There is also a detailed factual exposition of the technical changes forced by Russia since 2014 in Crimea and later Kherson "Rerouting of Kherson follows familiar gameplan" [1].
In [3] below Viktoriia Opanasiuk writes:
"responding on «As this only affects LIRs, I doubt there will be significant participation by non-LIRs» I must say that it affects all internet service providers that use IP resources. In Ukraine there are more than 5 000 registered ISPs, but not all of them are LIRs.
The situation that we have now is that when russian troops withdraw from our territory, they dismantle and take with them not only washing machines, but also telecom equipment, TV- and radio-transmitters, leaving people who live there without any information channels and means of communication. We have to re-build telecom and internet infrastructure, and yes, we could bring new equipment there, but if the IP addresses of local Internet Providers will be transferred to other parties, we will not be able to restore even our critical infrastructure there, and there is no place to get new IPv4 addresses.
Therefore any solutions that involve allowing transfers now and somehow reverting them later are not solving this immediate problem that we have."
The threads with most focus seem to be:
"Protecting Resource Holders in Distressed Areas" [2]
"IP adress transferring in Ukraine" [3]
"UA IP transfer" [4]
"UA IP transfers situation" [5]
[0] https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/ncc-services-wg/2022...
[1] https://www.kentik.com/blog/rerouting-of-kherson-follows-fam...
[1] https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/ncc-services-wg/2022...
[2] https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/ncc-services-wg/2022...
[3] https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/ncc-services-wg/2022...
[4] https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/ncc-services-wg/2022...