This is not true for real numbers with the usual "less-than" relation. In fact, considering real numbers, no open subset of R admits a lower member.
According to Zorn's lemma, there exist some order relation where your assertion is true, but I seem to remember from my math course a few (!) years ago that Zorn's lemma is equivalent to the axiom of choice.
Must it?
"Let x be the smallest element of the half-open interval (0, 1]" isn't really something that you can say *.
* Assuming the standard ordering of reals; sure you can say it's defined for some well-order, but then you require the Axiom of Choice anyway.
Must it? Is there a real number closest to zero?
My disagreement about this post is: I don't see what it has to do with the axiom of choice. The only "choice" used here is that this nonempty set of non-describable numbers (if indeed we can define it at all) contains at least one element. That's a tautology and doesn't require choice.
Also, the author may be interested in Skolem's paradox: in particular, if the theory of the real numbers is consistent, then there must be a construction with only countably many reals, and so if I understand correctly, they would all be describable.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard's_paradox
Hence, it is also impossible to construct the complement of this set. In fact, Richard's "diagonal argument" chooses precisely the sort of number we ought not to be able to choose, according to the blog post (but again, this just shows the set is not well-defined).
Edit: note that even "the smallest positive rational number greater than 0" doesn't exist, even though the rationals are merely countably infinite.
1. Wikipedia explanation of the axiom of choice.
Also, algorithms that don't terminate are still algorithms - especially if they keep emitting pieces of a solution, instead of producing the whole solution at the end.
For example, here is an algorithm for printing all of the natural numbers:
i <- 0
while true:
print(i)
i <- successor(i)
Finally, computability is not typically considered necessary for a mathematical construct to exist or be useful. Just like geometry sometimes studies shapes that can't be constructed in the physical world, other kinds of mathematics sometimes studies concepts that can't be computed (at least not given known models of computation).