What is the shortfall once all the assets of the bank are sold though? It's not like anyone is putting $150B into this to make sure those deposits are made whole.
Everyone seems to be operating under the idea that while their liquidity came into question the underlying assets were and are strong-- if that were true they would have found a private sector solution early in the weekend. Waiting until 6pm on Sunday and a second regional bank collapsing to announce "oops, all bailouts!" seems like an open admission we're in the early stages of another banking crises.
Problem is they're just not even a good investment compared to brand new fed bonds / bills of short / long (might have that backwards) due to the now MUCH HIGHER interest rates. They locked in at historically low rates, and had a bank run on their free reserves.
I see some correlation between SV remote working and COVID, but don't understand how mortgage backed securities play into this. Are you suggesting higher inflation on the way, lower property values, higher rates, and that it was intentional?
One does not follow the other. The triggering problem here were unmatched maturities of assets and liabilities, i.e. liquidity crunch. They have created that liquidity by selling some assets at a loss and tried to recoup that loss from investors.
But that was not the problem. The problem was now-imminent bank run, potentially requiring up to ${total-deposits } liquidity injections and unclear future then. Once VCs told their portfolio companies to pull out svb was effectively toast.
Once the situation evolved from stage 2 to stage 3, the liquidity hole expanded from ${gap-in-maturities} to roughly ${total-deposits} and that is only to contain immediate issue, fixing books would have possibly required additional capital.
You are probably right, a bigger bank with liquidity could have saved SVB at stage 2. However, the situation evolved from stage 2 to stage 3 too quick for any meaningful deal to take place while still in stage 2.