Boeing 737 Max production hit by a new defect
seattletimes.com
seattletimes.com
It's probably a form survivor bias: https://www.scribbr.com/research-bias/survivorship-bias especially when news media is involved since they amplify sensationalism in hopes to generate ad revenue.
Glad to see it's under intense scrutiny and problems are being identified, addressed, and fixed, just sad not all planes get this much attention. It's not like every other manufacturer is perfect and nails it every time with riveting success.
It's not a safe plane. It's a set of bad compromises which has cost the company more than designing a safe plane from the start.
[0] https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/646497/flying-blind...
This is not an issue with media, but the thing that this plane was designed using shortcuts, cost cutting mind and with as little oversight as possible. Si it is logic for so many defects to show up .
Remember that the persons that were giving the certification to Boeing were it's own employees...
Just now imagine that they had to rush to find acceptable hacks to be able to have their plane back in service. The fastest possible.
For christ’s sake, this level of hyperbole is completely unjustified.
A supplier found a non-safety-critical flaw in a component they were manufacturing. It’s being fixed for new planes, and a plan is being devised to retrofit a fix on existing fleets. What more do you want?
Yes, the earlier issues with the MCAS and single AOA sensor were tragic and highlighted serious and inexcusable deficiencies within both Boeing and the FAA. And yet, since resolving this issue, the 737 MAX has returned to service with an exemplary safety record.
Flying on a 737 MAX—even including the fatal crashes due to MCAS—remains quite literally the safest way to travel by both time and distance.
Chill.
That said, MCAS is a reasonable solution to a genuinely crappy problem. The 737 MAX is for all intents and purposes a reasonable refinement to an existing widely popular airframe. And yet, in chasing reduced fuel consumption through larger, more efficient engines, the handling characteristics changed enough that it would otherwise have forced airline pilots to undergo expensive retraining to fly on the new model.
So here’s your options:
1. require customers to retrain their pilots on the new revision of the airframe 2. launch the plane with a higher rate of fuel consumption 3. launch the plane with a system that makes it handle like the older model in the few regimes where it’s meaningfully different
Keep in mind that the first two options put you at a significant disadvantage to your primary competitor. Which option do you choose?
Are you claiming there are no safer planes than the badly designed ones that killed a bunch of passengers recently?
I am claiming that flying, even if you choose to do so exclusively on 737 MAXes, is still by an enormous margin safer than any other mode of travel.
There are 2,698 A320neos in service that have been involved in two fatal accidents, with no passenger fatalities.
The first was when an A320neo struck a motorbike that mistakenly entered the runway during the aircraft's landing. The two riders on the motorbike were killed and no passengers were injured.
The second incident was when an A320neo struck a firetruck that mistakenly crossed the runway during the aircraft's takeoff. Two firefighters were killed and no passengers were injured.
Boeing 737 MAX: 1,144 built, 346 passenger deaths.
Airbus A320neo: 2,698 built, 0 passenger deaths.
There are multiple aircraft types that have had 0 passenger fatalities. There is one aircraft family that is not only statistically safer than the 737 MAX, but also safer than the entire 737 family: the ERJ.
The A320neo sprang to mind instantly but I looked it up and the Dreamliner is safer with 1,048 built and 0 passenger (or other) fatalities.
Your statement is completely false.
Ludicrously false.
Maliciously and purposefully false?
I was sloppy with my wording, no need to assume I’m trying to deviously manipulate people into flying towards a fiery death while I twirl my mustache.
Note that I am considering the combined safety record of the 737 MAX both pre- and post- MCAS fix. You are also correct that before this issue was resolved, this model compared poorly against some modes of travel.
Now that it’s back in service, it’s slowly converging toward the same hull loss record of other modern airframes. We have no reason at this time to suspect that retrofitted planes or newly produced ones will fare any worse than other contemporary models.
while the defects were present
Boeing is still working on a proper MCAS fix…
This tragically happened to an airbus flown as American 587 shortly after 9/11. It crashed into a neighborhood in New York City after it encountered wake turbulence from another jet and one of the pilots responded too aggressively with the rudder. Truly a horrifying incident.
Parenthetically I don’t recall whether this was a training issue, a software issue, or a pilot error. Accordingly, I don’t want to sound like I’m slamming the pilot.
On the other hand I’ve seen a B-52 lose just about the entirety of its vertical stabilizer and it didn’t seem to care at all; landed safely.
It was a design issue, which many people like to blame on the pilot because they don't know any better.
The problem was that the rate-of-change of control-force per rudder angle is/was negative for that particular Airbus model... which is generally known to lead to PIO (pilot induced oscillations). When I say generally known, I mean it has been documented since at least as early as pre-WWII NACA (the precursor to NASA) studies.
In fact, that's what led to the installation of MCAS on 737 Max's: The FAA requires that, for the elevator (but not rudder), the control force should increase as deflection increases. So Boeing tried to simulate that behavior with elevator trim + software.
In other words, MCAS was a bad, hacky "solution" to a problem very similar to what happened on AA587 (but for pitch instead of yaw).
> On the other hand I’ve seen a B-52 lose just about the entirety of its vertical stabilizer and it didn’t seem to care at all; landed safely.
Yea, but a B-52 probably has more elevator authority than most commercial airliners (both because it is meant to go supersonic and need to deal with Mach tuck and because B-52 is expected to shed some "payload" while airborne). The problem is that the vertical stabilizer weighs a ton and is waaaay out at the end of the fuselage, so it really throws off your weight and balance if it falls off.
My limited knowledge about the BUFF is that if you achieve supersonic flight in one, you are _definitely_ doing it wrong.
My impression of what the purpose of MCAS is for has, accordingly, not been influenced much by your comment.
As an example; this could be as minor as using a riveting tool that hadn't been inspected on the correct schedule but was still operating as expected. It could be far more serious; perhaps that riveting tool was operating at a dangerously low pressure resulting in a poorly attached vertical fin.
We don't know yet. If this had happened before the 737 Max debacle I would have complete trust in Boeing's and the FAA's assessment that "...that there is no immediate safety issue.”. As it is I can't help being a little skeptical, that loss of trust is a real shame.
As an example; this could be as minor as using a riveting tool that hadn't
been inspected on the correct schedule but was still operating as expected.
It could be far more serious; perhaps that riveting tool was operating at a
dangerously low pressure resulting in a poorly attached vertical fin.
No immediate safety issue pretty much means what it says. Planes aren't likely to be falling out of the sky today, but given enough time things will likely fail.