Transformer stockpiles and power grids come under threat
spectrum.ieee.org
spectrum.ieee.org
The TSO I work at has started to switch to in-place building, where all the components are shipped to the final destination and the transformer is assembled directly in the substation.
Also, lead times are apparently really long since everything is custom made.
Given that Russia's GDP is wholly dependent on petrochemical exports, regional competition (even with identical pricing) is bad (perhaps existentially so) for the future of the Russian economy.
Also I'm fairly sure that Ukraine has the right to deny Russia the right to transport oil through the existing pipelines in their territory, which IIRC is how the majority of Russian exports get to Europe.
That seems excessively high.
From Dec 29th attack:
Ukraine's military said 69 missiles were launched, with air defences intercepting 54 of them.
So 78% - I've not looked to see how normal or not that is, perhaps you can?
Now that I think of it, Putin might not give af
[1] https://www.gegridsolutions.com/hvmv_equipment/files/grid-ac...
HVDC converter stations are absolutely massive and necessary to interconnect the HVDC line with the rest of the AC grid, making them larger targets than even the largest autotransformers (i.e. 750kV to 330kV like they seem to have in Ukraine).
They already repatriated an s300 battery from Syria back to Russia.
The "only" land missile batteries in russian is S300 in Belgorode area that shoot at Kharkiv direction.
Russian ALCMs have ranges of over 1,000 miles, and are launched from bombers that fly from bases hundreds of miles from Ukraine. There are no surface-to-air missiles that can shoot them down in flight from Ukraine.
Ukraine is attacking the bombers on the ground with their own Tu-141 drones converted to cruise missiles.
The only thing that can practically be shot down in flight (short of a sufficient air combat capability to challenge control of airspace over Russia, which isn’t happening short of a general war with the West, sending equipment to Ukraine won’t do it) are the missiles themselves, which is why Ukraine is being supplied systems like Patriot and NASAMS.
> or anti-ship weapons that can harass targets in the Black Sea?
Ukraine’s domestically-developed land-launched Neptune missile has longer range to the US’s longest-range dedicated anti-shipping that currently have a surface launch system, and only slightly shorter range than the ATACMS, which isn’t AFAIK, designed for anti-shipping use but might be pressed into such use, or the LRASM, which is currently only integrated with certain US air platforms. The only thing the US might be able to transfer that would provide this coverage is the just-introduced Maritime Strike Tomahawk, which I gather there are very limited numbers of in US service.
Also, Ukraine striking Russia would erode international support for it, and be a fantastic domestic propaganda opportunity for Russia.
There is no situation in which doing so would be to Ukraine's advantage. It can only win the war by destroying Russia's will to fight, it cannot win it by destroying it's means to fight.
Ukraine has been striking inside Russia proper since at least April. Ukraine has every right to strike back at Russia, at Russian military installations inside Russia.
Maybe. I would not rule out that the real rationale is that limiting the scope of escalation of assistance serves the purpose of giving room to escalate further without crossing some point beyond that which would cross what it actually sees as “too far”.
Also, Ukraine has a (limited) domestic deep strike capability using Tu-141 jet drones converted to cruise missiles, which it has used to strike deep into Russia at strategic bomber bases from which Russia has been launching attacks.
> It is ridiculous that we are tacitly tolerating this war by Russia
I’m not sure I’d describe it that way; while on the one hand we are limiting the kind and scope of assistance to Ukraine, and not directly intervening, the arms lift to Ukraine is pretty much unprecedented in anything post-WWII where we aren’t directly engaged. This doesn’t seem to be “tacit toleration” of Russia’s war.
Which is strictly untrue; weapons the US has supplied already can strike inside Russia (and get the ability to strike further inside Russia as Ukraine has retaken territory.)
It is likely that if, any real criteria regarding where it can strike is being used, its something like “systems that would be an advantage over other alternatives available to Ukraine only (or primarily) in strikes into Russia”.
It’s also possible that that’s a PR position covering a different set of calculations with regard to weighing the desire to provide Ukraine superiority while limiting the acceleration of the escalatory spiral and preserving visible options for retaliatory escalation short of general war to deter new Russian provocations.