US to start training Ukrainian troops on Abrams tanks within weeks
airforcetimes.com
airforcetimes.com
It would be best to arm Ukraine to the extent required (missiles, planes etc) to reclaim all their territory vs reactively doing just enough to keep them in the fight.
The trouble is: it's impossible to know ahead of time what's enough. It's doubly difficult because Russia gets to react to what NATO and friends do (e.g. with additional mobilization).
I do agree, though, that it would have been a lot better to have gotten to this place right away.
Honestly, though, the real thing that the Ukraine needs is way more artillery ammunition. And no one in NATO really has a lot of excess that they're willing to part with. Or much capacity to create more.
If NATO could give Ukraine 20 million rounds of 155mm per year, that would substantially improve their prospects. And it wouldn't be the same sort of "escalation"[1] that aircraft or long range missiles might be.
Edit: artillery -> artillery ammunition
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1. IMO, the escalation theory is overblown. But enough people believe it in the US that it causes problems getting those kinds of equipment to Ukraine.
Citation needed here. What happens is, western governements are shipping older, but good gear to the Ukraine, and ordering shiny new as replacements.
There is no reason to presume the same is not valid here.
It makes some sense to provide small arms -> light support -> progressively bigger weapons systems. It is worth remembering that at the beginning of military aid to Ukraine, there was a large chance they might have suddenly capitulated. In that event, anything you send would have immediately fallen into not-Ukrainian hands.
We are 14 months in now.
There's no reason we shouldn't have gotten some of their pilots started in a training pipeline months ago.
The first is that it takes a long time train soldiers on complex weapon systems and the entire logistical supply chain required to support and maintain those weapon systems. Giving someone a weapon system without this makes the weapon system nigh useless to them. Look at how long it takes for American soldiers to become rated on new weapon systems.
The second is that weapon systems are designed to fit a specific war doctrine. Most weapon systems will have greatly degraded effectiveness deployed outside of the context in which they were intended to be used. US builds weapons for the way the US expects to fight. One of the reasons there is a shortage of artillery and related munitions, which is critical in Ukrainian doctrine, is that the US and many other NATO countries don't need much artillery and therefore don't have much of it nor the ability to manufacture vast quantities. And it is not feasible for Ukraine to radically change their war doctrine at this point such that NATO weapons would be more fit for purpose, it requires years of preparation to do this.
Basically, the US but more broadly NATO can't easily supply a war that is being fought the way the Ukrainians are fighting it because their militaries are not equipped to fight a war that way.
They don't fight exactly according to US doctrine, but they don't not either.
[0] https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2022-04-07/ukraine-c...
For purpose of discussion, does that include Crimean and Donbass?
That's pretty easy to stop - I'm sure NATO has already told Ukraine that an incursion into Russia proper would mean an end to military aid.
Really though, all we're waiting for is Putin to die from old age, or lose his hold, and then Russia will decend into anarchy.
Which will end the current threat, but open up others...
This means that anyone close to Putin, is likely lacking in capability, or perhaps more importantly, the ability to lead and drive loyalty.
Weak leaders fall fast, if they try to pick up the sceptre.
This isn't slashot. People don't need personal trolls here. Is there any reason you're following me around?
In this case if Ukraine & Russia arrive at some kind of a truce, its likely a low level conflict (fought through online misinformation /cyber warfare /border shelling) will continue. But it also won't be this full scale war
Probably because this it the real goal. Ukraine is a pawn.
Also the defense industrial complex sells more shit in a long conflict than a short one.
If they continue the war, it will be difficult for them to hold onto power for more than 1 failed offensive.
There will always be a group of people that want the war over, not for peace reasons necessarily, but for economic(and political or personal reasons). A new dictator stands on a shaky ladder. They need to have a successful offensive quickly or they will be replaced.
> Being an anti-war activist in Russia is dangerous. Rights groups say there have been more than 16,000 detentions across the country for anti-war actions.
That's 16000 as of last September, by the way. Thousands more since.
But you can go on Youtube and find people doing interviews in Russia. It's pretty clear to me that the war continues to have substantial popular support among Russians.
Is it a majority? Who knows. But it's not difficult to find people who are strong supporters.
For all those other regions on the planet, the Great game never ended and is in full swing ever after. For them the WorldWars were a colonial power internal affair, and now its "our turn to become the king of the hill of skulls". The history and injustices of 2 worldwars is just a justification to go into battle for them.
Its bleak, but our reality altering screams never penetrated that mindset.
There are more protests against the war in Ukraine now, than there were in Russia in 1915, and the Russian people eventually overthrew their czar over that.
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/767/do-not-go-gentle
(Disclaimer: contains recordings from Russian police stations...)
An invasion of Taiwan on the other hand would have a huge and immediate effect on our lives. We could in an instant be cut off from Semiconductors and would likely respond with a trade embargo with China who makes everything.
The occupation of Ukraine signals Russia's intention to do the same with other countries they occupied in the past (Poland, Romania, the Baltic countries, &c) which are now part of NATO.
If you think Article 5 should be honored, then it does make a difference.
None of those countries have ever been officially mentioned as the "red line" by Russia, except Ukraine. Article 5 doesn't apply to Ukraine, and it doesn't allow for preventive military measures on non-alliance territories just because "there's a signal" somewhere outside.
a. Ukraine's will to resist
b. NATO's will to supply military arms
c. Russia's will to continue the operation
d. Russia's economy
Of those, I'd bet (d) fails first.
Nazi Germany (which was economically mobilized for total war) showed you can only keep the economic house of cards going for so long. And the Russian economy is not the German economy (then or now), nor has mobilized for wartime.
It looks like it's doing okay, and the Russians loudly claim so and point at the Chinese and Indians buying crude and gas, but we'll see how long the veneer of "okay" lasts.
None of which was happening anywhere close to US borders. In finance they say that past performance is no guarantee of future results, but you're eager to bet everything you have on this war outcome nonetheless.
Yes it did, you're arguing against basic facts.
Are we calling Iraq and Afghanistan losses? Sure would be great if we established a liberal democracy in Afghanistan, but it seems like after Osama was killed, Americans mentally declared victory and we were just burning money and lives.
Iraq had their leader overthrown and a new government established. Its really hard to call that a loss, even if it wasnt a perfect liberal democracy like we want.
Neither came out great but both are stable, Iraq is not destabilizing the region and Afghanistan isn't harboring people who want to attack the west and have the capability to.
That said, we never should have invaded Iraq and we probably could have accomplished what we accomplished in Afghanistan and more had we more seriously pursued diplomatic options in 2001.
Throw in some shock and awe on Taliban forces if we wanted to make more of a point, I suppose.
The mood in 2001 was one where diplomacy was impossible short of unconditionally handing over everyone in Al Qaeda to the US.
That wasn't an unreasonable request all things considered. We should have tried much harder to get the Taliban to accept that deal. They needed to look like more legitimate government with a stronger grip on power. We needed Al Qaeda. It should have been an easy deal to make. Marketing it would have been harder.
We've made the same deal a dozen times before. It's not like we didn't have the playbook ready to go. All we had to do was translate the end user guides from Spanish and replace "commies" with "Al Qaeda". Obviously the details would have needed to be hammered out but it's not like the precedent wasn't there.
Perhaps not for the country, but it could be for Putin. It's dangerous to make a man with the nuke codes desperate toward the end of his life.
You always talk about the nukes because it's all you have left.
Western leaders will never bow to the nuclear threat because doing so means Russia/China can get their way in everything if they just use the nuclear threat.
I talk about nukes because I believe it's the biggest danger the world faces and have for a long time. I grew up in the shadow of the cold war being drilled on how to hide under my desk when the missiles came. Far before Ukraine I was mystified by everyone's ability to forget that threat still exists. It seems possible and even likely to me that nuclear catastrophe will come before and be far greater in magnitude than any AI or climate catastrophes, for me it overshadows every other threat. Apparently I'm not the only one that perceives a threat: https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/
The chain is even longer then the higher ups decision to actually launch a nuke though.
Would you press the button to nuke another country knowing that doing so will very likely kill your entire family and you?, or would you ignore the order?.
This isn't reddit - we strive for a higher level of discourse here. "Upvotes / downvotes" mean "good contribution to the discussion / not good, ad hominem, rude, etc." And the above comment is an excellent contribution.
I want someone who actually has a good grasp of foreign policy, strategy, wargaming, geopolitics, etc. to answer this. I too want to understand how America arming and training a Ukrainian man to fight Russia is so strategically/diplomatically different from an American man fighting Russia. The degree of indirection seems so minor, how is it so different from direct engagement? Why/how does Russia/U.S. not treat it like direct engagement? I don't understand.
The episode where the Russian jet sprayed fuel on the US drone? Standard cold war tactic that was very common in the 80s. Russians have been ramming and harassing US vehicles for decades. Here's a video of Russians harassing a US convoy of sorts in Syria a few years ago: https://youtube.com/shorts/hSGv02qQfhQ?feature=share
Both sides have been flagrantly arming and training opposing factions in these proxy wars for decades as well. Modern Ukraine looks a lot like a reversed Vietnam, actually, and the US never declared war on Russia for that either.
Neither side wants direct confrontation with the other, so they play games like this. Ukraine is a bit tame compared to the other recent/ongoing proxy wars. The flashpoint is that it's happening in Europe, which makes every move very public and sensationalised, and adds more pressure to the situation in general.
So most of this talk of "violations" and escalation is in some sense naive, because the actual red lines have been carved in the sand outside of the public eye over the past half century. What we understand as a clear escalation is often just par for the course in the minds of the people involved in these conflicts.
> we strive for a higher level of discourse here
I am not ashamed. TexanFeller's comment is not contributing to the discussion, he fearmongers with nukes to advocate for the subjugation of a country.
It could just be that it's his honest opinion, but I've seen too many similar comments always using whataboutism and/or nuclear fearmongering.
I have concerns about going to war with a nuclear power therefore I'm pro-Russia and wish for the subjugation of Ukraine? Obviously manipulative and ridiculous framing.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_Agreement
We didn't do anything when they annexed Georgia and Crimea and here we are. It's certainly concerning.
That's exactly what Russia was counting on. Should we (by we, I mean the rest of the world) just let them annex whatever land they want, with no consequences or resistance?
There's no "whatever land". The war is going for a particular land with particular significance to Russia, similarly to Panama's significance to the US [1]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_invasion_of_Pana...
As Putin himself said, Russia has no borders, so the orcs' goal is to subjugate everyone.
What history does Russia have in Romania (it still occupies Transnistria)?
What history does Russia have in Crimea (orcs only became the majority because of the execution/expulsion of the natives https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6a/Ethnic_P... )
> similarly to Panama's significance to the US
Why is it that Russians are the most jingoistic "Americans"? Whenever someone points out what Russia is doing, they immediately praise the US for doing a lesser version of the same thing.
If there's a similar significance does that mean you'll leave Ukraine afterwards?
> What history does Russia have in Romania (it still occupies Transnistria)?
It has the same common history with Carpathian Ruthenia land that Ukraine isn't willing to return to Hungary and Romania.
> Whenever someone points out what Russia is doing, they immediately praise the US for doing a lesser version of the same thing.
That's to show you that double-standards exist and that nobody seems to care as long as it serves their agenda.
Yeah why is it our problem?
Assuming you believe in honoring the alliance, it's a lot easier to provide Ukraine with ammunition than to let it fall and have to send American troops to fight in Poland/Romania/etc.
Chile and Iran were egregious examples of the US sticking our oar in.
It’s been over a generation of peace, so people have forgotten them.
For instance the ukraine and russia war is a proxy war for the USA but is not for russia, as russia is fighting.
Soviet pilots fought in Korea and Vietnam (to a much lesser degree). There are stories of Soviet special forces, infantry instructors, etc. participating in Vietnam as well. Vietnam received tons of anti-air missiles and systems, not to speak of the fighter jets, tanks, guns, and more.
The US trained and armed fighters in Afghanistan. It wouldn't surprise me to learn US special forces popped in from time to time.
Those are more well known--especially the Korean War and Afghan war shenanigans--but there are many others that are more obscure.
The US, UK, etc. funded and trained a number of independence and / or revolutionary movements in the Eastern Bloc and China. The Baltic states, for example, had some level of guerilla war for a bit until the Soviets cracked down.
The Soviets, of course, funded all sorts of, shall we say, interesting characters in the West.
More recently, Iranian forces fought against American forces in Iraq. Syria has seen the US and Russia square off in a few incidents.
The question in my mind is: what level of support is too much support? How do we reason about that?
What level of support deters additional territorial conquest? Does territorial conquest in and of itself increase the risk of Armageddon?
This is the sort of thing I'd expect to see in some Cold War era RAND Corporation white paper.
I worry we have lost some of our Cold War worries in the public consciousness. Being the top dog for so long has made us feel invincible.
But I also think we've forgotten that the Cold War was cold, not frozen, and there are valuable game theoretic discussions to be had or revisited
The Abrams is powerful but it's expensive and logistically difficult to operate with jet fuel and trailing supply vehicles designed for a modern American army.
I'm most interested in the hundreds of Bradley's and other IFVs showing up.
Yeah, yeah, defenses, and I agree. The last time the Nazis and Soviets fought over it, ~250k casualties resulted (I think).
It's a hell of a choke-point.
But 31 Abrams is just about enough to do it, right order of magnitude in the least.