GE is laying off 20% of its workforce devoted to onshore wind power
cnbc.com
cnbc.com
For some context, GE is kind of riches-to-rags story. Check out this chart of the share price:
https://www.tradingview.com/chart/?symbol=NYSE%3AGE
Here's a company whose stock is trading at 1994 levels. It never recovered from the "dot-com" crash of 2001. The dividend yield is nowhere close to a US treasury at any maturity. It's losing money left and right. A good chunk of that was the pivot, under Jack Welch's leadership, from actually making stuff into financial services, shedding hundreds of thousands of jobs along the way. GE was therefore well-placed for full-impact during the GFC.
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/59366216-the-man-who-bro...
In case anyone thinks it is past now. There is army of nincompoops who idolize him even today.
Unions with a board seat. Employee ownership. Shares in the hands of pragmatic investors who value long term over extraction and dumping the carcass on the next fool. People like Welch and characters like Gordon Gecko aren’t heroes, they’re cautionary tales, the Frank Underwoods (House of Cards) of finance and corporate management.
I'm curious, what are the things that happened during the Clinton administration that you think were short-term gains at the expense of long-term improvements? I've always felt that many of the fiscal policies of Clinton were in favor of long-term stability (e.g. specifically his tax policies and balancing the budget).
Now, with monetary policy and Greenspan specifically, I 100% agree that the "Greenspan put" was absolutely a disaster for long-term stability, but Greenspan was in office from 1987 - 2006 (originally nominated by Reagan), so I see his choices as pretty orthogonal to whoever was president at the time.
The dot com bubble forming and then popping is a notable one, Enron's fraudulent ascent is another.
While I agree with this, I interpreted the parent comment as saying there was something specific about the Clinton administration's policies that led to short term thinking. New technology boom and busts have been going on since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution (just look at early railroads and auto companies); the dot com bubble had nothing specifically to do with Clinton. Similarly, WTF did Enron have to do with the Clinton administration?
Who is responsible for allowing these things to happen if not the President at the time? Sure, there are limitations to executive power but far more leeway in raising the alarm via the bully pulpit and plenty of scope for using the investigation and regulatory powers that did exist and it would have been a great opportunity for spending political capital to act or at least try. I’m not aware of any evidence of any of that being done and the notion that Clinton couldn’t have known or couldn’t have done anything at all about it is ridiculous. Therefore it’s the implicit Clinton policy of neglect or inaction which is where the culpability lies. I’m happy to be proven wrong and I’m not blaming Clinton alone or even primarily but he deserves plenty of blame nonetheless.
The President is not God, or a king. People seem to be confused about the role and powers of the President in our system. What, exactly, do you wish the President had said on his bully pulpit about Enron??
I always find it bizarre that people blame the President for everything that happened on his watch, just as much as I think it bizarre that they give him all the credit. I mean, I generally think Clinton was a good president, but he also had much more than his fair share of luck in presiding during a booming economy (which would have boomed no matter who was president at that time).
Keeping Presidents accountable doesn't mean expecting Godlike powers.
Let's not forget WorldCom and Arthur Anderson, who later formed Deloitte if I'm not mistaken. We have them to thank in part for SOX and SOC audits as well as the PCAOB.
There used to be strict leverage restrictions on funds that raised money from investors, as well as limits on who/what entities could invest in the funds. The article really goes into more detail but lawmakers and the Clinton administration eliminated these laws and birthed the modern private equity industry which is pretty much the definition of short term focus.
Of special note, the two BRAC rounds that were conducted under his presidency (93, 95), as well as one under H.W. Bush (91) and one under Reagan (88), substantially reduced the number of extraneous, pork barrel military bases across the US.
The 1988-2001 US defense budget decreases made a lot of hard and politically unpalatable choices that were fiscally responsible.
And since the US budget is ~15% DOD, that addressed a big chunk.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_Realignment_and_Closure
I'd say the current version isn't terrible. Competition has lead to creative destruction. What would be real failure is GE sticking around with a bunch of moribund initiatives tying up skilled individuals and resources. Spinning out divisions is bad for GE shareholders (when the whole thing collapses) ... but I'm not sure it was actually bad for country, or for employees of new companies, or innovation in general.
Things sorta worked they way they are supposed to. Bad management decisions over time results in bankrupt companies and their resources being auctioned off to more efficient corporations.
The thinking was that GE was screwed. Welch had been in power too long and made too many changes. There was no obvious leader. And GE had very much become Jack Welch Inc.
Company 1929 Revenues
Standard Oil (New Jersey) $1,523 (SO NJ > Exxon > merged with Mobil Oil to form ExxonMobil)
General Motors $1,504 (Reorganized in 2008, Still in Business)
Ford Motor $1,143 (Privately held until 50's Still in Business)
US Steel $1,097 (Still in Business)
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea $1,054 (Out of Business 2015)
Swift & Co. $1,000 (Still in Business, Acquired by JBS SA in 2017 to form JBS USA)
Armour & Co. $1,000 (Bought by Greyhound in 1970, divested many ways, impractical to explain without a diagram - probably counts as out of business)
Standard Oil (Indiana) $495 (Amoco > Acquired by BP)
Sears, Roebuck $444 (Alive? maybe a zombie business)
General Electric $415
> GE’s precipitous fall, following years of treading water while the overall economy grew, was exacerbated, some insiders say, by what they call “success theater.” Mr. Immelt and his top deputies projected an optimism about GE’s business and its future that didn’t always match the reality of its operations or its markets, according to more than a dozen current and former executives, investors and people close to the company. [0]
Jack Welch didn't always make great decisions -- diversifying away from GE's core businesses into financial markets, media, etc. His last act of trying to acquire Honeywell failed. But it was Immelt who brought the company down. Immelt grew GE Capital from 40 to 55% of the company at the onset of the Great Recession, took government bailout money when it tanked, then divested it from the company when it was clearly a drag on profitability. He championed GE Digital which never materialized, and then made big bets on conventional energy just when renewables were taking off. I don't know if it could have been different in someone else's hands. But a little more truth-telling would probably have helped. Welch did think that appointing Immelt was his "biggest mistake" [1].
[0] https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-jeffrey-immelts-success-the...
[1] https://finance.yahoo.com/news/jack-welch-one-regret-general...
It is because Jeff did not (or not allowed) to continue with scammy accounting practices encouraged by Jack Welch to keep stock price and earning per share high.
> Jack Welch didn't always make great decisions
Big, if true.
It's not that surprising once you think about it: Booming technologies means more companies enter the market. Some will be able to produce cheaper or better products than what's already there. If the old ones can't adapt they'll struggle.
In the case of solar what happened was that the Chinese government underwrote Chinese manufacturers who produced significant volumes of solar panels which they dumped on the global market for incredibly cheap prices which put pressure on all the other global manufactures and consolidated the market. That said a lot of the Chinese manufacturers also went bankrupt as they undercut each other on prices to fill out the manufacturer queue.
Also in energy tech you don't have infinite upside like technology -- as you deploy hard capital you have a finite range that you can get returns on. In the electricity markets you typically have to build technology and sell it for cheaper than what is currently available (i.e. project finance your project on a PPA < market rates). Already a fundamentally difficult structure to do well in - add in regulatory slowdown, political mandates, utilities as your clients (slow lead times).
Unfortunately, the skills involved in deploying on land don't transfer very easily to sea work. Doing anything at sea is a specialty of its own. So, people with long sea experience will learn to put up wind turbines.
A wind turbine (even an extremely large one) otoh is only earning $400/hr so if you spend a million dollars getting it up 3mo earlier you've made a loss.
I'm sure some have adapted though.
the solar industry is literally zero moving parts. Panels and inverters are off-the-shelf commodities that are in a race to the bottom for price. this is further helped by the fact that they are largely interchangeable.
Wind turbines do not function like this and they are complicated, dynamic systems requiring continuous monitoring and regular maintenance.
The reality here is that the wind energy industry is and will continue to see a boom and order books are often full years into the future. Despite the headlines, onshore wind isn't going anywhere because there are many regions around the world where offshore wind does not work well.
Offshore wind is being hyped up by Europe - coincidentally, a region with relatively shallow seas and limited land area. Despite the boom, there are not that many manufacturers of wind turbines precisely because it is a capital intensive industry. This is not good news.
"The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down." [1]
The last sentence is a sarcastic quip, for those who aren't familiar with his personality.
[1]: warning, pdf link: https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf
Airlines lack substantial economies of scale, customer captivity, captive supply, or regulatory protections. The airline industry is a textbook case of an industry with no durable competitive advantages, thus the only performance factor is operational efficiency.
Insurance on the other hand, there are substantial economies of scale (large fixed costs and also larger insurance companies are more diversified thus less costly/risky) and high customer captivity (high switching cost, high search cost).
The other major factor which prevents airlines from ever sustaining high profits is pilot unions. The pilots will demand most of the extra profits, and usually get it because a strike instantly shuts down the entire airline.
Airline A can have 100% coverage everywhere in the world and be the largest airline. But if Airline B enters a specific route, there is no advantage to a customer whether they ride with A or B for that specific route. This is why there are so many entrants into the industry.
The biggest factor to the lack of durable profits in the airline industry isn’t labor or unions. It’s the ease of entry into the market which puts tremendous pressure on price. There are no substantial barriers to entry, prices go down until profits are close to zero. So in classical value based investment lingo, it is an industry with no competitive advantages.
The airlines industry in aggregate has never had a ROIC greater than its cost of capital over the long term (>1 yr) for the lifetime of the industry.
However, for investors, we care about profits from capital deployment, or returns from invested capital minus cost of capital. The marginal earnings that leading airlines generate from loyalty programs and business traveler accounts do not make up for the huge demand for capital, thus insufficient to break even the cost of capital.
Tickets are fungible and people will make insane choices to save a dollar. The constrained resource is gates. The network effects that make big airlines viable are expensive, so without regulation there’s always upstarts who drive the price as low as possible. That’s why Emirates is fancy.
If you live near NYC, there is an airport in Newburg that attracts weird financial engineering airlines that leverage leases to fly international cheaply. When I saw Hamilton, I flew Norwegian airlines from NY to London for $24. The long term parking cost more.
It’s an industry where the low barrier to entry ensures that the industry as a whole is barely profitable.
"Network Effects" means the Nth person doing business with the company generates more value for the business's service to everyone else, all else equal. I don't think airlines have network effects. There isn't much benefit to flying a highly-trafficked airline vs a lower-trafficked airline, provided they have the same routes. (If anything, this might be marginally inversely correlated? Small airlines seem to have a better experience than the big ones)
"Economies of Scale" means that cost of goods sold becomes a lower percentage of revenue as revenue grows. This doesn't hold true for airlines, because jet fuel & taxes thereon, and leasing gate space make up the biggest fixed costs IIRC. Bigger airlines don't have a lot of negotiating edge vs small ones, here. Plus, big airlines have an exponential logistical problem to solve, which is costlier to solve "at scale". Thus, profit scales basically linearly (some might argue sub-linearly) with revenue.
There are indeed regional economies of scale for those airlines that invest in monopolizing growing transit hubs. Virgin Airlines and Southwest built their businesses on them, and are well-studied examples. But they are not durable over a long enough time horizon, and don't "scale" up to bigger footprints.
Airlines "own" far too little of their costs, and startup cost is far too low, for them to be durable and large business.
The dynamic is terrible for value investors like BRK, but arguably quite great for consumers (fliers). And not too shabby for early-stage investors, either.
Ultimately the problem boiled down to plain arithmetic. Just addition, subtraction. Hard problems involved multiplication.
After like the tenth problem I lost my patience & raised my hand - why don't you just do these problems with small numbers ? Like 23-(5+12+4) = 2 ? Why are you making us do 23,000,000 - (5,000,000 + 12,000,000 + 4,000,000) = 2,000,000 ?
The Professor said - Accountancy is arithmetic. With Big numbers. That's money for you.
You picking a cheaper airline with worse margins does not mean that airlines are a good business
Spirit (and other airlines) innovated and temporarily enjoyed a large market share of a second modality of commercial flight (very low budget travel). But it isn't (and wasn't, if you compare their operating margin over time [1]) a durable advantage.
The reason is there's very little preventing you and I from starting Soul Airlines, and copy-pasting the Spirit playbook. Many airlines have, and more will. And this drives their prices down, which is great for you but not for long-term Spirit investors.
At the end of the business cycle, the logical limit of their operating margin has proven to be functionally indistinguishable from Delta's.
[1]: https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/stock-comparison?s=operat...
The reality is it's harder to fully book a plane like the one you describe, than one with a distribution of seats that more closely resembles the distribution of the commercial airline customer population, especially when you consider how to pass on the cost of spiky jet fuel to the people in the cabin.
On a plan with 8 business class seats, you can pass on most of that price to those 8, and you'll still fill the rest of the cabin and make money on the flight. With "only" 30 business class seats, it's a different story. Missing 6 seats might cause you to lose money.
Wikipedia says Ted folded in 2008, amid a spike in fuel prices.
I am just lamenting the loss of an airline where I, being taller than the average human economy seating is optimized for, was actually comfortable for the whole flight. The only times I've been comfortable on a plane have been in exit rows or the small number of times I've splurged and flown first class.
Lots of companies provide valuable services, yet are crappy businesses from a FCF standpoint.
https://www.ft.com/content/3f1ac0e6-f204-478d-8b64-54a699a12...
https://www.npr.org/2022/06/01/1101505691/short-term-profits...
https://www.axios.com/2022/05/31/jack-welchs-questionable-le...
https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Man-Who-Broke-Cap...
Oh, and he fought hard against the EPA and scientists who said PCBs had bad health consequences so that GE could continue dumping them into the Hudson river and not have to pay for the cleanup until 30 years later (when he was long since retired).
How many times have we seen this exact thing play out?
Xerox, Kodak, IBM, HP, etc.
Some of it is due to technological change, but even that isn't necessarily the problem but rather the company's response to it (failing to invest, focusing on financial engineering rather than innovation, asset stripping, enriching executives at the expense of everyone else, etc.) is.
What isn’t apparent, is that at most orgs you can get a short lived lift in revenue by burning a technical asset for pennies on the dollar. 10% more revenue by reducing quality 50%, but the reduction in quality lags the revenue bump by a couple quarters. You look amazing and then move on.
Why? It’s the MBA dream to make out like a bandit and leave a trail of despair and destruction in your trail: any joy left over is value you failed to extract.
One of the greatest lines ever
My faith in anything they do is very low.
Ref: "The fall of GE" https://theweek.com/articles/761357/fall-ge (2018)
My point is that it would have been extremely difficult for any giant conglomerate adapted to the business environment of 1981 to transition successfully to the business environment of 2021 without changing nigh unrecognizably.
[1] https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1981.html
[2] https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/01/16/IBM-reports-sharply-...
[3] https://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/23/business/ge-had-small-gai...
That's why GE and GM both let the finance part of the business wag the dog.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rockwell_International#Apex_an...
Some are in fact successful companies to this day.
The MBA ruined many things, it was scientific management brought back with a catchy name. Not creative enough to be in the artists? Lacking the intellectual discipline to become a real process engineer? It's okay you can become an MBA, learn no real skills, no real information and feel superior because then you can lord yourself over the serfs that decided to go into the silly practice of actually providing goods and services, when you can "manage" the people that actually contribute.
Note this shouldn't be taken as a tirade against management, there are good leaders out there that do make things better for those they lead, but my point is that an MBA is totally independent variable to whether or not someone will be a good manager. The problem is that an MBA basically trains people to see their work/world as a video game where they play with spreadsheets, choose the right dialogue options in the tree, and assign your workers to specific tasks, and then when the reality doesn't conform everything hits the fan.
This is a bad, if commonly-made, attribution [1].
Confirmation bias truly is a juggernaut.
It was a fun thought to ponder in a vacuum, but the real world has timelines.
Accurate except the last part - when reality doesn't conform you come up with a 'transition plan' that involves you finding another group to run over a 3 month grace period while all the workers scramble with much less time than that
[0] https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/03/25/us-owne...
20 years later in another life I did business with IBM as an enterprise customer. Same complete shitshow. Never again ...
This was around 2005 and the entire GE Wind division was recently acquired from the Enron meltdown. Part of my job was to sort through a bunch of Enron manuals that had water damage sitting in the Tehachapi desert for 3 years in a warehouse. Surprisingly, the work done at Enron was quite good and bluebooks were really well done. They had already worked on a 5MW version of the turbine and had plans for 8MW. I'd say a third of it was water damaged and impossible to read. But, GE's management was a trainwreck happenning in slow motion beyond that. I worked a little bit with their Bangalore team that was working on wind turbine conceptual design framework. Essentially, GE's internal simulation tool for determining a whole bunch of design envelopes. There was little coordination between the US and Bangalore software team, often stepping on each other's toes. This program ended six months later after my internship. Basically, GE's wind turbine division at the time was Enron's zombie dressed up with nice clothes and trying to stand straight. Idk if things improved after that. I hated that internship so much, part of which was sifting through nasty boxes of molded design docs and then scanning them on a xerox machine.
First I have heard of this!
IIRC then the house of cards collapsed right after Jack Welch and his management cult of personality retired?
Likely this is a "last gasp" financial bloodsuck to sell off what remains of the legitimate parts of the company.
The former VC / MBA who succeeded Jack Welch [1] is the one who discovered the cooked books and financial shenanigans. Welch was educated as a chemical engineer [2].
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Immelt
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Welch#Early_life_and_educ...
Unless you're trying to say that there were NO MBAs under Jack Welch's management team and organization?
MBAs are absolutely the problem.
You can't compete against a nation state. Best you can do is have nation states agree to let you in on the action.
https://m.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/VESTAS-WIND-SYSTEMS...
If they did want to make Vestas their champion, they could make Ørsted, a global leader in offshore wind in which the government has a majority stake, buy Vestas turbines. As it is, Ørsted has historically only bought from Siemens and GE.
In reality, Vestas is based and rooted in Jutland “far” from the capitol.
Is their a study that answers these questions?
> to pay up for all that steel, copper, aluminum, and a couple of rare earth metals,
This sentence obfuscates that we're just talking about the dollar price here. Which is easily calculated
> offset the environmental impact of collecting and producing such materials?
Harder to decisively calculate but seems unlikely to be an actual issue; and trivial when compared to the opportunity cost of generating the same energy with fossil fuels.
On shore wind is not as cost effective as solar or off shore wind either.
No direct answers but you can back out some timelines from these https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/offshore_...
https://weatherguardwind.com/how-much-does-wind-turbine-cost...
"GE’s renewables segment is going to generate between $15 billion and $16 billion in revenue this year, and onshore wind will make up the vast majority, roughly 70%."
The returns are fine and growing, but GE is restructuring, and as the article points out, facing stiff competition and supply chain issues as well. Apparently they think losing 20% of their staff will help, and it doesn't necessarily have anything to do with how long it takes a new tower to become profitable.
There are several businesses in the chain.
The manufacturer (GE), and sometimes component manufacturers, the project lead/developer, financiers, insurers, the engineering lead, and sometimes specialists, the subcontractors who do the physical work. And probably more.
It's not uncommon for some of these to be financially stressed at times in PV. Not the financiers, though.
Jérôme Guillet has a series on financing offshore wind[1]. On-shore is along the same lines; I'm sure you can adjust.
It's around 6 to 9 months.
edit: HN not being able to take a joke as usual.
However, remember that all power plants have materials, and wind has the second-lowest lifecycle emissions of all renewable technologies (https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy21osti/80580.pdf), and of course is orders of magnitude better than non-renewables.
You are asking about the capacity factor, but that's governed more by when wind is available, and is about 40-50% for onshore wind.
> and during which lifetime to be able to pay up
This is the payback time and there are several to consider.
For the embodied greenhouse gases of the wind turbine, about 5.3 months on average: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6686152/
> for all that steel, copper, aluminum, and a couple of rare earth metals
About 6-7 years for the economic payback of capital costs (not counting the unaccounted avoided $ externalities of displaced fossil fuels).
https://www.semprius.com/how-long-does-it-take-a-wind-turbin...
Turbines last about 20 years.
> About 6-7 years for the economic payback of capital costs (not counting the unaccounted avoided $ externalities of displaced fossil fuels).
Presumably, all that steal and other material is still around in 20 years to be resold?
How much do materials like these depreciate over 20 years? I'd guess in REAL terms not even 50%.
Historically (since 1975) metals have appreciated about 5x after inflation. Here is the 50 year price of scrap steel futures:
https://www.investing.com/commodities/steel-scrap-historical...
Stuff like composites for the turbine blades don't have a clear recycling/resale story yet, although there have be recent attempts to grind them down and turn them into other useful things:
https://cen.acs.org/environment/recycling/companies-recycle-....
Links to articles that reference the studies: - https://www.windpowerengineering.com/wind-turbine-carbon-pay... - https://www.newscientist.com/lastword/mg24332461-400-what-is...
Wind can compete favorably with solar on price when you have the right conditions, which are both starting to beat traditional sources of power. It is hitting the point where you would select either wind or solar for price, when ignoring the desire for stable output.
One current issue for wind power is what to do with the waste. The blades erode over time and need to be replaced, but mostly consists of fiberglass. It's not a huge problem, but each advancement in technology brings a new set of problems to be dealt with. Still, I'd rather deal with fiberglass than nuclear waste.
You are comparing wind power to 'nothing'. You need to compare it to the alternatives.
...
The wells, refining plant, and pipelines for gas, and the mines, railways, and ash disposal pits for coal. And the river intakes, detention ponds and so on needed for steam and cooling water.
I read an industry article mid-COVID that claimed the biggest barrier to offshore right now was the lack of ships to install them - alleviated somewhat by the introduction of floating offshore rigs, like these:
So yeah, it's gotta be way cheaper to drop a couple of those in the ocean than truck towers out to middle-of-nowheresville or digging a foundation at the bottom of the ocean or whatever.
Interestingly with these size is not the be-all and end-all. If you make them so that they fit in the average port (towed by an average pair of tugs), the range of locations where they can be installed increases a lot. As does the availability of ships usable for the install.
These have been around longer than fossil fuel powered ones. They're called bikes.