Certainly: Fastly’s Own TLS Certification Authority
fastly.com
fastly.com
https://archive.is/20230221154358/https://www.fastly.com/blo...
The original page is a 404 for me.
https://web.archive.org/web/20230221151451/https://www.fastl...
Also, I really like the name :)
Let’s Encrypt isn’t exactly a SPOF (single point of failure) but also it isn’t like there are 13 equivalents.
Though the intermediate cert is cross-signed by GoDaddy, so this isn't a problem right now.
> are fully supported by Fastly without any dependence on another organization.
There are conceivable scenarios where GD doing something (or not doing something) could result in Certainly search no longer validating on some subset of older browsers/clients, but they're quite obscure and unlikely. If you include those scenarios as Certainly having a dependency on GoDaddy, I feel like you would also have to say that Certainly depends on their domain name registrar to not give away their domain out from under them.
Inclusion into the trust stores for Linux distributions like Red Hat and Ubuntu will be another interesting one to watch with Certainly.
Oh and the Oracle Java Root Certificate Program [2], since the JRE has its own root certificate store, and Java is still used very broadly.
[1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/trusted-root/prog...
[2] https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/javase/carootcertsp...
That includes Debian, so probably also Ubuntu. Dunno about Red Hat but it's probably the same.
Three years seems like a long time to be working on a CA!
And in practice although you need all of the big ones to be OK with it, the one that matters is Mozilla, via m.d.s.policy, a public group overseeing this well, policy for Mozilla both directly as the vendor of Firefox, and as de facto trust store for Free Unix systems.
Now, m.d.s.policy wants to see a whole bunch of paperwork, including audits, beginning from when you began setting stuff up, your own policy documents etc. and it sometimes wants these fixed so you need to go around the loop again. During this you need a complete, working, system, with the only differences from your final public system being maybe scale and the fact you aren't actually directly trusted. But in practice you will have trust via a cross signature (in this case GoDaddy) so you are trusted, just indirectly - if you screw up that's for real and that's going to be a big deal.
Example: m.d.s.policy wants to see what a working secured web site will be like, so you spin up a site which exists only to show that yup, we can issue a correct leaf cert for the site, with a valid expiry date, path leading back to GoDaddy, if testers tell their test system that it trusts $newCA, then it says it's valid from you not GoDaddy, check.
Another example: m.d.s.policy wants to see that expiry works properly, so you spin up a site with a two month old certificate but only a month of validity. Except wait, if you're like Let's Encrypt/ ISRG you intentionally don't have manual issuance so you literally need to use your normal automated issuance process and then wait until the certificate expires to show that this works. Let's Encrypt really did this. Twice I think.
I do actually have some sympathy for the monetary cost of the infrastructure surrounding the "pay to do math" model, but you're 100% correct that for a CDN company, that cost must surely be damn near invisible among the rest of their cost of doing business
don't downvote me
maybe it was taken down, there is another post which made couple of minutes back
"Protecting your web apps has never been easier: Introducing the Fastly Managed Security Service" https://www.fastly.com/blog/protecting-your-web-apps-has-nev...
Edit: Tried opening in a private browsing window (read: more privacy options but no ublock origin) and it still fails.
Cache headers weren't being set properly, new pages would or wouldn't load depending how you reached the page (direct link vs. javascript loading the content via an internal cache or via a fragment fetch)