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The maximum expiration time is now down to 13 months, for certs that need to be valid in a browser. And if you want to cycle yours more frequently, you can. But there's enough places that can't set up automated processes that trying to make it 90 days for everyone would be a lot of pain and a lot of broken sites.

> But there's enough places that can't set up automated processes

Why can't they be automated?

And anyway, this is the exact problem that short expiration times avoid! Systems that aren't set up for automation, and rely on someone once a year remembering some creaky, error prone process to get a new cert. Much better to force short expiration times so manual cert renewal is a thing of the past.

DV is not the only kind of certificates validation. I don't want to have to go through the OV/EV validation process several times a year, nor to validate 4 certificate issuances a year in advance.

But if I wanted to, I can do so even now without being forced - request new certificate during it's validity period, and revoke the former one.

DV is the only kind that actually matters. Browsers do not display EV certificates in the address bar anymore, the verified identity is hidden in a panel or sometimes even invisible. If you want to pay extra for snake oil, you get to enjoy all the pain in the process. See also: https://www.troyhunt.com/how-everything-were-told-about-webs...

Google made quite a few questionable changes in Chrome (with the rest feeling forced to follow the fashion set by Chrome) and not displaying EV info. Many big organisations use tens of domain some of which look very suspicious. Information in a EV/OV cert is often the only way to establish that a domain operated by the legitimate company (and not by a phisher who registered a similarly looking domain).

Google and Firefox made the change roughly at the same time -- because there was a lot of evidence that EV indicators simply don't work. Users don't pay attention to them, and even if they did, the idea that company names are unique - even within a jurisdiction - is simply incorrect.

The only upside of EV certificates is that the PKI companies can seek a higher rent.

Even if a higher price is the only EV difference (which not exactly the case) it would be enough make sites with EV certs much less likely to be used in phishing - threat actors want to keep their cost down because they frequently register a lot of domains (much more than most legit companies). And even company names are not unique good luck with registering PayPal Inc or Bank of America Corporation to get an EV cert for your phishing site.

I don’t understand. Why would phishing attacks bother getting EV certificates? Users can’t tell the difference in modern browsers.

Depends on who user is. I hope a typical HN user can find a way to view certificate information even in a modern browser.

The problem is - in modern internet it is very hard to find out who is behind a particular domain: NS/A often point to a CDN or a cloud, info in whois is hidden and all you can see is 'Private'. OV/EV cert is often the only way to know that a domain like acmecorp-invoices.com is used by the same company as acmecorp.com and not phishing (registering a domain similar to the main company's domain is a bad but not uncommon practice).

One of a reasons to get OV/EV cert is to avoid you domain being listed as phishing - if would give a security expect no hints that your suspiciously looking domain is a legit one and not impersonation there is a risk that it would be blocked.

Phisher practically never use OV/EV certs on other hand (probably because they know there are little to no changes they'll get a cert with the target company's name in organizationName).

> Why can't they be automated?

E.g. because of regulatory requirements, chain of responsibility, a paper has to be signed with a pen, etc.

Interesting, but that sounds like speculation. Do you have any examples of regulatory requirements, as opposed to voluntarily-broken internal processes?

The people installing the certs aren't necessarily the people buying the certs. I can't do anything to automate the cert purchases at my current workplace; that's a separate team that I have no control or influence over.

Shorter expiration times just mean they send me an email with the new .pfx every 4 months instead of every 12.

If they had to do that every 2 months instead of every 12, they might get tired enough of it to fix their broken process.

Several of the appliances we manage have certificates that are installed using a Web gui and require a reboot with a 15 minute outage for the change to take effect. We've looked at automating some things but there's only so far I want to go down the rabbit hole of headless chrome vs manually installing a cert yearly.

It seems like enforcing faster rotation would do a lot to encourage people and companies to move away from such obtuse platforms, no?

> And its long enough that each time, I (and everyone else) can justify not bothering to automate the process

And even worse, if you do automate it there is a pretty good chance something changes and breaks your automation by the time it is needed. And that is assuming you actually tested the automation before your new cert is close to expiring.

I solve this by certificate expiration monitoring and renewing the certificate at the 60 day mark.

The expiration warning is configured so that it starts to yell at me if it passes that timeframe.

That gives me plenty of time to fix it IF it goes wrong.

In your case, "something breaks in your automation" might mean that, by the time the cert is (about to be) in need of renewal, the notifications you set up are now going to an email account that doesn't exist any more, because you left the department got re-orged and...

If "monitoring" is set up as "send email to specific personal mailbox" then things are gonna suck a lot.

I was more imagining that it was going to an email account called e.g. "devops@"; and then when you left (possibly very quickly, e.g. via termination), the need for the continuity of that account was forgotten, because it had never become institutional knowledge; and then during a reorg, a new group (= email distribution list) was created to match the new department name; with nobody remembering to forward devops@ to the new address, because it wasn't receiving emails anybody needed to see on any sort of consistent basis, only these once-in-a-blue-moon emails.

That's one reason why nobody who knows what they're doing relies (solely) on email for monitoring. You use a monitoring solution, and if that whole system gets "forgotten" then there are bigger problems anyway.

The same can happen if you assign it to the team's mailbox, reorganizations happen at all levels.

Of course it "can happen". Anything "can happen". It's about mitigating risk by picking a strategy. In this case, from worst to better: personal mailbox -> team mailbox -> an actual monitoring solution and not friggin emails.

And how do you ensure your monitoring keeps working?

Alert on missing data. Keep a continuous stream coming in.

Setup 365.25 domains and have one renew every day!

>>to set up processes which automate renewal.

that is all fine and good for things that have the ability to automate that process, plenty of hardware and device do not. Some are not even legacy are still actively being sold and developed

It is also not good for internal networks where you can not valid out to something like lets encrypt to automate that validation process, sure you could do your own internal PKI and run your own CA for that but......

In my current org 60 days would be a NIGHTMARE to manage.

> It is also not good for internal networks where you can not valid out to something like lets encrypt to automate that validation process, sure you could do your own internal PKI and run your own CA for that but......

Or you can set up certbot or similar on a public facing server (or something that can add DNS records to for your domain), and use a secure channel to send the private keys to the things that need it.

I would like to see more of a push to make setting up an internal CA a lot easier though. Because that is probably most correct way to handle that.

>It is also not good for internal networks where you can not valid out to something like lets encrypt to automate that validation process

Why not? Just use DNS validation.

Yep, I do this for internal names, works great. I've used acme.sh to update the names in a public zone that is isolated from the rest of the zone and has it's unique AWS credentials to update via Route53.

I like to renew certificates long before expiry. At my job certs last a year but I automate renewal after 5 months. If you find a certificate that is older than 6 months you know something is wrong (long before expiry).

Advantage of certbot: a systemd timer that runs every other week is very easy to write, because "certbot renew" doesn't need any user interactions.

So it's literally < 10 lines of systemd unit file to automate it.

Or one line of cron.

> Or one line of cron.

For each distro, with each having their own format and own crond implementation, at each different file paths.

If you don't automate, don't document and don't check that it is actually working your process from the get-go it is only your own fault, especially when working on industrial scale like this.

Rotating the certificates constantly works for personal websites but it is not ideal in places where one can't easily update things - like behind corporate firewalls or where corporate processes permit updating/replacing things only in fixed cycles, which are often much longer than 90 days.

Don't remember the Let's Encrypt root certificate expiring fiasco from year ago? Granted, that wasn't really Let's Encrypt's fault but it shows well that these things can be a tad more complicated than just running a script every 90 days.

Ballmer's Law: Engineers will design a system's maintenance schedule to be just beyond their promotion cycle