“Titanic” Disaster: Report of the Committee on Commerce, US Senate (1918) [pdf]
senate.gov
senate.gov
>The committee finds that this catastrophe makes glaringly apparent the necessity for regulation of radiotelegraphy. There must be an operator on duty at all times, day and night, to insure the immediate receipt of all distress, warning, or other important calls. Direct communication either by clear-speaking telephone, voice tube, or messenger must be provided between the wireless room and the bridge, so that the operator does not have to leave his station. There must be definite legislation to prevent interference by amateurs, and to secure secrecy of radiograms or wireless messages. There must be some source of auxiliary power, either storage battery or oil engine, to insure the operation of the wireless installation until the wireless room is submerged.
Also the HTML version is here https://www.titanicinquiry.org/USInq/USReport/AmInqRep01.php
Quite impressive for someone to read an incident report and actually implement the recommendations - so often they sit in a filing cabinet forever.
That's not really true. There is a saying when it comes to transportation regulations, "Safety regulations are written in blood." That is, nearly all safety regulations are the result of analysis after a tragic accident.
Generally when I write a postmortem there is a long list of modifications that could solve the problem. However they all have different costs, different effectiveness, different specificity and may overlap in different ways. This means that the high-cost, highly-specific modification may not be worth implementing when a lower cost and very broad modification can cover that same class of problems (even if not quite as effectively).
As an example you may have two recommendations:
1. Queue the requests and add many retries so that if a problem occurs in the future the requests are not lost and the problem can be fixed or allowed to resolve itself.
2. Add a second implementation of the process using different technologies and dependencies and fail over to it if the first implementation fails.
If this specific type of request is not very latency sensitive 2 is likely not worth it even though it is an improvement over just doing 1. 2 might be the better solution as well however 1 would greatly mitigate not only the specific request that had a problem this time but all similar requests in the system so 1 is good to do even if 2 is done for the other types of request.
In the end I would say that both are good recommendations however the logical business choice is just to do 1.
Update that to 'the interwebs', and we are [still] sadly lacking.
/!totc
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOLAS_Convention
SOLAS doesn't make a lot of requirements of recreational vessels but in practice you'll have a Digital Selective Calling VHF radio much like SOLAS requires a container ship to have, because either local laws require it or just it was really annoying without it as you can't talk to anybody. DSC has automated Mayday. So it's practical to teach children how to activate it at about the same age you teach them to make a 911/ 112/ whatever phone call. The radio will make Mayday radio calls, automatically giving its location (unless it doesn't know) and its identity, and explaining that there's a problem, but it doesn't know what the problem is. Somebody will come investigate, because SOLAS also made explicit what is obvious to most mariners, that you should always come help people. The ocean will definitely kill us if it gets a chance, so by the Golden Rule we should all pitch in to save others.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_selective_calling
SOLAS also requires float-release EPIRBS which are beacons that a COSPAS/SARSAT satellite can see from space, and again transmit their identity, so a shore-based emergency response co-ordinator can see e.g. this beacon is registered to a medium sized power yacht named "Example", we don't know what's wrong with it, but its beacon is activated, so either it sank or its in trouble and the beacon was activated manually (or somebody fucked up). The owner's satellite phone doesn't answer, he gives a home number, his wife answered and said he's fishing with two friends, due back this evening.
Go read the wiki, it's amazing: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violet_Jessop
The name comes from the earlier telegraph "CQ" call for alerts, named after the French word "sécurité", abbreviated as "sécu" which is how the letters C and Q are pronounced in French. "D" is added to indicate distress. Sending a CQD call means sending the letters C,Q,D in Morse code; this practice was later supplanted by SOS.
Wikipedia has a page with more information: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CQD. It mentions the Titanic disaster: "Harold Bride, the junior radio operator, suggested using SOS, saying half-jokingly that it might be his last chance to use the new code."
Currently software developers are often not learning from previous security disasters. I hope that will change in the future. There are already efforts to start writing up about important problems, and that will be a start.
Perhaps some developers aren't, but many are. It may also be that their recommendations or efforts are ignored or overruled ("that'll make things too slow/costly/etc").
Data breaches or misuse of personal data is not punished (at least not in the US), neither by the government nor by the market. There is no financial incentive there.
While it’s important to have backups in failure cases. It’s important to also consider the impact backups have in contributing to other failure cases.
Another example, people often wonder why airlines do not equip passengers with parachutes in the case of a crash. The answer is that people do not know how to use them, and would likely injure or kill themselves. Furthermore, they wouldn’t help in the period of flight where accidents are most likely to happen, which is take off and landing [2].
Disasters are a systems problem. And when looking to mitigate, we need to consider the efficacy of the mitigation and the total influence of mitigation’s on contributing to the likelihood of other failure cases.
[1] https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/eastland-disaster-kil...
I think MAIB (the Marine [edited: this said Maritime but that's wrong] Accident Investigation Branch, a UK government agency) wrote a report about this at one point. In coastal waters particularly the ship's master is realistically never going to encounter a situation where abandoning to lifeboats is the right choice. Fire is the most likely reason to consider it, but modern vessels should be able to contain plausible fires well enough to reach safety, even if as a result the ship is damaged beyond economic repair. Just loading the passengers into lifeboats and putting the lifeboats into the sea is a pretty fraught endeavour, you will probably injure either a passenger or crew member doing it - and that's before any risk from being in a tiny boat out at sea.
Current security disasters are typically exclusively financial or social and don't involve the death of those impacted. So, in a certain sense, I hope this doesn't change in the future.
The tables are also more nicely formatted in this version. And Google has kindly performed OCR as well.
You can download a PDF of the entire 1912 congressional record, of which report is a small part, here: https://books.google.com/books/download/Congressional_Record...
In this case the redundant systems were the watertight compartments. The engineers thought the ship wouldn't sink because it was unlikely for five of them to fail at the same time. But they forgot just how likely it was that any incident (e.g. an iceberg collision) that damaged one compartment would likely also damage many others.
Keep that in mind next time you think your system is ultra-reliable because you have 50 instances of every service, but they're all running in us-east-1.
According to:
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/in...
this equates to around 120m pounds sterling today.
It seems to me that there's no way you could construct anything like her for that amount of money today. I wonder what gives.
For example, in 1973 a 2N2222 transistor was $0.79 at Radio Shack.
Today, a single 2N2222 is $1.29 at Jameco. It's $0.95 at AmplifiedParts.com. It's $7 for 100 of them at Amazon.
If we go by the price of 2N2222 transistors and use the price for single units at Jameco we get inflation of 1% per year over the last 50 years.
In 1977 the price of volume I of Apostol's "Calculus" in hardback was around $20. Now it is $153 on Amazon, for the same book. By "same book" I don't just mean hardback. I also mean the same content. It was on the 2nd edition in 1977 and Apostol saw no need for any further revisions.
Using Apostol volume I as our yardstick inflation has been 4.6% per year over the last 45 years.
The most complete way to represent inflation would be as a vector whose components are the inflation for each individual good or service.
To get a scalar for inflation they take another vector that represents how much of each good or service that some hypothetical typical consumer consumes and combine them to get what the overall inflation is for a typical consumer.
Not only was this PC a vastly disproportionate weight in the new calculation of deemed essential domestic goods, but strangely the specification never was upgraded and so the effect on calculated inflation was strongly negative.
Consider this was masking inflationary signals for well over a decade before ZIRP took over the economy...
https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ukcompare/relativ...
(Edit: Somewhat funnily, it seems one of the help pages on measuringworth.com actually uses the example of the Titanic: https://www.measuringworth.com/tutorial4.php)
These are _much_ bigger ships than the Titanic, and with much more sophistication, complexity, luxury, etc.
If ships were still as simple today as the Titanic was I imagine 120m pounds would actually be pretty close.
It doesn't involve intentially killing the people, since if the ship didn't hit an iceberg there would have been time to rescue them.
So it either all of that, or it is just an accident caused by bad technology, bad practices, incomoetence, corporate preasure ans greed and bad luck. Your pick on what you want to believe.
> Repainting, changing the interior and all that involves a shipyard.
The ships were in shipyards together after the damage to the Olympic, and major parts were swapped between them. Sure, many people would notice.
> Why not have them on route and near by the Titanic
They were meant to have ships nearby.
> how exactly do you sink a perfectly good ship?
The iceberg wasn't meant to sink it. When the ship left port, there was a large fire on board, one that had been going for days or weeks.
I'm not sure if that's the theory on how it was supposed to happen.
Indeed. My Uncle was involved with the installation of Samson and Goliath [0], the two yellow cranes at Harland and Wolff. Goliath was installed in 1969, and the story of the ships being swapped was told to him then.
The story told to him was that Morgan had ships ready to sail to the rescue from New York, but they ended up fog bound and delayed.
[0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samson_and_Goliath_(cranes)
Why did he have to die, you know?
- the titanic did not beak in two parts
- there was no substantial suction
So the movie is inaccurate
The ship lies on the ocean floor until today, broken in two parts with almost half a mile separating them.