And to accomplish that all we have to put up with is a huge lack of privacy and tons of false positives?
Now the authorities can go "there might be CP in there, think of the children!" and a judge will give them the warrant.
On-device check agains KNOWN CP checksums + E2EE encrypted iCloud -> authorities need to get the actual phone, they can't just go looking around on people's iCloud accounts to see if they might find something.
Are you arguing in favor of on-device scanning? Or arguing against all scanning?
Perhaps easier, what do you think they should be doing?
Either commit and say “scanning for CSAM is the top priority” and scan on device or say “privacy is the top priority” and don’t scan at all.
I’m literally saying this halfway path is the worst of both worlds, since people still lose privacy, but very little meaningful progress against csam will be made.