In my time as an avionics tech on C-130s, it was drilled incessantly into us to never perform maintenance from memory. Always consult each step in the relevant publication and have it with you. We weren't immune, we also had ASORs (Aircraft Safety Occurrences, but nowhere near this level of seriousness) where mistakes were made because the techo did not consult the publication. We had tuffbooks that were loaded with all publications and STIs (Special Technical Instructions, similar to SBs) that should have always been carried to the aircraft and consulted during maintenance. If the SB in this case was unavailable, maintenance should have ceased until it became available. When you sign off on maintenance, you are signing off on it being completed in accordance with the publications referencing the specific section of the publication (at least, that's what we did in the Air Force).
On the driver side, my immediate thought was: How did a fuel leak in one engine cause a total loss of fuel? I would hope that there are now checklists that prioritise shutting off the cross-feed valve if a leak is suspected. Weight and balance are subordinate to the risk of running out of fuel and starving both engines.
On a side note, we would have regular "Safety Days" where incidents of ours, and major incidents like these that have happened to other aircraft were presented to the squadron (both aircrew and maintenance) in detail and discussed. Having the potential consequences in your mind at all times really helped fortify the necessity of following the correct procedures during the regular conduct of your work.