Thank you. I've been trying to figure out what they hell they are and have been unsuccessful. I thought it was just me.
As far as I can tell: it's a system of private keys stored on devices, in order to transmit a key you also need to unlock a device (e.g. phone) with some other method like a PIN or fingerprint/face scan. Combine those two things and it means a would-be hacker would need both the physical device as well as the local authentication for that device (PIN or biometrics).
What happens if user loses the only device on which passkey was enrolled?
If this is a Google Service, then that means begging, pleading, threatening, crying like a baby, then finally posting a rant on HN to get the service unlocked.
Google is fairly infamous for making it near impossible to recover lost account access, or appeal bans.
I have an account that I’m never getting back. I made an error, when setting it up, that resulted in me losing the password (I saved the wrong one, in 1Password). It’s been a few years, but I remember trying everything to get it back, and was stymied at every turn.
Eventually, I gave up. The reason I registered the account, was because it was the name of one of my corporations, and I didn’t want fraudsters registering it.
Mission accomplished. Ain’t no one using that account.
Yes!
> What about desktop machines with no fingerprint sensor or faceID?
You can use a PIN, your login/screen lock password, or an external device offering a fingerprint sensor.
> What happens if user loses the only device on which passkey was enrolled?
You can either sync passkeys to an online account and across multiple devices, or use multiple passkeys stored in multiple physical authenticators.
But all of that has to be set up in advance, right? What happens if I really only have a single passkey, associated with my phone, and then lose the phone?
Not all authenticators are going to have backups enabled (even ones which are backup capable), so these are really meant as hints so that a website (a la Relying Party in the spec) can guide the user to a proper experience. For instance, if you use a hardware security key fob, they may recommend you keep your password and SMS enabled as options, so you can get in even if you lose it.
But if you have this and the old authentication methods, doesn't that greatly reduce the security gains of this? I mean, the old methods still exist, so what you've done is increase the attack surface.
You don't have to use the latter, you can store your keys wherever you want.