in a search), quite possibly the police/DPP would have decided against charging him – but there's no guarantee of that. In the event they did charge him, the sentence would have been significantly more lenient. But the actual criminal conviction would have been exactly the same.
The idea that mere writing words in a private diary is the same crime as filming the actual rape of children – including the former in the offence seems (to me) to belittle the heinousness of the latter.
And I'm not comfortable with the idea that a person can commit a crime just by putting words in their private diary – even if they are absolute unrepentant scum like Bester – as I said, it is about the principle, not the worth of the person to whom it is applied.
I practically agree in the probabilistic sense. I don’t think I’m willing to categorically dismiss moral relativism, but I find it very unpersuasive at best, delusional in most cases, and dishonest at worst.
Here’s one reason. Say you find a person who claims to be a moral relativist. It is always possible to present them with an ethical dilemma where they have to choose. Doing nothing is a choice. Their choice will reveal their true (hidden) morality, which is certainly not completely relative.
There is riposte to this — one that I find hard to believe — where the person says e.g. “of course I had to make a decision, but that doesn’t mean I think it was morally better.” How can one resolve this? Is it reasonable to take the person at their word? It seems to bottom out at questions of sincerity and conscious awareness of fundamental ethical behaviors that are clearly deeper than the conscious brain.
I suppose one can offer up an ethical system that claims to stand independently of biology. If so, I’d like to see it. And show me some people that will live according to that code and genuinely suggest that their loved ones should too.
I'm not a moral relativist, but I think invoking moral relativism here is somewhat beside the point – even if it is true that morality is (somehow) objective, that doesn't mean every moral dispute is resolvable in practice. There are plenty of factual questions which are impossible to answer – for example, what was Julius Caesar's last meal? Most people assume there must be an objective answer to that question, but nobody alive now knows it, and odds are we never will (speculation, guesswork and imagination aside). Well, in the same way, even if it is true that moral questions have objective answers (I for one believe they do), there is no guarantee we can actually know what the answers to all of them are.
Given that, it is reasonable for society to permit people with different moral views to coexist, rather than trying to force everyone to live by the same morality. Of course, there are certain moral issues on which society as a whole needs to take a side – the wrongfulness of murder, for example – but there are plenty of others on which it doesn't have to do so, and probably better not. I think, when it comes to questions of discrimination (on the basis of race/gender/etc), it is good that society seeks to prohibit it in public settings (government, the education system, the workplace, public accomodations, etc), but trying to outlaw it in private is a road to totalitarianism, and that's true even if private discrimination is objectively morally wrong.
Sometimes, an act itself can be morally wrong, but trying (too hard) to stop other people from doing it may also be morally wrong. It is wrong to be rude to your family for no good reason, but it would be even more wrong if the police started arresting people solely for doing that.
> I suppose one can offer up an ethical system that claims to stand independently of biology. If so, I’d like to see it.
You are assuming a materialist philosophy of mind. If a person believes in idealism (as in Berkeley or McTaggart), there is no particular reason why they should expect objective moral truth to be ultimately grounded in biological facts. Scientific theory is famously underdetermined by the evidence, [0] and I think that is true of metaphysical theory as well – there is a lack of empirical evidence to decide between materialism and idealism, and I think the widespread perception that the evidence somehow favours materialism over idealism is mainly due to a failure to take the latter seriously as an intellectual option.
[0] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermina...
Finding the appropriate response is key, in policy, as in individual action. Response to an undesirable behavior need not (and typically should not) be blunt or "zero tolerance". There are a wide range of better responses / interventions.
Policies (whether before-the-incident precautions or after-the-harm responses) can be evaluated both in terms of (a) moral intent and (b) moral outcomes. Ascertaining intent of a collective decision (often requiring some kind of voting or consensus) can be theoretically impossible and often practically impossible.
But when it comes to moral outcomes, there are warning signs that suggest an immoral policy: (i) lack of a targeted impact; (ii) poor benefit / cost ratio; (iii) disproportional response; (iv) high sensitivity (as in "sensitivity analysis") to imprecise or unknowable information; (v) serious unintended consequences; (vi) prioritizing ends over means
Moral relativists can have moral beliefs. They simply recognise that these are their own (very strongly held) opinions, rather than a reference to a universal moral code (like say, the Ten Commandments)
There are various flavors of moral relativism. My comment criticizes one flavor of moral relativism without specifically identifying that I was criticizing meta-ethical relativism. I rewrote it in a sub-comment.
> Descriptive moral relativism holds only that people do, in fact, disagree fundamentally about what is moral, with no judgment being expressed on the desirability of this.
> Meta-ethical moral relativism holds that in such disagreements, nobody is objectively right or wrong.
> Normative moral relativism holds that because nobody is right or wrong, everyone ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when large disagreements about morality exist.
> Said concepts of the different intellectual movements involve considerable nuance and aren't absolute descriptions.
Quotes from Wikipedia [1], even though I prefer the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [2] for more detailed explanations.
[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism
[2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/#ForArg
> moral relativism is intellectually bankrupt
There are three forms of moral relativism (see my other comment).
I agree with descriptive moral relativism in a sense, even though I think practically there are huge swaths of overlap between most well-known ethical/religious systems.
I don’t think I’m willing to categorically dismiss meta-ethical moral relativism (MMR), but in practice, I find it unpersuasive at best, delusional in most cases, and dishonest at worst.
Say you find a meta-ethical moral relativist (MMR). You present them with a set of hypothetical moral dilemmas. They will claim there is no objective ethics to guide us.
I accept this as a philosophical position; however, if that person were immersed in the dilemma and had to choose, they will choose. (Note: doing nothing is a choice.)
Their choice will reveal their “private” morality, which is certainly not completely relative. That person won’t agree with any ethics that say it is ok to kill them (under a scenario where they have done nothing wrong) for example. If it was a real situation, they would use various means at their disposal to protect their life: fleeing, fighting, or negotiating.
So, while perhaps the MMR person claims that it is ok for an ethical system to endorse killing them, but they would act differently from that belief.
prescribing moral importance to training set bias is also intellectually bankrupt
Sure, it's hard to defend. But we embody it nonetheless. We're emotional creatures, we lack logical consistency in a fundamental way.
... and "AI's don't really understand" as people say
So, in the end, is anyone/anything capable of reasoning? Probably only humans in their specific fields of expertise. Even then, we are often updating our reasoning patterns in light of new discoveries, upturning previous reasoning.
99% of the time humans are just GPTs with hands and legs generating untrustworthy logic.
Which moral absolute would you put in its place?
Like the classic: "In this company we make decisions based on data, so let's use my data."
Yes, and "we" here is Silicon Valley Democrats, whose ideas of virtue doen't align with those of most other people in the world.
a request to draw a banana will, necessarily , bias the results towards slender yellow fruits.
a lot of the taught biases are hopelessly simple , so problems arise. A lot of the problems being witnessed now seem more like problems that arise from the inexperience in dealing with these systems to me.
personally speaking, witnessing the teething issues of the current day AIs raises the question within myself as to whether or not 'thought without bias' can even exist on anything more than the must superficial levels.
Honestly, that might be the most human trait they have.
Why? Because language and ideas have different life cycle than humans. LLMs are closer to language than humans. Both humans and language are self replicators and evolutionary systems, that is why they can be easily confused as the cause for certain behaviours.
It's also why I don't attribute to GPT the merits for its skills and abilities, I think this belongs to the training corpus. And certainly you can change the model but keep the same corpus, and get similar results. Humans are all different - different number of neurons wired in a different way, GPT is different from T5, but all learn the same. It's the language, not the model (or the human).
We can also stop wandering at the abilities of AI and think of them as the abilities of language, that both humans and AI can use. It's in the name: language models, not human models.
BTW: having coding and computer use abilities, LLMs are also emerging as self replicators. They can generate the code, and if needed they can generate a training set as well, including the RLHF part, and monitor the training run. They can explain the model and methods and propose ideas for improvement, ideas they can test. So LLMs can be self replicators, they need nothing outside to create a new LLM (just a prompt and huge compute).