The USN has plans to limit the risk to the carriers, but most of those also limit the usefulness extensively. Even still, a maneuvering and properly-escorted CVN is not an easy target.
>>Seems like the focus should be on the stealthy underwater stuff that can pop up and deliver payloads like missiles and drones but what do I know.
I fully expect our submarine force to do most of the heavy lifting, especially in the critical early months of a hot war with China. But the problem is their limited ordnance. USS Ohio after her SSGN conversion only carries ~150 Tomahawks @$2 MILLION per missile for Block V versions. So that's 150 targets, max, before she has to slink away from the conflict zone and find a resupply ship or port. A Nimitz has a sustained sortie generation rate of ~80 sorties per day, and while I can't say what their typical ammo stores are, the carrier air wing should have more than enough bombs and guided munitions to strike 150 targets, and many targets can be prosecuted with fairly cheap JDAMs, SDBs, Mavericks, etc...
While our pilots still possess the essential skills and munitions to peel back an Integrated Air-Defense System (seems the Russians lack both of those), I don't think we are prepared for the ridiculous numerical disparity we will face here in the First Island Chain, combined with the reasonable qualitative parity of Chinese assets.
In fact, the old S-300s and Buks in Ukraine have been pretty effective and probably what spooks the Russians from using their air force in mass. Even those old systems are probably better than the Patriot for a lot of tasks. There's even been talks of sending more S-300s from Greece because they work and Ukraine knows how to operate them.
That would be unwise from a Greek perspective, because of Erdolfs ambitions and posture.
Most people seem to think it'll be a walk in the park for either the US or China, but I think it'll end up a kind of stalemate, with China and Taiwan both facing extreme privation from sea blockades, the Strait and SCS being a charnel house, and the world experiencing a massive economic disruption; domestic politics in democratic states would determine the terms of the final resolution.
Well, honestly your next sentence is pretty on the mark in broad terms: sea blockades, massive asset destruction in the main conflict zone, global economic impacts and political chaos.
I think the Chinese are using Russia's Ukraine failure to re-do their math about an amphibious assault aimed at Taipei (100x more difficult than driving across a land border into Kiev). I still expect their combination of ballistic missiles, land-based airpower (including old aircraft converted into drones/guided bombs), and a metric boatload of surface ships to wreck most US combat power in the region with sheer mass. We simply don't have enough assets or enough AMMO forward deployed here to maintain supremacy right on China's doorstep.
The big question marks are the responses from other local powers. We expect the Japanese to help if attacked, but what if they aren't targeted directly by China? The Japanese -N-a-v-y- "Maritime Self-Defense Force" is large and competent and we need them to counter the Eastern Theater Command Navy. Will the Philippines let us stage combat power in their territory? What will Vietnam do in the SCS? Will India distract China in the Himalayas?
Even if we get the upper hand in combat, maybe after 90+ days when we've gotten reinforcements from allies, from the continental US, etc....at BEST the situation becomes "Well China, we sank your entire Navy and Marine Corps, and killed most of your Air Force pilots......can we consider this 'Taiwan unification' issue settled?". The concern is that Xi Jinping and the CCP have staked their regime's reputation on this one goal. It's the same problem with Putin and Ukraine: failure is a guaranteed regime-ending scenario from domestic discontent, so they might just double down no matter how irrational it appears, and if the CCP can foster sufficient nationalism from the population, we could be looking at a LOOOOOONG bloody conflict and total economic chaos.
Not to say that's impossible, just that it's currently an unsolved problem.
It's much harder than it sounds.
A ballistic hypersonic missile isn't like a TV-guided cruise missile that can track a moving target or a HARM that will seek out RF signatures. You'd basically have to wait until the carrier is parked somewhere for an expended period (multiple hours at a minimum), otherwise you'll waste a $100M hypersonic missile.
That all said, none of this is impossible, and first tier militaries are putting a whole lot of effort into this problem; in a sense, "it's just engineering." But so far no first tier military has actually seen how their system would work in the field, and the results remain to be seen.
Particularly, if China were sure that it could sink American carriers at will, it would already be invading Taiwan.
The US Navy is actually pretty good at avoiding that.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/navy/...
Something else that's probably over - parking an amphibious assault ship offshore and using it as a base for USMC operations. The USMC and USN invested huge resources in that concept, and it's been very useful in small wars. Those ships are now vulnerable.
A LTJG writes in Naval Institute Proceeding on this.[2] If a carrier is close enough to do anything useful, it's vulnerable to shore-based attack. A Coast Guard officer worries about attacks by drone swarms launched from fishing boats.[3] China has a large fleet of small coastal vessels, the "People's Armed Maritime Militia", which are used for observation and other tasks.
[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61141118
[2] https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/december/eye...
[3] https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/december/res...
I agree that in a US-China war, the US will stay very far away from Chinese land-based platforms. The surface fleet would mostly remain outside the first island chain and fly sorties to take advantage of US air superiority.
If carriers were useless, China would not invest in them. But what does China know?
Occam's razor would suggest China invests in aircraft carriers because it sees an actual benefit.
As you mentioned, carriers are good for dunking on low/mid tier powers that can be dismantled and then bombed on budget. Questionable if it's good for peer warfare with powers that can take out carriers.
And if you look at numbers, PRC is not really heavily investing/committing in carriers. 3 hulls over 10 years and ~50 J15s is very conservative relative to PRC MIC building prowess. For comparison, USN laid down and completed 4 Forrestal within 5 years. Nimitz was being launched every 3-4 years. Compare PLAN submarine fleet with huge tech gap that never the less commissioned many new hulls in same period because there's recognition that mass subsurface capability (and thus need to build up talent pool) is integral to future force composition.
IMO right now they're prestige projects used for peacetime "diplomacy" and building up carrier infra if PLAN ever decide to go super carrier power projection route. But it could just as well as be dead end trial/experiment with future oriented towards UCAV carriers like Type 76 and long range bombers like H20.
In 20-30 years, 100 B21s could probably drop cheap ordances more efficiently than carrier groups. IMO it will get hard to rationalize super carriers. But USNavy is a seperate branch with their own budget and desire to remain relevant, so US ends up with trillion dollar "presence" / photo ops platforms when the money could be best spent elsewhere.
> IMO it will get hard to rationalize super carriers.
It's a know-how preservation program. The US Navy could easily refit the old Nimitzes and extend their life by 3 decades. Instead, they are building new Fords at the most glacial pace that makes sense. One every 4 years means 3 billion spent per year. The Navy has a budget of $250 BN or so, so that's about 1%.
The problem the Navy has is: right now they don't need new carriers, but what if one day they'll need 3 or 4 new carriers per year. It happened before. It's much easier to scale from 2 per decade to 4 per year than from absolute zero.
On top of that, the Fords are a pretty flexible platform. They can carry now 75 manned jets. But you can easily see one day they can switch to 25 manned jets and 150 drones.
> 100 B21s could probably drop cheap ordances more efficiently than carrier groups
100 B21s will cost about $70 BN. And a lot to operate on a per hour basis. They might be cost effective for some missions, but they are not going to make carriers obsolete anytime soon.
I'm not a naval expert either, but I would be strongly cautious of writing the carriers' obituary just yet.
So, if we had 500000 geosynchronous satellites, with a 1pbs link we could find carriers in a good fraction of the Pacific — maybe 10 or 20% of it?
I remember being told that terrorist wouldn't eavesdrop on undecrypted satellite communication something that I didn't believe at the time. I consider underestimating adversaries to be a time honored military tradition.
Sinking an aircraft carrier, let alone most of them, is also such a big loss of life and material, it could easily lead to WW3/nuclear boogaloo.
There are also anti-anti-shipping missile cruisers, CIWS, AWACS, etc. around aircraft carriers all the time.
There is also a lot of stealthy underwater stuff that is indeed ongoing. A big question on that front of course, is how would you know how it’s doing, or what it’s capable of, when it’s by its nature stealthy and hidden.