It’s an “operation” in the mathematics sense, but it’s not an operation in the imperative sense. It doesn’t
do anything (ie it doesn’t have an effect), it is part of the description.
Let’s step back from “if” or “filter”. Suppose you have a basic primitive definition “book”. If you’re to define a taxonomy of types of books, you might start with “fiction” (or “non-fiction”, but this terminology kinda gives away where I’m heading). Okay, so a definition of a book which is fiction might be:
fiction-book:
book &
factual-constraints: none
So far we have entirely static definitions (at least within a universe that book-like things need no distinction). We don’t even have to define what could be assigned to factual-constraints.
What happens when we try to define non-fiction? We have to define factual constraints it might have.
non-fiction-book:
book &
factual-constraints: all
There are some implied conditions here, and we could just stop there. If you have a book and want to know whether it is non-fiction, you
must evaluate its non-presence in sets that don’t conform to full veracity (let’s be generous here and pretend non-fiction is honest, and omniscient).
But let’s go further, and define so-called “hard science fiction” books (ie there are aspects which might be imaginary but only if the imaginary aspects are conceivable without disputing known facts, I know this is imperfect but I think it’s good enough for the purpose of this discussion):
hard-scifi-book:
book &
factual-constraints:
all - known-impossible
Uh oh, that’s an operation! Have we started imperatively defining types of books? Nope. We’ve declared how they’re defined, without specifying their inputs, and without affecting them. To the extent the definition itself is correct (exceptions already acknowledged), the definition will always be correct because it’s a tautology.
But you can’t have the definition without those conditions, because a definition is a tautology. And that is the tautological definition of a definition.
What would make it imperative is if:
- the thing itself might change, and so the determination of its definition might change along with it
- the determination of its definition might change, and so its previous definition might have been invalidated
If neither of those things are true, all of the conditions expressed in definition are declarative.