> By the mid-1970s, it became clear that nuclear power would not grow nearly as quickly as once believed. Cost overruns were sometimes a factor of ten above original industry estimates, and became a major problem. For the 75 nuclear power reactors built from 1966 to 1977, cost overruns averaged 207 percent. Opposition and problems were galvanized by the Three Mile Island accident in 1979.[46]

> Over-commitment to nuclear power brought about the financial collapse of the Washington Public Power Supply System, a public agency which undertook to build five large nuclear power plants in the 1970s. By 1983, cost overruns and delays, along with a slowing of electricity demand growth, led to cancellation of two WPPSS plants and a construction halt on two others. Moreover, WPPSS defaulted on $2.25 billion of municipal bonds, which is one of the largest municipal bond defaults in U.S. history. The court case that followed took nearly a decade to resolve.[47][48][49]

> Eventually, more than 120 reactor orders were cancelled,[50] and the construction of new reactors ground to a halt.

> [..]

> The failure of the U.S. nuclear power program ranks as the largest managerial disaster in business history, a disaster on a monumental scale … only the blind, or the biased, can now think that the money has been well spent. It is a defeat for the U.S. consumer and for the competitiveness of U.S. industry, for the utilities that undertook the program and for the private enterprise system that made it possible.[53]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_the_United_St...

Or as, Hyman Rickover also called: "Father of the Nuclear Navy" said:

> An academic reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following basic characteristics:

> - (1) It is simple.

> - (2) It is small.

> - (3) It is cheap

> - (4) It is light.

> - (5) It can be built very quickly.

> - (6) It is very flexible in purpose (’omnibus reactor’).

> - (7) Very little development is required. It will use mostly off-the-shelf components.

> - (8) The reactor is in the study phase. It is not being built now.

> On the other hand, a practical reactor plant can be distinguished by the following characteristics:

> - (1) It is being built now.

> - (2) It is behind schedule.

> - (3) It is requiring an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. Corrosion, in particular, is a problem.

> - (4) It is very expensive.

> - (5) It takes a long time to build because of the engineering development problems.

> - (6) It is large.

> - (7) It is heavy.

> - (8) It is complicated.

> The tools of the academic-reactor designer are a piece of paper and a pencil with an eraser. If a mistake is made, it can always be erased and changed. If the practical-reactor designer errs, he wears the mistake around his neck; it cannot be erased. Everyone can see it.

> The academic-reactor designer is a dilettante. He has not had to assume any real responsibility in connection with his projects. He is free to luxuriate in elegant ideas, the practical shortcomings of which can be relegated to the category of ‘mere technical details.’ The practical-reactor designer must live with these same technical details. Although recalcitrant and awkard, they must be solved and cannot be put off until tomorrow. Their solutions require manpower, time and money.

> Unfortunately for those who must make far-reaching decisions without the benefit of an intimate knowledge of reactor technology and unfortunately for the interested public, it is much easier to get the academic side of an issue than the practical side. For a large part those involved with the academic reactors have more inclination and time to present their ideas in reports and orally to those who will listen. Since they are innocently unaware of the real but hidden difficulties of their plans, they speak with great facility and confidence. Those involved with practical reactors, humbled by their experience, speak less and worry more.