And the relevant court document: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23569961-motion-to-r...
And the relevant court document: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23569961-motion-to-r...
Not only does the FBI decline to say how they determined what IP address the defendant used to access the Tor hidden service, but they're also trying to hide the fact that the defendant asked to see that information by requesting the court label the defendant's court filing itself a "highly sensitive document"? And the court granted that request? Is that normal? It seems really bizarre to me, but I'm not a lawyer.
But just wanting to keep it secret is not enough. So they will claim that this has national security implications, saying some targets are terrorists. And courts defer very heavily to the government in this area, so the FBI might be successful.
Because just knowing that there is a break is enough to tip someone off, the FBI can and courts likely would classify a request for details as well as the details themselves.
As was discussed verbally at Defcon, a huge chunk of the exit nodes are either in the US or EU. Same for guards.
(The whole GCHQ vs several EU countries trying to do intel in parallel without a shared intelligence agency thing is perpetually amusing.)
Yeah, it's been a problem for a while now. I do think you're referring to Parallel Construction, a.k.a. evidence laundering.