For a text, The Economist published a great introductory article (though paywalled) into modern approaches to national constitutions [1] this August, shortly before a failed referendum in Chile to change the country's constitution. An excerpt from the article notes that there is no "template for how to write the ideal constitution," with different approaches having reasonably good results (e.g. the UK's uncodified constitution versus the US's written constitution).

From The Economist's article: "[...] But academics have noticed patterns. Frequently changed constitutions are often a symptom of political corrosion, and tinkering can cause chaos in turn. Attempts to amend charters have led to violence in Burkina Faso, Burundi and Togo among others in recent years. The world’s longest charters, such as India’s and Brazil’s, are also among the most changed.

"There is a strong case for brevity, too, in which constitutions establish the ground rules of how a state functions and leave the specifics to politicians. Overly long constitutions often create conflicts between articles that can only be resolved with further tampering. And “if everything is highest law, then nothing is highest law anymore,” points out Dr Versteeg. Omnibus amendments require voters to balance the merits and drawbacks of many changes at once, making it harder to generate consensus."

The viewpoint by the writer of The Economist's article would actually conflict with the view held by the original commenter, as it notes that many more recently-written constitutions that have taken different approaches from older constitutions have contributed to political instability (though the writer also acknowledges that other factors have also been at play behind instability).

[1] https://www.economist.com/international/2022/08/25/dictators...