Hacking Google for Fun and Profit
blog.andrewcantino.com
blog.andrewcantino.com
Great content aside, I found the tone especially refreshing. Too often, it's "look how smart I am, and how stupid you all are" -- the brilliant jerk archetype.
Thank-you.
It takes a bigger man (company), to admit they are wrong and reward people accordingly for helping them.
Although I would never be able to understand security on this level, it has always interested me since the days when hacking guides were galore across the Lycos and Yahoo directories
Just curious for someone who knows more than me, couldn't all of these have been prevented by requiring all POSTs to the server have an attached CSRF nonce? Is there a downside to having a blanket policy like that?
The first was a GET request, not POST. Images have fairly lax cross domain restrictions. So while the attacking website can't see the image loaded from Google they can detect when the image doesn't load. Google was returning a non-200 response code for images the user can't see.
The second wasn't a traditional XSRF. Instead it was making the victim (unknowningly) edit a shared document created by the attacker. The attacker uses the feature of Google docs that shows all current editors to see the victim's Google account name.
You reckon? I doubt that engineers are making ~$1m/yr...
But I agree, that the time spent by someone discovering a bug is worth well over $500. Let say you spend 3-4 evenings playing with it and you find something. that roughly translates into 2 full days of work. Assuming $500-700/day figure (which might actually represent a significant amount of engineers at Google) they should be paying at least $1-1.5k per bug. But even that is on a cheap side I think...
You conclude that these bugs are "subtle", but I don't quite agree. In some sense, ClickJacking is always "subtle"(vuln 2 and 3), and you can argue the same for any kind of side channel information leakage (vuln 1 and 2).
Except that clickjacking is known for years now and should be considered serious like XSS.
And the information leakage, well, it's IMO just not allowed to happen if you're a huge corporation implementing a worldwide single-sign-on identity service and many different types of web applications, while claiming to care about your user's privacy. It should be their number one priority and failing this means they're rolling out new features in a tempo that simply means they cannot hold true to claims about privacy.
Somebody else mentioned the tone of this article. While I'm not a big fan of the "jerk" attitude either when it comes to security testing (mostly because usually the bigger the mouth, the less interesting their feats), a security vulnerability is still a coding mistake that always ends up inconveniencing or endangering the privacy of the userbase. And I think that should be said. Which the author did. But he also downplayed the bugs by calling them "subtle" and then immediately praising Google for how lucky we are that they fixed them so quickly ... maybe I just do prefer the jerks, after all.