It seems like a very, very bad thing to store both your passwords, and TOTP codes in the same tool...
It seems like a very, very bad thing to store both your passwords, and TOTP codes in the same tool...
If you are using a strong random password generated from 1PW you've already mitigated against that threat. TOTP isn't buying you much additional security. So for most folks it is just fine to store you TOTP seed in 1PW.
Unlike TOTP, passkeys _do_ buy you additional security in their phishing resistance. So you should always prefer passkeys/fido2 keys to TOTP if that is an option. Its still fine for most users to use 1PW as your passkey storage.
The only argument I can imagine is that if someone gets ahold of your phone it's either locked and they can unlock it or it's unlocked, in which case either your 1pw account and/or other TOTP apps are either locked or unlocked. In the worst case scenario where everything is unlocked, having a separate app is negligible.
Besides, AFAIK Google Authenticator doesn't require additional unlock steps, unlike authy or 1password.
You're better off worrying about how to avoid TOTP and securing 1password than about having TOTP codes stored alongside your passwords.
Why isn't TOTP buying much additional security?
It seems to me that apart from password reuse it's mitigating many other potential problems: keyloggers leaking passwords from your device, passwords leaking from the authenticating server, etc.
The only good solution is WebAuthn and related technologies (phone passkeys for disaster recovery), so that server side needs nothing more than a public key.
But lets say you are in fact a user that gets targeted by an adversary capable of deploying a key logger against you. Does TOTP protect you? No! If you are compromised to that point, the attacker is also in a position to just hijack your sessions.
There isn't a threat model out there that is trying to solve the problem of "my end user device has been compromised but I still want to be able to use it to access sensitive systems without those systems being compromised."
I use Authy instead, which also backs up TOTPs.
I'm also having the same thoughts about Google Auth: my email (Gmail) is a big target for gaining access to the rest of my digital life, and putting 2FA in the same hands seems risky. I'd need to do more evaluation to consider leaving Authy.
Storing both on 1Pass is not as secure, but the option is that once in a while you misstep and spend a week restoring TOTP setup (or lose entire accounts because your service provider has no functional customer support) then I'm amenable to stable but less secure options.
Yes. It defeats the purpose. But whenever you mention it, you will get lots of replies with plenty of hand-waving why this is still better and why it doesn't matter "much".
If you go to the effort of doing 2FA, do it right. Two Yubikeys, and a reasonably decent TOTP app (Authy qualifies as "reasonable") for those sites that do TOTP.
There are many non important accounts where I have 2FA, and both the password and the TOTP is in 1p. This should suffice for any brute force password attacks. However there are some accounts (like google) which one can consider more important for which I keep the TOTP on a separate app like Authy.
More recently I've been switching to yubikeys where possible.
I keep my 2fa backup codes in my Keepass safe. Where else will I keep them?