It's an attractive idea that some thing has agency (or consciousness, or whatever property you want to define) to the extent it does some sort of computation. But then you have to go figure out what it means for something to do that computation. That turns out to be extremely difficult; most things can be interpreted as computing most other things.
Chalmers paper is behind a paywall but I dont see how your point makes any sense. A rock is not processing anything, an insect or a person or a calculator is. Seems pretty straightforward to me.
The states that Putnam argues are happening inside the rock dont mean anything unless some action results from them. You'll notice I mentioned 'actions as a result of processing' above.
Surely the /concept/ doesn't depend on us having the tech to make such actuators...
Unless you're into panpsychism - which I can't discount because although its a ridiculous explanation of consciousness, all the other possible explanations are equally ridiculous