First Republic, other regional bank stocks sink after failure of SVB
cnbc.com
cnbc.com
Perhaps they should require your consent to invest your money in illiquid assets. If they can't promise depositors liquidity they are cheating on their obligation in hopes seek a higher interest rate (profit).
In this case it's not just a case of the depositor's money being tied up in illiquid assets, it's that the asset's market value dropped so that they're worth less than the deposits. This is slightly different than just the assets being "illiquid", because if were only illiquid, you can presumably pay off your depositors once a sale can be arranged. In this case even if they were able to sell the bonds, there won't be enough money to pay back the depositors.
>Perhaps they should require your consent to invest your money in illiquid assets. If they can't promise depositors liquidity they are cheating on their obligation in hopes seek a higher interest rate (profit).
That's... basically how banks implicitly work and one of their core functions (maturity transformation).
They’re deflecting blame. A bailout is unrealistic given the House. And there is no contagion to the systemically-important banks. VCs should have advised their founders to adopt reasonable treasury procedures. Instead, they funnelled them into an easy solution.
Who, realistically until now has had “bank goes bust” on their risk list?
“Crypto exchange goes bust”, almost a certainty, but “major bank goes bust”, I don’t think it’s reasonable to criticize for not having five distributed bank accounts.
Which is not even true because it is a tiny no name bank. Prior to this debacle if you asked an American to name a bank nobody would have said SVB.
That said, I sympathize with your broader point. With hindsight, it would make more sense for a company to have a brokerage account, and do something like invest their cash 1/3 each in 1-month/2-month/3-months Treasuries, rolling over every month.[1]
But most tech CEOs/founders of tiny startups probably don't know much about finance, and I can't really blame them for just putting their cash in a large bank.
[1] There's a startup opportunity to build this product right now, a pure custodian-style cash-management "bank" for small companies.
These products already exist. That is why I mentioned IntraFi (https://www.intrafinetworkdeposits.com/) and MaxSafe (https://www.wintrust.com/maxsafe.html). There are standard cash management accounts, https://www.moneycrashers.com/cash-management-account/.
> But most tech CEOs/founders of tiny startups probably don't know much about finance, and I can't really blame them for just putting their cash in a large bank.
Completely agree. But this is exactly the type of area VCs should be there to assist with, even if just purely for self interest.
> There's a startup opportunity to build this product right now, a pure custodian-style cash-management "bank" for small companies.
Again, these already exist, and are literally called "cash management accounts".
Also, though, it wasn't just SMBs. Roku had nearly $500 million, a quarter of their cash, in a plain old SVB bank account!! Why they wouldn't put more of their money in 3 month TBills earning nearly 5% is beyond me.
I do have sympathy for 20-something founders who were too young and unaware of these risks, and focused on other aspects of their business, but this is not a “hindsight only” kind of thing.
Every corporate treasurer. This is a core function of a CFO. I didn’t realise the degree to which this was missing in Silicon Valley so soon after a global financial crisis.
I am in awe of how aggressively stupid VCs are being about this:
https://twitter.com/htaneja/status/1634620603469647873?cxt=H...
Silicon Valley Bank has been a trusted and long-time partner to the venture capital industry and our founders. For forty years, it has been an important platform that played a pivotal role in serving the startup community and supporting the innovation economy in the US.
The events that unfolded over the past 48 hours have been deeply disappointing and concerning. In the event that SVB were to be purchased and appropriately capitalized, we would be strongly supportive and encourage our portfolio companies to resume their banking relationship with them.
In other words, they're going to keep doing the same stupid thing, more vigorously.
For SVB it was tiny. I'm guessing other banks it is bigger but idk
The comment section on hn makes this seem like it was obviously risky to bank with svb but to everyone making treasury decisions, it looked to be the same as banking with any significantly old and significantly large bank. They are very large, publicly traded, regulated like everyone else, have their assets primarily in us treasuries and all fdic member banks have the same insurance policy.
There really can be a run on other large banks, svbs balance sheet wasn't upside down unless you marked to market their hold to maturity assets. If people start withdrawing you have to sell those and you get exposed and all of the banks are holding us treasuries that are worth a lot less due to rapidly rising interest rates. If people start withdrawing from other banks they get exposed too.
https://twitter.com/commbankerguy/status/1634637082659364866
1. Red flag if cash as % of assets or deposits is below 3%. Meaning can they handle a withdrawal of up to 3% or is cash tied up in bonds.
2. Red flag if tangible capital is under 4% after looking at bond portfolio as % of tangible capital (this one wasn't totally clear, but I think get the idea).
3. Red flag if over 20% of liabilities are brokered deposits and/or funds borrowed from FHLB. If the bank is not well capitalized those funds become restricted/unavailable.
Also:
High concentration of consumer deposits is less likely to face destabilizing run.
For example @commbankerguy says:
"If 50% in brokered/FHLB and capital level of 5%, I would recommend you move your money if over $250k." https://twitter.com/commbankerguy/status/1634764850126520320...
@Citrini7 shorted $SIVB in late 2022 after marking their holding to market and finding their book value was negative. https://twitter.com/Citrini7/status/1583593158738612226?s=20
Then this dude created an SVB recovery analysis that is legend:
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/13OyOLDePh85Wna5xcyTi...
Why would 2023 lead to you do that if 2008 had not?
I don’t think SVB has ever had an investment-grade (EDIT: issuer) credit rating. Certainly not in the last year.
https://ir.svb.com/shareholder-and-bondholder-information/cr...
I could find 40 community banks and shift funds around constantly or I could just put it all in JPM and actually worry about running my business.
Running a business means doing the maintenance keeping ship afloat as well as charting a course to exotic destinations.
It certainly sounds like they had some side-things going on, otherwise hard to believe they'd not just recommend fiscally unsound practices to their portfolio companies, but even require them to.
TL;DR: If we went with that VC for the Series A, they wanted us to be a SVB customer, and SVB demanded exclusivity.
The treasurer should have time as that’s part of her job.
It’s not terribly complicated.
I would expect that even the smallest companies have someone responsible for finance. Or they can rent or contract out for it. But if there’s truly no one then that company has a huge mundane risk.
{{Citation needed}}
Why would SVB be particularly special with respect to investments? They were all sharing the yield environment the the current effects of recent monetary policy.
Small banks usually had to pay more for deposits and run conservative books for this reason.
The banks have misrepresented their ability to pay out the current deposits.
On the other hand, if the house is actually only worth $750k, then my issue is solvency. Even taking time to sell the house for as much as possible I won't have enough to pay everything I owe, and will need to go into bankruptcy. And we don't know for sure until I actually try hard to sell the house.
People running into issues of solvency often say that they are running into a liquidity issue, however, through some mix of wishful thinking, hoping for self-fulfilling prophecies, and lying.
Pretty scary to go from thinking you have a safe emergency fund regardless of the market to a potential bank run seemingly overnight.
Wondering what tomorrow will look like and how many people are wait to transfer funds out of any at risk bank.
I imagine the same would happen in other situations.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2023/03/11/some-silic...
Why should I keep my money there if I can hit a few buttons and move it somewhere with less perceived risk? What if every one is thinking like that? Great FDIC will step in quickly, I hope.
I think tomorrow will be interesting in general to see how things hold up.
I wonder how much this outcome was foreseen and discussed by the fed when they went into full rate rise mode.
The bank run exposed the insolvency. But it was already there. That’s why SVB couldn’t solve their problems at the Fed’s discount window.
SVB lobbied for exemption from the Fed’s stress tests and Basel III that would have prevented this problem. The policy treatment is rolling back those changes so regional banks are covered.
There are a lot of interest-rates-weakened non-crypto affiliated banks in the US, but their deposits are mostly under the FDIC threshold. SVB had the worst vin diagram of all: Crypto, large average deposits, and very inter-connected client base.
Maybe. Meanwhile the second biggest bank failure in the history in the US is undergoing and it has nothing to do with crypto.
> Circle has the biggest or one of the biggest accounts in SVB and the stable-coin run or another factor made them rebalance.
It's Circle's fault now?
> There are 5 other banks that are affiliated with Circle and if any of them are struggling with underwater bonds, that would be a big problem.
Circle, unless they're lying, said they have $5.4 bn at BNY. $3.3 at SIVB and the rest over the 5 other banks. So out of $9.8 bn in USD cash reserves, there is at most $1.1 bn left, spread over 5 banks.
I don't think it's a problem as big as you pretend it is.
I also think it's an argument made in very bad faith that Circle is responsible for this. SIVB had, at one point, $200 bn AuM. $3.3 bn is not nothing but it's not much compared to $200 bn.
The banks partnering with large crypto whales in a high interest rate environment are likely in deep trouble. SVB was the perfect bank for startups, but its appetite for crypto and poor risk management likely caused the collapse.
https://www.circle.com/blog/an-update-on-usdc-and-silicon-va...
Few understand.
/s