Or you encrypt the entire drive. Then the secure erasure is a matter of throwing away the keys, and you don't have to bother with thinking through your threat model.
Say you have one root key and you derive per-file or per-block keys using various metadata (inode numbers, generation numbers, block addresses, whatever). You can't throw away derived keys though!
Or say you generate random keys per-file and you store those somewhere (it's annoying to have to store them). Now to throw those keys away you need to re-write the blocks containing them. If there's any behind-the-scenes copy-on-write going on then re-writing a block doesn't necessarily lose its old contents.
The only thing that's easy to throw away -maybe- is the top-level / root keys. But that means deleting the entire filesystem.
Well, yeah, that's why I said you encrypt the entire drive. If you do things that make it hard to throw your keys away, then it's gonna be hard to throw your keys away.
You can, AES-XTS does just this. Per-block keys can be derived on the fly from the root key and the block address. When the root key is gone, everything is gone.
Having to wipe an entire filesystem to securely delete a file is not useful.