Imagine you take your $10 million fortune and convert it all into gold bars and hide it under you bed. Then you order a pizza. When the pizza guy shows up, even though you are "rich," you are also in that moment broke and can't pay for the pizza. Not only will the pizza guy not take gold, you can't find someone to convert your gold into cash before the pizza guy gives up and leaves.
I don't know why HN seems to have locked into this meme that SVB does not have a shortfall. It does not reflect reality.
But they don't have time and did have a bank run, and therefore they do have a shortfall.
I think you might be able to argue that the bank itself had enough intrinsic value beyond it's ledger which could make up the shortfall, but that's all in the eye of the beholder who might want to buy them. We'll really see whether this is the case or not based on whether they have a new owner on Monday or they don't.
SVB overleveraged into long-term bonds in 2021 when interest rates were at an all time low. A financial institution/bank normally would hold a mix of maturities in their fixed-income holdings - 1 year, 3 year, 10 year - to maintain liquidity and reduce insolvency risk.
"If they were able to hold them to maturity there wouldn't have been a problem" does not make any sense - it's as if your company told you just wait an extra month for your paycheck, there won't be a problem. And then you told the mortgage lender to forget about this month's payment - if they just wait until next month, there won't be a problem.
Not to mention they had well over a year's advance notice to do _something_ because they knew exactly by how much their assets would decline in value. In March 2022 the Fed announced the decision to raise rates and continuing to do into 2023. By Sept they had announced the terminal rates would be over 4%, and have continued to openly increase that target since then.
Bond prices moving inversely to interest rates is Econ 101; anyone (at SVB) could've quite literally calculated their ~$25B 10-year 1.8% notes would drop by _at least_ $5B in 2023 before the terminal rate is even reached.
The run was the result of a clearly impending liquidity issue due to lack of near-maturation assets, not the other way around.
For SVB, the knock on the door is more like a loan shark coming by to call in for their return. You have gold under the mattress that is sometimes worth plenty, but it’s value isn’t determined until it sells and it isn’t looking to square up with what’s due.
In their case, the market value of the TBills that they purchased slipped too much. Because that’s just paper value and could have recovered or been been balanced for eventually, it might not have been an issue without a run of withdrawls. But buzz hit that they were in an unexpectedly and unisually fragile position, and that made people start the run that broke them.
Really? Most of the reporting has described them as having a crisis in part because lots of treasuries that they had classified as "held to maturity" needed to be reclassified as "available to sell" which required marking them to market.
They weren’t trying to tie up their funds in extremely low-yield assets for the next decade. They were parking it somewhere that made their books work until they could move it somewhere else.
of course, we've already done all of the tests to prove it is gold and not lead dressed up in sheep's clothing
A bank the size of SVB has a whole team that does that - it’s just a necessary part of operating at that scale.
Blowups like SVB happen when an entire team of financial experts have tried everything - and have nothing left they can do.
Then it blows up big, because all their other moves ‘come due’ at once.
Also, the shortfall is never tiny (else there wouldn't be a failure) not is ever large (else there would have been a failure sooner).
So there is some standardized range.