The more important question of disclosure has to do with the so-called "held-to-maturity" book, which I want to start affectionally referring to as the "held-to-mortality" book, or the "head-in-the-sand" book.

These are all fancy ways of talking about accounting tricks that banks are allowed to employ in order to hide economic losses from their financial statements. Banks would argue that their accounting tricks are blessed by the priesthood of professionals accountants, so it's perfectly legal. Which it is. It is not obvious that real-time mark-to-market accounting would have made things any better, but pretending that massive economic losses were not real was not a sustainable trajectory as soon the accounting fiction (no losses) collided economic reality (the need to sell holdings, in order allow depositors to withdraw their cash demand deposits).

Given the panicy herd psychology of humans, it has long been argued (at least since as long as the collapse of Lehman Brothers) that "head-in-the-sand" accounting is preferable to mark-to-market in order to ensure the stability of the financial system. In laymen terms, sometimes it's better for the public not to know how bad things have gotten behind the scenes. That is a kind of common sense practice for governance, and it isn't going to go away. Ironically, the answer to the SVB collapse is that you should have less informed, less rich and less well connected depositors (i.e. tame and docile customers) if you want to reduce the risk of a run on your bank, which is obvious in retrospect.