Nothing in the link you provided contradicts anything I've claimed. Some of it contradicts
your claims, though. It confirms that Toyota has been working on EVs, plugin, and hybrid simultaneously over the last 25-30 years but they thought hybrid was the correct strategy to lead with, and again, it made them a market, and nobody has any idea why you think that was somehow a
bad plan for the two decades it sold them a lot of cars.
And if you wanted to support some not-complicated just-wrong point, you should have picked something else, because Hollis is correct about many of their points in that article. Definitely regarding practical concerns surrounding refueling for many use cases / markets on a 2019-2024 horizon. And the author's closing paragraph where he basically insists the charge-at-night what-else-is-there-to-think-about use profile fixes all concerns makes him look as narrow as someone insisting fuel cells really should be taking off now any day now.
Hollis's statements about EV demand are also essentially correct circa 2019. "No demand" overstates the point, but he's entirely accurate for his market when he says "demand for electric is less than it is on hybrid." 2018 and 2019 were the first years EVs really started to look competitive domestically and they were still lagging hybrid sales substantially (we're only now getting to the point where EVs sold are basically at parity with hybrids).
And even there he's openly saying EVs are part of their roadmap but that they intend to follow demand, not try to lead it.
If there's something Toyota was wrong about demonstrated by the article, it was their bet they could lead the market to pick up on the advantages of fuel cells like they led the market to gas-electric hybrids. I'm not even sure they were wrong about the advantages, but clearly they weren't able get the market to follow them.
If that's what "they just got this one wrong, it's not complicated" really looks like to you, tell me some more areas in which I can bet against you.