given an exhaustive description of all possible causes of Y, say X, then if X causes Y, *NECESSARILY* Y given X
causation is a form of necessity, necessarily Y occurs or it doesnt
In this case P(Future|Past) and P(Past|Future) are somewhere between 0 and 1. This isnt consistent with causation.
ie., All possible information about all possible causes of Y (the future), say X (the past) are insufficient to gaurentee any given Y (any particular future).
The "interpretation" element of QM is to say that we are really in this case, ie., that we have X = all possible information.
There are several ways of denying that P(Y|X) in the case of QM should be read this way. You can say X is incomplete, either by saying there is non-local information we don't have, or global information we don't have. Of the "global" kind, which of many worlds we are in is a kind of global ignorance.
So that if we had, P(Y|X, which-world) then we'd observe P(Y|X, whichworld) = either 1 or 0 --- as with classical mechanics
P(CatDead|PoisonBox, worldA) = 1
P(CatDead|PoisonBox, worldB) = 0
etc.
and, eg., P(F|G,M,m,r) = 1 if F=GMm/r^2
Imagine, for simplicty sake, a world is a series of four switches which we can describe by 0 (off),1 (on).
Eg., world A at time 0 is 0000, at time 1, 0001, ...
Now a change from 0000 to 0001 is causal if in every physically possible world 0001 follows 0000, ie., P(0001|0000) = 1
Now suppose that we enumerate every possible world, ie., all the worlds containing only this kind of switch, and only four of them.
Now if 40% of the worlds had 0000->0001 and 60% had 0000->1000, then P(0001|0000) = 0.4
The question is how can it be that the fourth switch behaves randomly? Ie., without any necessary flip from 0 to 1. Nothing at all can cause that switch to flip, by definition, the world contains nothing else in it.
What property does the switch have such that it turns on 40% of the time? NONE.
Consider two resolutions to this problem: bite the bullet and say the switch is "miraculous in some sense" in that it "just turns on" sometimes; OR, say that this thought experiment is physically impossible and we're missing information.
Eg., that there's a hidden switch: 10000->10001 always, and 00000->11000 always, we just can't see the first switch, so it looks random.
If that's what the world is then there's no "we"
If there is a universal wavefunction evolving deterministically what would it mean to talk about the future holding more data than the past? There would be a direct one-to-one correspondence between the future states and the past states.
I don't know! If the "data" is about the state of the universe (i.e. the wavefunction) the "data" doesn't really change because of unitarity.
You may be talking about something else - but it's not clear what.
What is data? How do you establish -given a wave function- the amount of data that it holds? What are you claiming exactly?
And, I didn't use the term data first. But when I used that word I was trying to transmit the meaning of "content", "substance", or character, nature, or what exists in the matter/issue. What is in the principle of a system's operation. How do I establish given a wave function the amount of data that it holds? A wave function doesn't exactly contain data. You either prescribe a wavefunction, or try to model one based on hypothetical constraints, or you can attempt to guess what an existing actual wavefunction was through measurement. As I mentioned I think when we say data we're usually talking about what is measured. But there is something more that exists than what is measured. Something that you could say is invisible doesn't not exist if it determines everything else that exist. If you understand everything about an object or a system you can prescribe an exact wavefunction. But we do not understand everything about what is in the objects for which we have tried to prescribe wavefunctions. What am I claiming exactly? I was not claiming anything, although now I have made a claim at the start of this comment; but I was asking a question as to whether 'mjburgess' was merely phrasing his original comment to make it seem to the careless reader or undiscerning eye that 'If the future "holds more data" than the past then it's random with respect to the past, by definition. This is one of the major interpretations of QM.' was actually "If the future "holds more data" than the past then it's random with respect to the past, by all possible definitions (implicitly). This a conclusion finally reached by physicists after having studied QM, rather than merely one possible interpretation given the best theory available so far.' but they indeed did not write that.