Russia's Only “Winning Move”
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It assumes all players are rational.
In Russia's case, this might not be the case. They don't necessarily want the best outcome for them. They want to show the rest of the world who's boss, or die trying.
It is self-serving and dangerous to ascribe irrationality to behavior that is out of the norm from our perspective. The problem is that in many cases, what we deem as irrational behavior is simply behavior predicated from different beliefs or different values. How Putin evaluates different outcomes for Russia is likely to be very different than that from a western context. Our strategy to avoid a nuclear war must be in light of our assessment of his beliefs and values, and an analysis of how he will maximize Russia's outcome from that perspective.
If our policy is one of complete Russian retreat, and we reason from our context that escalating to nuclear weapons to secure victory is irrational, we're all but assuring an eventual nuclear confrontation with Russia. The only way to surely avoid nuclear war is to allow Russia an avenue to some kind of victory in Ukraine using only conventional weapons. We want to severely raise the cost of this victory, but at the same time we should accept the outcome if Russia is willing to pay it. If our policy is such that the choice is left to Russia to either go nuclear or completely withdraw, it will just represent the complete recklessness that our policy towards Russia continues to be.
Few people aside from area experts are aware that Saddam Hussein thought that he won Gulf War 1. In his world, when a ruler loses a war, he is deposed and probably killed. He faced a war with the world's most powerful forces and emerged alive and in power. Therefore, he won.
The portrayal of Putin and the Kremlin in general by Western government and media is based on caricature. Since the war began, Kremlinologists trying to give a more nuanced view are shouted down.
If Russia dropped a tactical nuke, the U.S. would have to retaliate with one as well to make it clear that we are willing to. Letting them doubt our deterrence capability would be even more risky, and they know that.
>If Russia dropped a tactical nuke, the U.S. would have to retaliate with one as well to make it clear that we are willing to.
There is no reason that we must retaliate against Russia for a tactical nuke used in Ukraine. This in no way appears to undermine our willingness to defend NATO territories against such a strike.
What this idea does, that Russia cannot use a tactical nuke in Ukraine because of the principle of a necessary retaliation by the U.S., is negate the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering Russia at the mercy of U.S. interests around the world. You may like this principle, but Russia may not. They may be motivated to assert their interests in Ukraine using the only remaining tools they have. They may see anything less as signaling permanent subjugation to U.S. interests. I personally have no interest in risking WW3 just to force Russia to signal subjugation to U.S. interests.
But that's the thing: nuclear weapons cannot be allowed to provide a strategic advantage in a conventional war of conquest, or they would be used. Russia using a nuke in a war on conquest would set a terrible precedent that cannot be allowed to stand. If they can do it with Ukraine, they can do it with Moldova, and then they can do it with any other country they choose to attack. If they have no retaliation to fear, they have no reason to hold back anymore.
I don't think NATO can afford not to retaliate in some manner. How, I don't know, but doing nothing will effectively reward the offensive use of nuclear weapons, which means it will happen more often.
I don't know what this means other than we will fight a nuclear war to prevent other states from using the threat of nuclear weapons to secure their interests. But this is just unintelligible to me.
> If they have no retaliation to fear, they have no reason to hold back anymore.
We can demonstrate, and have, a massive increased cost to such incursions. But some nations may choose to pay that cost some of the time if they calculate the benefit is sufficient. The only way to prevent this is nuclear war. It is absolutely not worth it to maintain the stability of the current border configuration.
I don't really know either. There's definitely a point where nuclear escalation is going to require a nuclear response, but if a non-nuclear response is possible and proportional while still stopping Russia's ability to deploy nuclear weapons, that would of course be preferable.
There's a good reason why nobody wanted to escalate to nuclear war during the Cold War: you put the opposition in the position of either having to accept one-sided nuclear aggression, or go to full nuclear war. Both are terrible.
Think it; US won't directly attack Russia mainland, neither Russia will attack US mainland. But EU continental territories will probably be fair game for NATO.
So if a nuclear war begins nukes will only be deployed inside EU countries, that will probably lead a NATO disband and / or some countries with nukes or even conventional kinetic weaponry, just starting to directly attack Russia somehow, without US "ok".
You can't predict at this point how it is going to be played, but almost certainly, EU elites won't be happy knowing / discovering their land / cities / territories are going to be - nuclearly - taken to tabula rasa once again, and that would lead to decisions.
> Think it; US won't directly attack Russia mainland
You might ask yourself some questions:
(1) Why is having multiple independent nuclear powers as members an important part of NATO’s nuclear posture.
(2) Why is the forward deployment of US troops and nuclear weapons (some slated for delivery by host-nation forces under nuclear sharing agreements) also an import part of NATO’s posture?
(3) Why is the involvement of non-nuclear members of NATO in NATO nuclear planning an important part of NATO’s nuclear posture?
NATO—including the US—isn’t going to nuke itself (most of the EU also being in NATO or in close security arrangements with it) and not Russia in response to Russia using nukes against the EU.
I really wonder why you'd possibly think that. NATO dwindles when it seems unnecessary, but as we've already seen, nothing unites NATO like a common enemy does.
Keep in mind that NATO has spent its entire existence preparing for a possible war with Russia. The moment Russia starts throwing nukes, it will get nuked by NATO. It's the very thing the NATO nuclear doctrine is designed around: retaliation if Russia ever initiates a nuclear war.
The Budapest Memorandum suggests otherwise.
There is—security of the Eastern flank of NATO—though it doesn’t require a nuclear response.
> What this idea does, that Russia cannot use a tactical nuke in Ukraine because of the principle of a necessary retaliation by the U.S.
That’s not the principle. The principle is that Russia cannot prosecute an unprovoked war of aggression, in which it commits an appalling array of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Direct NATO response has not been withheld short of further escalation by Russia as a matter of right or because Russia has committed insufficient provocation (on either aggression, humanitarian risk, or regional security risk calculus, Russia has far exceeded that which led to NATO intervention against Serbia or Libya) but out of desire to reserve responsive options in the event of further escalation.
> is negate the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering Russia at the mercy of U.S. interests around the world.
The idea that other nuclear powers cannot respond militarily to aggressive use of nukes by Russia negates the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering those powers at the mercy of Russian aggressiom around the world.
> You may like this principle, but Russia may not.
Global concern for what the current Russian regime likes is not particularly high right now, nor should it be.
> They may be motivated to assert their interests in Ukraine using the only remaining tools they have.
That is, indeed, a danger of a regime ewuipped with WMD of any kind facing conventional defeat and without the perception of its own domestic political strength to just take the L. But unless the world is prepared to allow itself to be forced into abject surrender to any aggressor willing to wave around nonconventional weapons, there needs to be a clear expectation—and demonstrated follow through should someone decide ro challenge it—that using sich weapons to rescue failing aggression will only magnify the scope of failure.
The whole idea of "security of the Eastern flank of NATO" goes out the window when NATO engages in direct conflict with Russia. Your response is self-defeating.
>The principle is that Russia cannot prosecute an unprovoked war of aggression, in which it commits an appalling array of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
That's great for a tweet, but it doesn't actually outline NATO's policy towards Russia. If the goal is NATO security, our continued escalation of the proxy war is self-defeating. Moral indignation should not be the driver of foreign policy.
>The idea that other nuclear powers cannot respond militarily to aggressive use of nukes by Russia negates the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place
No, the idea is that a nuclear power inserting itself into an engagement between two parties while expecting the other party not to escalate to nuclear capabilities is undermining the strategic value of nuclear deterrence. The U.S. sitting out an engagement it was not involved in does nothing to undermine nuclear deterrence.
>But unless the world is prepared to allow itself to be forced into abject surrender to any aggressor willing to wave around nonconventional weapons
This is patently false and extremely dangerous, as I've already argued in a sibling comment.
No, actually, the whole reason collective self-defense and regional is a thing is that once someone is attacked, not fighting the aggressor can be worse for your own security than fighting them. THere’s a reason NATO Article 4 exists alongside Article 5 and has led to NATO action more than Article 5 has.
> That’s great for a tweet, but it doesn’t actually outline NATO’s policy towards Russia. If the goal is NATO security, our continued escalation of the proxy war is self-defeating.
No, the whole reason for NATO qua NATO support for Ukraine is that Russian aggression in the region is a regional security threat. Checking that aggression is by far the most important current security concern of NATO.
And what are the limits to this support? At some point, the support for Ukraine creates a greater security threat to NATO than no support. Escalating the proxy war to the point where Russia's only options are to nuke or retreat is a total failure of protecting regional security. Escalating even further to direct warfare with Russia is just to dissolve any idea of NATO security. There is no rational policy here, only policy driven by moral indignation.
So your trying to tell me, letting Ukraine force Russia out of its territories and showing them and the world that they aren’t the military ““super power”” everyone thought is _bad_ for regional security?.
What is your solution? To let Russia annex whatever territories it wants?.
This is just nonsensical. Offer an argument, and I will be happy to engage with it.
>What is your solution? To let Russia annex whatever territories it wants?.
In a comment upthread I have specified exactly how we should respond to avoid escalating to a nuclear war while also deterring future aggressive actions. Feel free to engage intelligently with those points.
> This is just nonsensical. Offer an argument, and I will be happy to engage with it.
Since you didn't link it yourself I can only assume that this is it.
> This isn't obviously true. Different regions will be valued differently by Russia in terms of control. It is clear that Ukraine is of supreme importance to Putin in terms of geography and cultural ties. If we raise the cost of victory in Ukraine to the point where that cost is higher than the anticipated benefit of occupying the next state, it is possible to prevent any further expansion. I believe we are well past that point in Ukraine. The assumption that any victory in Ukraine for Putin will inevitably result in further expansive attempts is a convenient narrative but doesn't hold up to scrutiny.
It appears your plan is to sacrifice Ukraine to Russia in hopes he doesn't do it again, this is a plan that is bound to fail as the world learnt with Hitler and the Sudetenland.
The only thing that will stop Russia having its colonial ambitions is to defeat them in such a thorough and direct way that they never think of doing it again as it would risk destabilising their country.
This is what is starting to happen in Ukraine, and what should continue to happen. The only way to stop this is force, appeasement never works.
This does not represent engaging intelligently with my argument.
Let's cut the crap. Is it your opinion that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange?
Is it your plan or not?.
> Let's cut the crap. Is it your opinion that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange?
No one is suggesting this because it doesn’t need to happen and is very unlikely to escalate to this.
Even if Russia uses a tactical nuke in Ukraine I don’t think the response from NATO would be nuclear because it doesn’t need to be. NATO is more then capable of pushing Russia out of Ukraine in a short period of time with conventional weapons given the state of the Russian armed forces.
No, your disingenuous characterization does not accurately describe my offered policy.
>No one is suggesting this because it doesn’t need to happen and is very unlikely to escalate to this.
So your policy is to leave the ball in Russia's court whether we end up in a nuclear exchange, based on the belief that Russia will ultimately back down? And you think this is a wise policy?
>NATO is more then capable of pushing Russia out of Ukraine in a short period of time with conventional weapons given the state of the Russian armed forces.
How can you be sure Russia will not respond with nuclear weapons to a direct kinetic response from NATO? Or a continuing and escalating response designed to push Russia out of Ukraine?
Then what is your policy? Your policy says to make it expensive for Russia to annex further territory.
But Russia has already annexed territory in Ukraine, what happens to that?. Can you directly tell me what you want to happen in Ukraine?, does Ukraine get to keep all its borders?.
> So your policy is to leave the ball in Russia's court whether we end up in a nuclear exchange, based on the belief that Russia will ultimately back down? And you think this is a wise policy?
It’s better then appeasement which is your policy. We cannot let Russia do what it wants or it will continue to annex territory from countries. For evidence of this just see.
- Moldova
- Georgia
- Chechnya
- Ukraine (2014)
> How can you be sure Russia will not respond with nuclear weapons to a direct kinetic response from NATO? Or a continuing and escalating response designed to push Russia out of Ukraine?
How can you be sure that Russia will?. Hell at this rate there’s a decent chance that Russias tactical nuke just wouldn’t work, which would be hilarious but also not a point I’d like to get.
Yes, expensive such that they will determine the cost is greater than the expected benefit. Every semi-rational agent responds to incentives, even Putin.
Yes, Ukraine will lose territory under my policy. How much remains to be seen. It turns out we don't get to unilaterally dictate how nuclear powers execute their foreign policy, not without risking a nuclear exchange.
>We cannot let Russia do what it wants or it will continue to annex territory from countries.
So your policy literally is that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange. Why do the hawks refuse to acknowledge the logical conclusion of their policy? Why not just own it?
> For evidence of this just see Moldova - Georgia - Chechnya - Ukraine (2014)
This isn't evidence that NATO demonstrating a massively increased cost to expansionist policy will not prevent further expansion. What the evidence shows is that no or lukewarm response to expansion, in conjunction with continued NATO expansion or interference, results in further Russian expansion. We haven't actually tried anything else.
Except they have learnt from Ukraine that if they threaten to use tactical nukes, people fold like a house of cards under your policy and Russia can get whatever it wants by holding the world hostage again.
> Yes, Ukraine will lose territory under my policy. How much remains to be seen. It turns out we don't get to unilaterally dictate how nuclear powers execute their foreign policy, not without risking a nuclear exchange.
So your dictating that Ukraine must lose a war, Russia gets everything it wants in hopes of teaching Russia what lesson again? that it can get its way as long as its threatens to use nukes?. What is to stop Russia doing exactly what they are doing now again?.
> So your policy literally is that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange.
My policy is to support Ukraine with any weapons that are not escalatory (ie dont given Ukraine its nukes back) and to provide Ukraine with the intelligence and support that it needs to push Russia out of its borders.
> Why do the hawks refuse to acknowledge the logical conclusion of their policy? Why not just own it?
Why do you refuse to acknowledge that your policy just allows Russia to continue doing whatever it wants as long as it threatens nukes, all your policy does is train Russia that nukes makes everyone fold like a cheap cardboard box.
> This isn't evidence that NATO demonstrating a massively increased cost to expansionist policy will not prevent further expansion. What the evidence shows is that no or lukewarm response to expansion, in conjunction with continued NATO expansion or interference, results in further Russian expansion. We haven't actually tried anything else.
What are these costs that you are suggesting that don't go straight out the window when Russia threatens another country with tactical nukes if they don't back down?.
No, they haven't. Let's not fall back into the dishonest takes after we made so much progress.
>What is to stop Russia doing exactly what they are doing now again?.
To repeat for the millionth time, the extreme cost that we impose on them for adventurism. They will not be willing to pay the cost they paid in Ukraine for fucking Moldova, for example.
>Why do you refuse to acknowledge that your policy just allows Russia to continue doing whatever it wants as long as it threatens nukes
Because it obviously doesn't to any honest interlocutor. I'm not sure what your deal is.
>My policy is to support Ukraine with any weapons that are not escalatory (ie dont given Ukraine its nukes back) and to provide Ukraine with the intelligence and support that it needs to push Russia out of its borders.
It's interesting to note the contrast between your actual policy proposal and the bombast of your rhetoric:
>The only thing that will stop Russia having its colonial ambitions is to defeat them in such a thorough and direct way that they never think of doing it again as it would risk destabilising their country.
It turns out you can't surely achieve the outcome of your rhetoric by adhering to the constraints of your policy. So which one gives first? What outcome are you willing to live with in reality, stripped of the rhetoric and cheerleading?
The only progress here is that you keep responding without any real answers.
What have exactly has Russia learnt if they get _exactly_ what they want when they threaten the world with nukes?. Can you actually answer the question instead of deflecting?.
> To repeat for the millionth time, the extreme cost that we impose on them for adventurism. They will not be willing to pay the cost they paid in Ukraine for fucking Moldova, for example.
Why cant this extreme cost be laid on them right now, so that they leave Ukraine, why is it that you are willing to throw Ukraine to the wolves so easily?.
> Because it obviously doesn't to any honest interlocutor. I'm not sure what your deal is.
The only bad faith participants here are you, you refuse to even explain any of your points or what these magical 'costs' are.
Your only point is that we must let Russia do whatever they want to Ukraine, and then hope for the best that they don't continue.
Your policy didn't work for Hitler and won't work for Russia.
> It turns out you can't surely achieve the outcome of your rhetoric by adhering to the constraints of your policy. So which one gives first? What outcome are you willing to live with in reality, stripped of the rhetoric and cheerleading?
Ukraine is completely capable of pushing Russia out of Ukraine, they are in fact doing it right now.
One of the Russian ""annexed"" cities fell mere hours after the ceremony in Russia, nothing happened.
What's the state of their economy again? What's the state of their military readiness? How many lives have been lost? How much wealth have the oligarchs had frozen? This is the COST. I don't know why you insist on playing dumb.
>Why cant this extreme cost be laid on them right now, so that they leave Ukraine
Because they are likely willing to pay that cost to secure Ukraine, whereas they likely will not be willing to pay a similar cost for Moldova.
>Your policy didn't work for Hitler and won't work for Russia.
This facile Hitler comparison is going to lead us straight into WW3.
>Ukraine is completely capable of pushing Russia out of Ukraine, they are in fact doing it right now.
We will see when Russia's "partial" mobilization is complete. We'll see when Russia continues to escalate their use of weaponry.
Also notice how you didn't answer my question. It's the same with all you guys, you refuse to state explicitly where your lines are and what cost you're willing to pay.
Russias mobilisation has already started, mobilised soldiers have already made it to the front and have had enough time (~1 week) to be captured as POWs.
This is literally all Russia has.
If you want to show the gains the Russian conscripts have made I’d be happy to look at the evidence.
But it appears to me after mobilisation that Russia has started being pushed back to their own borders at a incredible rate.
Unless you expect the conscripts to do better then the professional soldiers how does Russia have anything more to give?.
So far the most of the "COST" you're talking about has been covered by EU oil exports. Your "COST" is a missed opportunity. Not great, not terrible.
> whereas they likely will not be willing to pay
"Likely". That's reassuring.
> I don't know why you insist on playing dumb.
Conveniently your theory is that Russia costs are just on the line of winning in Ukraine, but not pushing forward. Same theory has been applied to every single Russia expansion, and it hasn't worked yet. But this time it's going to work, right?
You presented absolutely no evidence that supports your theory, and yet you act incredibly condescending. It's just "trust me guys, this time the costs are high enough for Russia to stop. But only after they conquer Ukraine". Who's playing dumb here?
At this point there's plenty of evidence that Russia actions are not rational, they are ideological.
Is it your opinion that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange?
If your answer is "no" then you are tacitly accepting a possible scenario where Ukraine loses territory and we let it happen.
If your response is something along the lines of "it won't come to that":
It turns out you can't surely achieve the outcome of your rhetoric by adhering to the constraints of your policy. So which one gives first? What outcome are you willing to live with in reality, stripped of the rhetoric and cheerleading? Ukraine losing some territory or a direct engagement with Russia with a significant likelihood of nuclear war?
If you're unwilling to do a worst-case analysis of your proposed policy, then it is clear you're an unserious interlocutor and only engaged in propaganda and cheerleading.
You're presenting a false dichotomy: either Russia wins, or Russia launches their nukes. Coincidentally same points are being made by Russian propaganda.
My opinion is that you prevent nuclear war by showing strength. Not by helping Ukraine fight, but by ensuring Ukraine wins. If Putin is willing to use nukes now, he would be way more willing to do it 10 years later, when he's at the death's door. Or, Putin aside, Russians would be way more willing, because NATO made them pay the "high cost" and they want revenge more than ever.
> If you're unwilling to do a worst-case analysis of your proposed policy
Naive worst-case analysis for nuclear powers is exactly what opens up infinite opportunity for blackmail.
Here, I can do one for your theory. Let's say Russia wins in Ukraine but pays a very high cost. Given they can no longer advance with their regular army, they launch nukes at EU. Because there are "secret labs developing bioweapons" in Poland. Or because russian people (the ones that ran from mobilization) are being discriminated in EU. Or those mobilization refugees decide to form their own state and separate from Finland. Or for any other fake reason.
Or, they declare Alaska purchase illegitimate and demand US to give it back. If US refuses, they launch nukes at US for stealing their territory.
Sounds crazy, right? But not so crazy when a dictator learns he's dying from cancer and decides to take his enemies with him to the grave.
No, I did not present a false dichotomy. "Up to and including" is not a dichotomy, it's a gradient of escalation. Seems pretty clear.
>My opinion is that you prevent nuclear war by showing strength. Not by helping Ukraine fight, but by ensuring Ukraine wins. If Putin is willing to use nukes now, he would be way more willing to do it 10 years later...
So in fact your policy is that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange. Why do you refuse to own the logical consequences of your rhetoric?
>Given they can no longer advance with their regular army, they launch nukes at EU... for any other fake reason.
Utterly ridiculous. This is unequivocally MAD territory. At worst you threaten MAD, you don't initiate a MAD scenario. This is the nonsense you dream up when you assume your adversary is totally irrational.
My take is that ensuring Russia loses decreases the risk of nuclear exchange. I don't know why you keep throwing in "up to nuclear exchange" in your argument as if it's somehow guaranteed. Russia has already threatened to use nukes. Where exactly is the line between them threatening and using that we shouldn't cross?
You presumptuously act as if know exactly where the fine line is. But lines are blurry. Maybe we're already past the point of no return. Maybe we've been there for the last 10 years.
> Utterly ridiculous. This is unequivocally MAD territory
Same has been said about Crimea annexation. And about eastern Ukraine annexation. And about current invasion. And yet it happens, and people like you are finding their ways to rationalize it.
I don't know if you realize it, but you are constantly echoing Russian propaganda.
Ukraine has been hitting territory that Russia either claims to own (Crimea) or actually owns (Belgorod) since the start of the war and nothing happened.
This should be the clearest message to everyone that all this nuclear talk from Russia is just posturing.
They had every chance to justify this months ago and they didn’t.
Obviously nothing is guaranteed, it's all a matter of probabilities/credences. But this is exactly why you can't make decisions based on the average/expected outcome and leave it at that. The utility of a nuclear exchange is so massively negative that it rationally requires giving that scenario a wide berth, wider than a simple likelihood assessment would suggest. That you are only considering the expected response in your analysis and resist considering the worst-case just shows how inadequate and ill-considered your proposal is.
>Same has been said about Crimea annexation. And about eastern Ukraine annexation. And about current invasion.
You don't seem to know what MAD is at all.
>I don't know if you realize it, but you are constantly echoing Russian propaganda.
I care about truth. I couldn't care less who else says it or what "side" it helps.
Again, this is based on assumption that Russia will stop after Ukraine. Given their rhetoric and actions in the last two decades, I see no reasons to believe that.
They've been consistently instilling hatred towards the West in their citizens. Not towards Ukraine.
Read the recent Putin's annexation speech, Ukraine was barely mentioned. It was mostly about USA, colonization, collective West, anglo-saxons, cancel culture, double standards, gay-propaganda, satanism (!).
Do you really believe this will all go away once Russia is done with Ukraine?
Just stop repeating this same nonsense. Either engage with the argument I posted up thread, or don't respond.
Since you're being vague and condescending at the same time, I suspect you're not arguing in good faith.
If you truly want people to engage with your argument, be specific.
Well, yes, anything where Russia perceives that using a nuke would be a viable option is a failure of regional–at least–security, which is why there has been substantial effort to make it very clear that that option is not viable for them, both through messaging, deployment of forces, etc.
Of course, should Russia use a nuke and that become a fait accompli, the same remains true going forward, which, to the point upthread, is why there must in that case be a substantial (though not necessarily nuclear, in response to a tactical nuke) response from NATO. But, before that line is crossed, communicating that that is the case is also important to avoid getting there.
Beyond that, Russia reaching the point that there only viable option is to retreat and abandon their aggression is not only a success scenario, it is the only success scenario. Everything else is some degree of failure. (Going forward, of course: retrospectively, allowing Russia to think that aggression was a viable path forward in the first place was itself a failure, but that’s the past and irreversible at this point.)
Yes, that is the intent. The problem is one of ensuring the message results in our desired belief-state in Putin. In reality, all we can do is be clear regarding our responses to various scenarios, and Putin will decide how he evaluates the cost of the west's responses. Putin may not evaluate the cost landscape in the manner we hope. Thus our actions may only precipitate further escalations from both sides.
>is why there must in that case be a substantial (though not necessarily nuclear, in response to a tactical nuke) response from NATO.
Why think this action itself does not start us on the road that inevitably leads to a nuclear exchange?
>Beyond that, Russia reaching the point that there only viable option is to retreat and abandon their aggression is not only a success scenario, it is the only success scenario. Everything else is some degree of failure.
This just goes to the point I made upthread, whether the U.S. can come to accept a world order not entirely driven by U.S. interests without fighting a world war over it. The era of universal success for the U.S. on the world stage is over.
No, it wouldn’t. A substantial NATO conventional response would be more sensible.
All in all, it's dangerous to let a deranged enemy think that the consequences for the use of nuclear weapons might be anything less than a nuclear response - allows them to think that it's a game of calculus that can be turned in their favor.
Using one of their nukes to take out a single himars is just dumb, even by Russian standards. They could burn through their stock pile in Ukraine, and still not achieve much tactical progress.
The response to using nukes on civilians probably starts with cruise missiles on Russian military targets. An escalation which Russia would eventually lose with certainty, and a final end to the "Russian Federation". This is not desirable to their leadership at all.
And let's say we do strike back with cruise missiles - it's unlikely to trigger Putin being overthrown. In fact, it may even convince some people on the fence that it really has been a war with the US for the survival of Russia all along. He has to retaliate so as not to appear weak, how can he reach an American target, even just an overseas base? I'm honestly not sure.
The scenario where his nuke draws one in return is just as messy with the out that it's so utterly shocking that it forces both sides to confront the fact that no one wants a nuclear war.
I really think China holds all the cards here - if they seriously threatened to cut Russia off over nukes, I don't think any get dropped. If they make wishy washy statements, there's a real chance they do.
If complete withdraw is off the table, then the game is every 10 or so years we will go through this cycle of land grabs by Russia, backed by historical revisionism and nuclear weapons - even with bad results in conventional warfare.
This started with 1 region in Georgia 2008, it's 2022 and i's already a total of 4 HUGE regions - with the promise of more in Ukraine and Moldova.
Where and when will it stop?
This isn't obviously true. Different regions will be valued differently by Russia in terms of control. It is clear that Ukraine is of supreme importance to Putin in terms of geography and cultural ties. If we raise the cost of victory in Ukraine to the point where that cost is higher than the anticipated benefit of occupying the next state, it is possible to prevent any further expansion. I believe we are well past that point in Ukraine. The assumption that any victory in Ukraine for Putin will inevitably result in further expansive attempts is a convenient narrative but doesn't hold up to scrutiny.
>Where and when will it stop?
If nothing else it stops at NATO's border. The fact is, the stability we've seen over the last 30 years is entirely due to the unquestioned dominance of the U.S. in the international sphere and the relative weakness of the next powerful nations. That era is coming to an end. If the current borders are unstable in light of current international power dynamics, they should not be defended at the threat of world war 3. The question is whether the U.S. can come to accept a world order not entirely driven by U.S. interests without fighting a world war over it.
Which costs are you talking about? Unlike the west, Russia clearly doesn't measure those costs in dollars or human lives.
Did any of those improve after 2014 invasion? Did any of those improve after 2022 invasion?
Again, you're trying to present him as this rational actor that shares western values. He does not.
Obviously they are not completely irrelevant. But they are nice to have. Not nice enough to convince him to change course.
I'm literally doing the opposite (re: western values). What I'm saying is not to assume he's an inhuman creature whose behavior is wholly unintelligible to us.
Well we things differently then. From what I see the rhetoric remains: to have Ukraine under Russian control, and all actions point in that direction. So I'd say, so far, it's holding up.
> If nothing else it stops at NATO's border.
Well, then the message is clear - join NATO or you risk being gobbled until it's borders, since that's the new limit. I don't think that's much of a game to be played in 2022. Plus it won't stop any World War, history has shown in the past what territorial concessions to expansionist leads to.
> That era is coming to an end.
I not sure if that's straight forward, and I'm not seeing many wanting to play with Russia in the split you're talking about, especially after these events. And to leave the weak at the will of an expansionist nation doesn't seem like much of world to be part of.
Is there any limit to how much you would escalate a war with Russia to defend the weak?
It's interesting that we are having this discussion about Ukraine, justifying a military response based on how morally wrong it was for Putin to start this war, while Ethopia and Sudan are fighting each other and nobody cares.
I assume that Western governments care about Ukraine because it is strategically important to them. It seems that self-interest is ultimately more important than morality in geopolitics.
So yeah, it is strategically important for the West that Russia loses. Because the end goal of Russia is not Ukraine. It's revanchism.
What are the people running Russia really afraid of? I assume they've been feeling existentially threatened, their boarders being indefensible, centuries of being invaded repeatedly across the open plains, declining economy and demographics, etc. Putin rolled the dice trying to take more of Ukraine, on his way towards defensible mountain passes, and it hasn't gone well for him. The real motivation is not revanchism, it's strategic. Countries come and go, sometimes disappearing. Russia is in decline, and they are doing what they think will improve their situation.
What are the people running the West afraid of? I assume they'd rather arm Ukrainians and have them die fighting Russians, in order to avoid having Western Europe possibly be involved first-hand in a war. Better that Ukrainians die than Westerners. The US is not existentially threatened, but we feel that it is in our interests to be involved in this war, as opposed to others that we don't care about.
I agree with what you said that it is strategically important for the West that Russia loses, but I wonder if I look at it more cynically than you do. I guess I'd be happier if people recognized that states are usually selfish more than moral, and often hypocrites.
Democracy.
> Better that Ukrainians die than Westerners.
The west is saving Ukrainian lives at the moment. Not "sort of" - the aid is actually stopping Russia's ethnic cleansing.
They find mass graves of tortured civilians in each liberated town.
Western soldiers in Ukraine would escalate the war.
> What are the people running the West afraid of?
Russian military.
I don't think avoiding democracy is the reason that Russia invaded Ukraine. How are the two related?
I assume they attempted to seize Ukraine in an attempt to better their strategic military and economic position.
> The west is saving Ukrainian lives at the moment.
I don't think that saving Ukrainian lives is the reason that the West is supporting Ukraine. In fact, our support of Ukraine has probably caused many Ukranians to die in the short term. If we wanted to save Ukrainian lives we would have told them to surrender.
> Russian military
I agree with you that the West is afraid of the Russian military. That's why we are involved. Not because of morals, not to save Ukrainian lives.
Putin seems to be afraid of losing his grip on Russian governance, and a Ukraine closer to the west means Russians will have yet another ex soviet state thrive and be modernized. For how long has Ukraine been stomped by Russia?
And you can see this in all of his address, talking about the GREATNESS of Russia - greatness shouldn't be preached, it usually shows in their sphere of influence. And Russia had the resources to actually be a great power - they're sandwiched between the largest trading block in the world, and a country on a crazy growth trajectory.
No one wants to invade Russia.
Maybe the reality of the narrative of the "West never wanted to play with Russia", is probably that after what Putin did in Chechnya he set the tone for future relationships. The US has also done some wrong doing, like he constantly reminds us to try to justify the validity of his actions, but at least the US leadership is renewed - we're stuck with Putin.
So this clearly isn't about being invaded. Those days of "open plain fields will allow them to march to the doors of Moscow" are long, long gone. That's his excuse.
This event seems to point at an attempt of Putin to remain in power. Even the narrative of him being the more moderate actor, while all the others preach for nuclear war is obvious, and a foreign enemy... where Russians used to take vacations, and the governance sent their children to study... That's why the next decades will be of absurdity.
>What are the people running the West afraid of?
Of a warmonger neighbor. Don't fool yourself: I'm pretty sure if they could intervene to end this rather fast, they would.
Don't forget that the west has been providing weapons with tech from the 80's, 90's and early 2000's... the closest thing to modern hardware are drones... an actually participation of Western countries would end this conflict fast. Of course there would be casualties, but the retreat to Russian borders in sight, it would be fast.
This is not a "border skirmish" with some AKs being fired.
The amount of equipment and manpower Russia has directed to Ukraine is larger than most of the world's militaries, except US and China.
Their losses of main battle tanks as of today correspond to 1/3 of the total number of US tanks, and more than the total number of tanks in western Europe.
Russia's casualties are now larger than the total US casualties during the Vietnam war.
The 800000 artillery shells in aid, correspond to 5000-10000 truckloads being delivered from neighbouring Nato countries.
Civilian Ukrainian casualties are in the tens of thousands, and counting.
I brought up the other conflict as a way of showing that we don't prioritize helping the weak. Other factors are more important.
> The only way to surely avoid nuclear war is to allow Russia an avenue to some kind of victory in Ukraine
It's easy to think that when you're thousands of miles away from Russia. But there's a reason top supporters of Ukraine (in terms of GDP) are Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and so on.
It is not the first expansionist war Russia has started. Any "victory" Russia gains means that next war is inevitable. Hell, this is their 3rd expansion into Ukraine, and every single time they claimed it was their last. And every single time they went a little bit further than the last.
If you believe they will stop after they're done with Ukraine, that's just wishful thinking.
No it's not semantics. The issue is whether Russia is capable of acting rationally to secure their interests as they define them given the facts on the ground and international pressure. Your personal evaluation of their value system is irrelevant to whether their behavior accords with their values and the cost landscape they are presented with.
>Any "victory" Russia gains means that next war is inevitable.
It's not inevitable. Different regions will be valued differently by Russia in terms of control. It is clear that Ukraine is of supreme importance to Putin in terms of geography and cultural ties. If we raise the cost of victory in Ukraine to the point where that cost is higher than the anticipated benefit of occupying the next state, it is possible to prevent any further expansion. I believe we are well past that point in Ukraine. The assumption that any victory in Ukraine for Putin will inevitably result in further expansive attempts is a convenient narrative but doesn't hold up to scrutiny.
You're missing the fact that Russia keeps redefining their interests. The word rational no longer has any meaning, because there's no way for Russia to act irrationally according to your framework. So yeah, it is semantics, we just have different meanings for word "rational". Yours seems quite useless, because in your world there's no way for anyone to be "irrational".
> It is clear that Ukraine is of supreme importance to Putin in terms of geography and cultural ties
Again, you're completely missing the point. Ukraine is of supreme importance because it's the easiest target right now, geography and cultural ties are what makes it the easiest. Once Ukraine is done, there will be next easiest target.
People seem to be endlessly confused that leaders spin various narratives to sell a war at home. Putin is no different. It is a mistake to confuse these speeches with the real motives.
>because there's no way for Russia to act irrationally according to your framework
No, what we can't do is a priori determine that he is acting irrational thus obviating the need of understanding and anticipating our adversary.
>Ukraine is of supreme importance because it's the easiest target right now, geography and cultural ties are what makes it the easiest. Once Ukraine is done, there will be next easiest target.
This is just blatantly a-historical and self-serving.
> People seem to be endlessly confused that leaders spin various narratives to sell a war at home. Putin is no different
So are we talking about Putin, or about Russia? You seem to equate the two. My belief is that Putin or not, revanchism against the west after losing the cold war is the Russian zeitgeist.
> we can't do is a priori determine that he is acting irrational thus obviating the need of understanding and anticipating our adversary
I never said we should not try to understand him. Of course he's not an absolute unpredictable madman.
But there isn't much to understand either. Clearly he's been playing foot-in-the-door game for a while now. Your suggested strategy "just give in a little bit more and hope he stops" has already been tried a few times and hasn't worked so far. You want to keep trying, but that is exactly what foot-in-the-door players want you to do. The best strategy is to close the door.
I think the idea is to relinquish as little as possible while making Russia suffer as much as possible.
> The best strategy is to close the door
Are you suggesting that we escalate and incur more suffering in the short term to head off a possible worse future outcome?
To me it seems obvious that Putin has been testing the waters for the last 10-15 years. Ukraine is not the end game, it's another test. So far the response that he got is that West is weak, worst they can do is slap on the wrist. Sure, the war turned out to be way more expensive than he anticipated, but Europe is still funding it.
Given Russia's rhetoric, hatred towards the west, and abundance of resources, my bet is that escalation is almost inevitable.
The question is on whose terms it will happen.
Escalation today seems necessary to prevent nuclear war tomorrow. If you're choosing between 1% chance of nuclear war today or 10% chance of nuclear war in 10 years, what will you chose?
I'm sure that doing nothing would have led to Russia attempting to exert control over Moldova and Poland next, at some point. I think everyone agrees on that. It's in the West's interest to make that as difficult as practical.
And the other alternative, escalating more than we have, might not make a difference, because unless we destroy the Russian military nothing would really change, and trying to destroy the Russian military would cost us enormous amounts of blood and treasure.
I may have misunderstood your prior "the best strategy is to close the door" remark. Are you saying that the West should be doing something more, like providing air cover to Ukraine?
If we escalated too much I assume the Russian's would adjust. Perhaps they would escalate, justifying tactical nukes because the whole world is against them. Perhaps they would withdraw, bide their time, and try again some other day, based on their fears and capabilities. Perhaps it's better that we stick with what we are doing - letting the Russians fritter away their resources trying to attain something just out of their reach.
I tend to think that we've been doing a good job of walking that line. We're helping Ukraine beat back Russia, trying to keep the conflict from significantly escalating, and weakening Russia in the process.
This is completely disingenuous as well as factually inaccurate.
Disagreed, it's pretty clear that the Russian position is that it would be 100% irrational to allow their biggest enemy to control Ukraine, which is essentially what happened when we meddled in Ukraine in 2014 and led to the annexation of Crimea literally the next day.
But the reality is that the sparks that lit the fire (declining to sign the EU trade deal, brutally attacking protestors, passing "dictatorship laws", etc) were completely Russian made. The reason that Russia lost control over Ukraine is Russia and Russia alone. The stupidity and yes, irrationality of their actions led them to lose all the influence they had.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Euromaidan
Sometimes the girlfriend dumps you simply because you're an asshole, not because she was "stolen" from you.
And of course US tried to ride the wave after the revolution was triggered, why wouldn't they?
Also, my understanding is that noone "controls" Ukraine. US obviously has a significant influence, but that doesn't even come close to a Russian puppet president they had in the past.
The US proclaimed this kind of events on their territory as "January 6 attempted coup", and people involved are now being prosecuted by the US authorities.
> but that doesn't even come close to a Russian puppet president they had in the past
The so-called puppet president didn't break state laws when he suspended preparations for signing of the Association Agreement, yet the coup happened anyways. His prior election was also recognized and endorsed as being fair and an accurate reflection of voters' intentions by all international agencies observing the election including the OSCE and PACE [1], yet he was ousted out of the country by the armed mob who didn't care about legitimacy of their actions. Meanwhile the US Assistant Secretary of State and the US Ambassador to Ukraine were deciding who would take what roles in the new Ukrainian government.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Ukrainian_presidential_el...
Yep. And if democrats were to provision laws like that in response: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-protest_laws_in_Ukraine#P...
you would not be describing this coup as "attempted" today.
> The so-called puppet president didn't break state laws
Not sure why that's relevant. As you said it yourself, he was ousted by protesters, not by Supreme Court. Breaking state laws is not the only reason for people to be upset.
Proven violation of state laws is a mandatory pre-requisite for a legitimate president expulsion from his office, "people get upset" isn't the same as the opportunistic power grab where democratic process wasn't held and due process wasn't respected. The US representatives were involved in the process to a degree, and yet you claim that it was the pro-russian puppet president at fault.
I think Ukraine handled it almost perfectly:
A temporary government was formed. Two democratic elections were held since. Each resulted in a new president being elected.
You could echo Russian talking points and call it undemocratic coup. But Ukraine undeniably returned back to stable democracy within a year. For a corrupt ex-soviet country, that's pretty damn impressive.
And the Ukraine Constitution was then changed, so elections after that aren't considered legitimate by everyone as a result. I mean we consider it legit because now our guys are running things.
So unlawfully changing the constitution voids the election results? Because that's exactly what the pro-russian president did, reverting changes that turned Ukraine into premier-presidential system, gaining way more power than he used to have.
Imagine this: a president gets elected and immediately discovers that changes that stripped presidents of power 6 years ago (!) were unconstitutional. What a lucky coincidence.
You can read about it here: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(20...
And the changes you are talking about didn't "change" the constitution, they reverted it back to previous commit.
But for the sake of the argument we can skip the details. Let's say you're right, the constitution was changed, and from now on elections are illegitimate. Are you suggesting to treat them illegitimate forever? Is there a process to make them lawful again?
Because if there is, my bet is that Ukraine has followed it: they reverted constitution back to the most stable commit, and held two elections afterwards. Those elections were recognized by everyone in the world, including Russia.
Do you have a better process in mind?
I think using your analogy, the Russian position is that a fork is needed.
2. Forking or not should still be Ukrainian business, not Russia or US.
Agreed 100% - but once the US decided to meddle in Ukraine shouldn't we have expected Russia would respond? I mean, that's been written in stone since the 1990's that Russia would not play games when it came to western encroachments in Ukraine.
People can talk sovereignty all they want, but how do we think the US would respond to China playing the same games in Mexico? Or for a real life example, the Soviets setting up shop in Cuba. Spheres of influence are real and crossing those lines start wars.
That's just ruzzia propaganda parroted by their apologists all over the world. You can't get raped "a little". And be assured that ruzzia won't stop. Any concessions will only embolden them to go further to other countries. Now with the resources and people of the concurred territories. If ruzzia succeed in ANY blackmail it will keep doing it because obviously EU and US are weak. That is until it's stopped. Might as well stop them now. Just look at Crimea they occupied for 8 years, did it stop them?
The problem with NATO is that they can't comprehend the other sides have their own rules.
For a more detailed look at what's been going on, ISW has some fairly fact-based reporting on the situation.
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-...
I find it more than a little funny that they're failing to conceal their obvious contempt for Russian incompetence in the last couple months, at the beginning of the war they were as neutral as one can get.
Understandingwar.org should be viewed only through the lens that these are the same people who were cheerleading the 20 year debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Depressing to see that this is the kind of crap former US military are putting out.
The situation is so far beyond these trite five rules as to be laughable if it weren't so deadly serious. This was the case even in Feb 2022. Everything the author claims the US should be doing is something Russia is doing.
There are no new insights here, just a strong undercurrent of US exceptionalism. Exactly the kind of garbage Russia is feeding to its people.
Nowhere does the author explain the consequences for Russia of leaving Ukraine. How can withdrawal be a winning move if the author doesn't even know what that move leads to?
> if it expects fair arbitration, the United States must ascribe to the rules it proclaims: For example, it cannot cry foul over Russian threats to freedom of navigation while remaining a nonsignatory to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Instead of flaunting exceptionalism and decrying these institutions’ irreconcilable problems, it must advance their credibility and authority. When necessary to withdraw from a commitment, the United States must state its intentions early and provide justification to avoid the perception that it too shirks the rules. Rule-breaking must bear a cost.
The article does say that there are costs to this game, and breaking rules should be in itself a cost.
If the goal of the game is to stop playing the game - peace - then the consequences must be lesser than the cost of continuing playing the game.
Hence, MAD is not present in most of the scenarios probably evaluated in some tables around the globe. Even here, I think nobody is even mentioning great chances of a massive nuclear confrontation.
So, Russia has the upper hand in the game, and there's no MAD as a variable. So perspectives look awry from going towards a clean exit from the conflict. Nuclear options, are just of the several bad outcomes for EU.
I think by now NATO has lost the war and Ukraine is by itself, most probably any further military, intelligence assistant directly regarding about regaining control of the south of their country is being re-assesed right now.
They probably know they will have the lines of cooperation open just a couple more of hours till they fall to silence, and they will try to exact the most advances possible in this grim situation, for those lines would probably be stable for years, as it happened with Crimea.
I didn't expect to see this level of sophisticated critical engagement.
If borders are malleable so too are ethnicity and nationality malleable.
Kenyan ambassador explained it really well: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ofijY6M-OA8
The possibility is very low, why do you think is nearly guaranteed?
This article estimates about 500 low yield US gravity bombs and 2,000 unspecified Russian weapons exist.
The other powers would have to respond in a devastating way albeit hopefully non-nuclear otherwise they’re giving Carte Blanche to North Korea, China, Pakistan etc to use tactical nukes or even allies.
So the only logical conclusion at the moment is that for russia to get out of this and still look like an actual power it needs to do something that stuns the rest of the world into backing off and potentially even retreating from some nato territory. And unless his new recruits pull some magic trick the only option left is the nuclear option.
Well, the Russian way of life seems to be to invade its neighbors, so yes, technically he's correct - sovereign well-defended neighbors are a threat to the Russian way of life.
Maybe it's high time they find a new, better way of life.
Tough love and hard to hear I bet but I think US needs to learn how to share and how to make it work for themselves to play second fiddle economically without getting violent or bitchy. Diva attitude hurts the classroom.
Also: different system doesn't mean evil. World should have multiple different systems and nurture the economic development of all.
Because they can't compete with literally any other country on literally anything?
And that gives them the right to murder and rape other countries?
I think you're missing two variables that could lower odds of the event of using nuclear weapons:
- Ukraine has already attacked Russian territory (Belgorod), and occupied territory (Crimea);
- Russia has broken a lot of of laws (national and international), treaties, agreements, contracts... I don't think being "legal" is a deterrent for anything. They can do what they want;
They use this threat because they have nothing else at this time, and it's their last card.
Who knows anyway. War is unpredictable. I hope i am wrong. But i fail to see an alternative course at the moment.
This war isn't aimed at ending Russia. In fact this war could end any time by Russia, there were many attempts and pleads to not even start the war.
I don't know what's in Putin's mind, but looks like he going through all of this to survive and keep is position.
Mm, who do you mean by we? I remember a very long drumbeat from US press of "intelligence shows massive Russian military buildup along border and says Russia likely to invade"