I for example just wouldn't like anyone to be able to see what data I exchange with any server, be it small profile blog or a login page.
Note: It's really, "see and modify undetected" what data you are exchanging with any server.As for what risk, two words: Great Cannon. For those who don't know, it's a well-known MITM attacker which injects JavaScript code on non-HTTPS pages, the injected JavaScript being used to do distributed denial of service attacks on other sites. Using HTTPS protects against these kinds of attacks.
Though if someone can set it up in less than 15 minutes, and doesn't, I reserve the right to snark. It's not a bad look in cases like that.
Thank you for your service
The funny thing is that IPv6 short-circuits my brain. Why do I have four addresses, and where did they come from? Why isn't there a link-local address for loopback and wireguard?
For self-hosted, it's table-stakes knowledge. Failure to do it implies the site admin knows so little about modern security that their access logs are probably only thinly secured. It's an "admin smell," if you will.
Though I suppose https is a prerequisite for that pipe to maybe be safe. Piping curl to bash varies from stupid to just fine depending on context.
The same goes for a privacy policy for that matter.
All of this was present in the 90s and early 2000s so not really theoretical attacks.
If you believe that your ISP or a middleman can't inject ads without breaking the S in HTTPS, I have a bridge to sell you.
They can just push the content into a frame and inject the content outside that frame. I encountered this more than once.
My ISP used to do that when they started deploying DPI hardware as a technology demo. They'll hijack your traffic and inject full ads w/o redirection or added (bill) warning banners or ads sporadically to retrieved pages.
My mobile carrier sometimes injects SMS & Notifications arriving to my modem if they find the chance w/o disturbing the connection too much.
So, having a HTTPS connection doesn't make it tamper resistant, but tamper evident, at most.
Because I'm pretty sure that happened.
Scenario a:
1. Navigate to https://www.example.com
2. Arrive at https://www.completelyunrelated-adsite.com while your address bar reads https://www.example.com
They used to do this regardless of your DNS. They directly hijacked that stream/connection.
Scenario b:
1. Navigate to https://www.example.com
2. Get https://www.example.com with an ad-banner on top.
They happened rarely, and never survived a reload or further navigation. They completely stopped after a while.
I have a 4G modem from my mobile carrier. They inject a info popup when I receive an SMS or any other notification' if they can manage it. It's very rare now, too.
The only way it would be possible is if you installed a root cert from your ISP onto your computer so that it would trust a cert issued by them. Otherwise, they would not have a valid cert for example.com and you would be presented with a cert error.
This is literally the exact thing https was designed to prevent. It is and always has been impossible (again, unless the client machine is administered by the ISP or whoever the middleman is, and they can install a cert on the machine)
That is not possible. You would get a cert mismatch error.
Consider what your browser does when you navigate to the page: it directly opens a TLS connection to port 443. There's nothing your ISP can do to force the browser to request the page using a non-TLS connection.
What might have happened, is that you might have carelessly typed the address in your URL bar without the "https://" prefix, as in "www.example.com"; for legacy historical reasons, most browsers (except IIRC some very old browsers from the dialup era, which always required an explicit URL scheme) treated that as if you had prefixed it with http:// (so it actually was the non-HTTPS "http://www.example.com" that you were using). Many sites would then redirect you to the HTTPS site, but your ISP could hijack the page before that redirect (since the redirect was not protected by HTTPS). Had you been careful to always prefix any address you type with "https://", there would be no initial non-HTTPS connection to hijack.
They're not doing this anymore, because I guess they now know how to use their DPI infra in useful ways to them.
My mobile carrier still injects stuff to HTTP pages, but doesn't mess with HTTPS ones, at least yet.