It’s Not What You Say, It’s How You Say It: Encrypted Messaging as a DOJ Weapon
grandjurytarget.com
grandjurytarget.com
People with "something to hide," i.e. persecuted minorities, need not to stand out from the crowd.
Your bank communications are encrypted, why not also protect your conversations with friends family and others? You never know when you or they might need to share things you wouldn't want used as blackmail (information ransom).
just wait for cameras to be installed in your bedroom to keep you safe
The same goes for my Windows machine and my phone. Frankly my phone's 32GB is clogged already and I can't install all the apps I want. I may not really know "what" is running on it, but I have fairly good ideas about "who" is running on it, and that can count for a lot. If I don't install any janky games from unknown publishers, and I stick with truly utilitarian, name-brand stuff, I can at least avoid most supply-chain based attacks, and hopefully some of the jankier data Hoovers.
There are some activities I do when I have to seriously consider setting my phone aside, or at least removing sdcard+SIM for safety from whatever threat actors might turn the phone against me or wrest it from my possession. I do not yet rely on my phone for payments and transit fares, so I can easily get around town without it (even if it pains me not to have real-time tracking and maps and emergency phone at the ready.)
I think if you know who's running on your systems, that's half the battle. Don't invite strangers into your home, don't install weird apps on anything anywhere. Make sure your family knows too. Keep a tidy firewall and DNS-based adblocks. Due diligence goes a long way. Make your peace with threat actors who are too powerful for you to resist, and just live your life as if they're already watching.
Again, could be misunderstanding your example...
Then again, maybe I'm just being pedantic.
Thanks for the clarification - have a good one.
That being said, there are situations where you would want to "revoke" information you shared willingly and intentionally with someone (think in the case of a messy breakup or divorce, where that information could be socially or legally troublesome if presented in a certain way) - encryption is still weak to a "plaintext recording" attack in that case.
Anyway, again, thank you all for the informative and civil discussions X) Have a good one.
People facing unjust persecution from the largely unaccountable Police.
The government's motion [1], as the article quotes, says that it "does not anticipate arguing—as Defendants claims—that Defendants 'specifically used an encrypted messaging application to evade law enforcement'". They concede that this would be irrelevant under the particular statute at issue. Instead, they argue that banning any mention of encryption is too much. They pose a couple of reasonable-sounding hypotheticals for when the encryption might be relevant. For example, "if Defendants attempt to attack the thoroughness of the Government’s investigation, the Government may need to present evidence that its investigatory avenues were limited by Defendants’ use of encrypted messaging." The article flippantly dismisses these without justification.
The judge's ruling [2] took the obvious middle path between the parties: the government can't bring up encryption as evidence of guild. If one of their hypotheticals actually happens during trial, they can approach the bench and ask to admit it then. This seems eminently reasonable to me.
[0] https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/63007873/united-states-...
[1] https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.med.615...
[2]https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.med.615...
Because this line of reasoning would result in outcomes that are contrary to the entire legal tradition of this country? Should the government be able to charge anyone who uses Signal because they can say "well, there would be evidence but it's all encrypted"? No one is calling the judge unreasonable, it's more a commentary about aggressive prosecutors.
I cannot see an investigation building a good case without material corroborating evidence, such as weapons purchases, criminal profiles, movement of vehicles, packages, etc. etc.
If arrests were made based solely on chats, how many kids running Call of Duty are going to get nailed, a la WarGames: The Dead Code?
IANAL, but my understanding is that this is not how law works.
If Meta had access already, the data they have could therefore be subject to a subpoena. They already are responsive to subpoenas for information from facebook for example[2]. However a subpoena can't compell them to change their app to do something it doesn't currently do - it can only get them to provide evidence they have.
[1] https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-501-7136?contex...
[2] https://www.zdnet.com/article/heres-what-facebook-sends-the-...
All of the US three-letter agencies have been lobbying VERY hard for warrantless surveillance of social networks and backdoors into E2EE apps, using CSAM as a justification and claiming that all of their existing evidence-gathering channels are "going dark" due to rising use of encryption. So far they haven't succeeded, but I feel that it is only a matter of time before they get the bulk of what they are asking for. Either due to a series of small "wins" stretched out over many years, or there will be a high-profile case where a child is abducted and murdered and the agencies will finally get their big win from congress by rushing in front of congress and TV cameras and shouting, "we could have prevented this with unfettered access to the criminal's phone!" (And I'll only give that about a 15% chance of actually being factually true.)
Second, there is absolutely nothing preventing the government from secretly compelling any US person or company to produce evidence via practically any means for a case via a National Security Letter if they can even tangentially frame the suspect as a terrorist.
IIUC there isn't a known case where the government has forced something like this. It is technically possible but legally some people claim that this is "forced speech" or other things so that it can't be compelled.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI%E2%80%93Apple_encryption_d...
OP doesn't say if prosecutors established probable cause by other means, but doing so would let them apply to a judge for a search warrant with particulars of what they were looking for.
Most search warrants involve going through a lot of irrelevant stuff to find the relevant stuff. Defendants can move to ensure the irrelevant stuff is excluded, and a judge not the prosecutor decides. It sounds like this is exactly what is happening in this case.
Of course defendants have been trying for a long time to force prosecutors to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt BEFORE getting access to evidence, but this goes counter to the Constitution and common sense.
But yes, to avoid the risk of "encrypted messaging usage" becoming a point of suspicion, that's also another point as to why people should use it for normal stuff.