I'm curious why you call out constructivism.
I've only really seen constructivism talked about by people who actually have a strong math background. Because it is hard to speak out against, say, the classical notions of existence that say that there are more real numbers than rational ones unless you actually understand why the classical proofs don't work constructively. And not just as, "We don't allow that proof."
To make that concrete, let's use computable analysis as a foundation for constructivism. In short, we represent Cauchy sequences as computer programs about which we can prove things in our favorite axiom system. You can build up a version of real analysis from that. It is easy to attempt Cantor's diagonal argument. You'll get a concrete program. But it will only represent a real number in our system if our axiom system can prove that every program it proves works, works as proven. This immediately brings up consistency. And so Gödel proves that showing this program represents a computable number in our system would imply our axioms to be inconsistent. (Bad axioms! Bad axioms!) And therefore Cantor's proof fails to produce a number in our system.
Of course classically we would say that if the axioms are consistent, then the program will compute a Cauchy sequence. And so it really does represent a real number even though we couldn't verify it. But whether we accept this alternate argument is a question of philosophy, not logic.