1. Default-DENY firewall policy mandates the admin being a DNS protocol expert and often requires a refresher (of own volition or ego-checkingj.
2. Gateway Firewall blocked the incoming response UDP of authoritative record transfers of secondary authoritative DNS. Firewall admin goofs often and delay discovery of DNS outage is often the result due to poor network error logging
3. Bastion (one kind of the split horizons) DNS server over multiview DNS is ALMOST always preferable in security theatre.
4. Forgetting to disable Firefox’s DoH after full DNS block at border gateway. Used Firefox policy for corporate and HomeLab network (during cutover from public resolvers to internal homeLab/corporate resolver).
5. Private DNSSEC root servers, setup of (in case of root DNS outages)
6. Negative cache resolution by TTL, balancing the
7. cache spillage prevention of internal corporate DNS records being exposed
8. Mastering resolv.conf (especially against incoming replacement by systemd-resolved)
Most still hit me 10 years later despite re-reviewing my private DNS HOWTOs. Some of above experiences that I have posted on my website by DNS topic [1].
Website caveat: Still not sorry that Google Chrome still cannot HTTPS-negotiate for HTTP/1.3-only (ignore HTTP/2) with just only the ChaCha (no AES/RSA) algorithm. Use a different browser, that’s my firm security stance. (Most corporate firewall should be blocking HTTP/2 until their transparent HTTP proxy have been upgrade to handle HTTP/2 because its inline selective blocking within a HTTP/2 TLS stream is still a thorny hurdle.)