Computation is not necessarily experience. I can't emphasize enough how fundamental understanding this is. It seems some just can't grasp this concept.
Would you say a program that echoes to the screen the responses of a hidden human is intelligent? Viewed as a black box, it would certainly seem so. But does it have any internal experience and understanding of anything? Of course this is a trivial experiment, but the point of it is to show, in the most absurdly clear terms, that producing plausible outputs !== being intelligent, much less having a conscious experience.
This example also shows that the perceived sophistication of the input-output transformation is immaterial, unless you want to say consciousness requires a certain internal architecture for computation, in which case I would ask: what architecture is that? No matter the sophistication of an algorithm, it's computation lies on a different axis to that of consciousness. You might say human compute because they are conscious, not conscious because they compute.
Another way to understand this: Let's say you touch a very hot object. You skin, in conjunction with your brain, senses and computes the temperature of the object. But, there is no essential reason why that should lead to an experience of pain, rather than a sensation similar to color, which generally does not produce pain.