Hackers could try to take over a military aircraft; can a cyber shuffle stop it?
techxplore.com
techxplore.com
First of all we have MIL-STD-1553, which is a broadcast bus. Those are inherently unprotected, as any device can jam the bus at any moment. OK, the attacker wants to override the device output instead. But this immediately suggests most efficient fix for any takeover process: switch to some other technology which is not broadcast. This will fix takeover problem, and jamming problem, and sniffing problem and many other problems.
Next, the mitigation they propose is "Occasionally, one device would slip in a coded message that would change both devices' network addresses". I don't think this works well.. after all, the messages themselves are not encrypted. So an attacker can just look at the message content to determine address to spoof. It is pretty easy to tell "throttle stick position" message from "engine status" one, especially given you know the prior history. One message immediately after address change might be unmodified, but that's OK, the next ones would be spoofed. Idea: as long as you are changing firmware in incompatible ways, maybe just add encryption? This is well understood and works well to protect against spoofing (and many other things too).
Finally, they assume attacker is guessing the number sequence using machine learning model, and that random number generation is done using predictable methods (I bet something like LFSR or LCG) What is their threat model exactly? Machine learning is pretty resource-intensive. If the attacker knows it will be LFSR or LCG, they can use predictors tuned to that specific algorithm, which will be substantially more efficient. And if this is any of many known cryptographically strong RNGs, then attacker might as well give up immediately. Either way, no need for machine learning.
IF F35's at the end of the runway before take off are giving out RF signals which can be interpreted, it might pay to then drone in a device to silently capture more of the RF when inflight and then transmit the captured data for later analysis.
If the canopy is left open when in its bunker, there are a few holes inside the cockpit which might provide a place to hide such a device. A bit of a Mission Impossible type thing. https://youtu.be/JP0TDw0m7Nc?t=295
Would need a competent drone operator and someone competent at building such a device. There may well be jammers around a base, things that can knock out GPS.
Could go for the audacious approach and drop a smart phone in that doesnt move around when pulling G's, but that depends on the checks the pilots make and what could be hidden inside a cockpit. I would expect the checks to be strict because you dont want anything loose causing the joystick to get stuck!
Research from places like Youtube could help and google can help with images. https://www.google.com/search?q=f35+cockpit Maybe even getting to sit inside one at airshows could show something up.
If that approach doesnt show anything up, best bet is probably listening into the RF when jets are nearby.
Might also pay to fly some drones over radomes like RAF Feltwell and RAF Menwith Hill to establish what direction the satellites are pointing to and also try to intercept their RF for later disassembly. Its possible F35 communication is transmitted via satellite and these satellite dishes are the weak link, even if the data is shuffled between ground based satellite systems, like between Feltweel and Menwith Hill.
In fact covering all these radomes could make it easier to hack the networks.
Rupert Murdochs Sky already tells me these satellite communications work to high standards even with extreme weather events like cloud cover.
I also wonder if the perimeter fences around these satellite installations are big enough to avoid someone listening in outside the perimeter?
If we see some military compulsory purchases taking place quickly or Military Police with Malinois and German Shephards moving lurkers on, then that could be a clue and, like the public footpath at RAF Lakenheath being closed to the public, then you know the US & UK Mil have a weakness!
I've been told the US Mil (USAF) communication from Europe goes up via satellite at Mannheim Germany via satellite back to the US.
Dont know how true that is, not investigated.