Silvergate Bank to begin voluntary liquidation
dfpi.ca.gov
dfpi.ca.gov
[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-03-02/silver...
Their safe, boring assets weren't safe and boring enough. Why can't there be a bank like this that just keeps your cash as cash?
Banking services basically are so successful they became a necessity for the vast majority of people who can access them—you have to have money storage, as a prerequisite to moving money you can’t or don’t wish to store. I can’t think of a reason I should pay a bank for the privilege of access to paying some of my own money to another party.
On the other hand, I think this is just as good an argument that the kind of banking I’m describing should be a public good rather than a part of the services provided by investment firms. I even think there’s fairly good precedent for that argument, albeit at a drastically larger scale and with an unfortunately storied history of fraud and abuse.
Many banks do put customer funds into T-Bills, or park it with the Fed at the fed funds rate. Both of which are 0 risk and effectively instantly redeemable. And this is still highly profitable right now, if you offer customers yields below fed funds rate (~5%), the money on the spread is risk free.
Pretty much every crypto adjacent firm has decided to take excessive risk with customer deposits to skim some off the top instead
Absolutely insane how my local bank's money market account interest rate is something like 1.4%. Their CDs only hit 3%. Like come the fuck on. Ended up moving most of my money out of there.
Others are probably upset with it because Silvergate had the option to hold cash as cash, or cash as one-month T-bills, and if they had done that, they wouldn't have had to liquidate.
But instead they locked it up in much longer dated bonds to grab a little extra yield, and got burned when interest rates increased.
The problem is highly liquid and effectively instantly redeemable wasn't enough when the crypto world melted down and a huge percentage of their depositors needed money back right away. No bank can survive that. Wells Fargo just has customers from a wide enough crosssection that they won't all need their money back at once. But you can imagine it happening to a small local bank following a natural disaster as well.
Silvergate was solvent and has the assets to cover liabilities, just has liquidity issues.
Obviously some assets they hold (mortgage backed securities) have declined in value.
If you bought them at 2-3% yields then you lost a lot of money, which is probably the case here. If they bought below par they would get their money back at maturity, but that could be 20-30 years from now. Despite being "safe" from a credit perspective, munis are not safe from interest rate risk
EDIT: In 2020 the Southern District of New York court dismissed TNB's complaint[1], finding the 18 month wait did not construe a denial (despite the application form saying a decision "may take 5-7 days"). I guess there was no appeal?
No, they weren't. Duration is a measured risk [1]. Silvergate chose a flighty, risky set of clients. Their portfolio should have been optimized for liquidity, not yield. They got greedy and are paying the price.
I thought banks were able to sell those long maturity assets for cash to another bank or investor to avoid exactly that kind of situation?
And my understanding is banks must meet their regulatory requirements overnight each night, so there is a market for overnight loans/swaps/etc to make sure thats the case.
Those assets dropped in value by like 20% last year. Check out the stock ticker "TLT", which tracks 20+ year treasuries to see just how bad it was, zoom out to 1-year or 2-years.
Can you explain what am i missing here ?
I invest in treasuries when interests are high or gonna stay high. If i see us hitting a recession in coming year, i keep mostly cash and start piling into treasuries over each hike cycle until at least the central banks start cutting rates and keep riding the treasuries till rates keep moving down.
Or in other words, dont fight the fed
I'm surprised there hasn't been more reporting about this. Maybe everything's fine and there's nothing to see here.
Also, most other banks aren’t overly concentrated in one area that could collapse and force a bunch of customer withdrawals like Silvergate was (in cryptocurrency)
If there was a problem in banking bond holdings, it likely would’ve surfaced by now with the massive interest rate changes.
[0] https://viewpoint.pwc.com/dt/us/en/pwc/accounting_guides/loa...
Anyone who knows what TLT is likely knows about duration risk.
https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/investment-products...
The FFR going from 0% to 4.5% over the last year is probably the biggest, most important (and definitely well reported) piece of news... and constantly makes front-page material on most financial newspapers I've been reading.
The idea that this is somehow "underreported" is... odd... to me. The amount of commentary on rising interest rates, federal fund rates, hawks in the Fed, inverted yield curves and more suggests that the public is hyper-aware of this and the implications.
This story sketches a problem that hopefully doesn't start to gather steam:
https://www.axios.com/2023/03/04/why-some-banks-are-heading-...
> It’s just last week that US regulators warned banks about this [...]. It’s almost like they knew this was coming. The regulators did not quite say “therefore, don’t bank crypto exchanges”; in fact, they said the opposite [...]. But you got the idea.
If you stay silent most of the time, but say “we might be on a collision course with an iceberg” an hour before said iceberg comes along, your advice is very valuable (it might not be legibly valuable if it’s the first time you spoke up, but that’s not the concern here). If you say a lot of things all the time and then warn about the iceberg thing a minute before it happens, well, your advice is still better than nothing, but it’s not exactly an example of amazing foresight. And surely appending “captains have broad discretion over the course of their ship, as permitted by law or regulation” to the warning should discount its value further, at least a bit.
> A run on the bank happens in, like, It’s a Wonderful Life, but in the real world of big US banks, that particular dynamic [...] would be strange. [...] The story today is that Silvergate’s customers are withdrawing their money because they are worried about Silvergate [...]. But that's not why they were withdrawing their money in late 2022, when the trouble started. Then, they were withdrawing their money because crypto had collapsed [...]. The customers — crypto exchanges — were the problem, not Silvergate. [...]. I suppose this counts as contagion from the crypto crash to the real financial system [...] It is a narrow sort of contagion: That bank is pretty much the Bank of Crypto [...]. But it is certainly the sort of contagion that regulators will want to discourage [...].
Are the crypto exchanges the problem, though? This doesn’t read like a “cryptocurrency bad” story, it reads like a “being the Bank of Thing is bad” story. Cryptocurrency exchanges are a particularly bad value of Thing here, sure, but generally speaking, if you are the Bank of Thing and an overwhelming majority of your depositors are in the Thing business, then aren’t you essentially betting that Thing will not experience short-term volatility? Most of the time, the most relevant Thing is retail deposits, and as the article mentions, there’s a whole bunch of stuff instituted to smooth that out, but doesn’t this still apply for other, deposit-insurance-disadvantaged Things just as well?
In that view, it seems like, first, there should be indeed some opinions that, if you a running a bank, being an undiversified Bank of Thing on the depositor side is not a good idea, but also, second, that if you are a bank regulator and you regulate a Thing to a point where most but not all banks will refuse Thing businesses, you are very much accepting that those few remaining banks will be vulnerable.
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/08/silvergate-shutting-down-ope...
Silvergate's stress came from holding normal super boring bonds and needing to liquidate those, it needed to liquidate because of the mismanaged crypto organizations, but its ability to liquidate came from its own portfolio choices during a coincidental macroeconomic environment and not crypto.
Is that really true? I got the impression the cryptocurrency industry was shrinking these days, with lots of companies that had previously announced involvement now exiting.
https://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2023/02/place-y...
(Which I don't buy)
While I agree there is a hype bubble forming, I disagree with the premise that it only produces garbage.
Right now I can basically ask my home assistant "what's the time/weather" and "play some music". Anything else returns "i don't understand".
I can see ChatGPT has huge potential here to give at least somewhat sane voice assistant responses.
The issue is even if the error rate is 1 in 100 and you scale that up to a billion users supporting thousands of use cases, you then need to maintain a large army of people to manually handle those errors.
Its a huge cost to even the largest firms. Very similar to what Facebook/Twitter/Youtube end up doing to handle content moderation. The faster systems scale the faster you get swamped with bugs you don't have bandwidth to fix. The consequences begin to multiply. Your basic Jurassic Park story plays out.
"Who played bond in that film Goldensomething?"
"I don't understand."
ChatGPT on the other hand returns "you're thinking of Goldeneye, where Bond was played by Pierce Brosnan"
(I hence appreciated the quotes).
I am also not sure it’s so simple; the tools are so much more powerful than I would have believed just a couple years ago. But there’s value and then there’s perceived value; the fact that there’s so much nontechnical interest is perhaps suspect.
FFR futures are expecting a +0.50% increase for the March 22nd meeting.
Crypto bros and LLM bros both monetize via tokens
https://wallstreetonparade.com/2023/03/fdic-investigators-ar...
> Silvergate’s ability to find a white knight bidder to “salvage” the bank ended when gutsy U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), John Kennedy (R-LA), and Roger Marshall (R-KS) released a letter on January 30 to the bank’s CEO, Alan Lane.
https://wallstreetonparade.com/2023/03/silvergate-a-federall...
> Another way that Silvergate apparently met the run on the bank was to obtain $4.3 billion in advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco – a program meant to support housing for the poor.