I'm wondering if the classified document wasn't about tor, but about the 'implants' aka malware that were leaked in the same set of Snowden documents.
I think as much as tor being broken in some fixable way, they'd like it known even less that the FBI installs malware on the devices of persons of interest who haven't been convicted of anything.
If they truly can't break Tor and they deem the person of interest important enough for "national security" then I don't think anyone who has studied history, American or otherwise, believes that they are going to throw their hands up and say "welp, that's it."
Outside the US, I have no idea.
Genealogists use parallel construction to build out their families. Data from a large variety of sources gets used to indicate and corroborate individuals.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R2013...
The CIA did a great job getting that word out there. It's sad it's used to dismiss credible and logical conclusions so readily.
The latest PDF[2] states:
In discovery, the Government has declined to provide any information related
to its TOR operation. The Defense therefore researched and drafted a motion to
compel such discovery. In the course of this research, the Defense discovered an
exhibit filed on the public docket in at least two federal cases with similar issues
(“Exhibit 2”). The document is partially redacted, purports to be the work of a U.S.
government agency, and is marked “Top Secret.” Outside of these public docket
filings, Exhibit 2 is widely available on public internet sources. A Google search for
Exhibit 2’s title yields 102,000 results. All of the top results apparently provide the
document itself, and most of these date back to 2013.
That would likely be a reference to something leaked by Edward Snowden given the year mentioned.1. https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1279441/downl...
2. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23569961-motion-to-r...
From a doc I found[0] he was under aerial surveillance (aka, the FBI Cesnas {related [1]}) since June 2018.
Also some of the facts in the case are...well this is from doc [0].
> Some of the surveillance footage is itself incriminating. (See Doc. 5, pp. 50-51) (asserting that Mr. Alazhari’s travel on certain days in May 2020 shows that he was “scouting targets fora potential mass shooting attack.”).
[0]: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21052490-motion-to-s...
Why not both?
From my experience over the years doing datacenter/transit/fiber/etc. type of infrastructure - just assume a government agency of some sort either outright operates an exit node, or has a wiretap on it. You can be the most trustworthy person in the world operating in the name of freedom - outright working for a say a colo provider. Unless you are the CEO, legal team, or the individual engineer responsible for it - you will have no idea you are also operating an exit node under surveillance.
I'd put money on well over 50% of the world's exit nodes being packet captured 24x7.
The FBI running hundreds of servers is fairly likely, and could give enough data to suggest that all of their information is just grunt detective work.
Why? What's the hurdle for running a bunch of servers? How much does a server cost?
> We configure NoScript to allow JavaScript by default in Tor Browser because many websites will not work with JavaScript disabled. Most users would give up on Tor entirely if we disabled JavaScript by default because it would cause so many problems for them.
[1] https://openresty.org/, https://github.com/openresty/lua-nginx-module
(Fuck you imgur)
The NoScript approach is dumb because it easily supports temporary and permanent white-listing of sites, which is agreeable to many (but still problematic depending on what your risk profile).
With NoScript’s current approach, you get ruined when your JavaScript-free-optimized starts sending you nasty JavaScript.
Tech-literate people use JavaScript.enabled=false in about:config.