A proof (there) is just a finite number of symbols which happens to have a specifix form (A=>B AND A), where A and B are sentences, which are finite sequences of symbols having a slecific form… Wait, I am telling you a half of what Gödel did to prove his result.
Whether or not a visual demonstration like that is actually a “proof” is a separate question. It definitely wouldn’t satisfy Hilbert, and doesn’t meet this definition:
> A proof of a statement S is a finite sequence of assertions S(1), S(2), … S(n) such that S(n) = S and each S(i) is either an axiom or else follows from one or more of the preceding statements S(1), …, S(i-1) by a direct application of a valid rule of inference.
I also don’t know of any visual “proof” like that which can’t be explained much more rigorously and powerfully with a formal set of assertions. But pulling threads like this and really asking what makes a proof a “proof” are some of the deepest questions I think a person can ask. It’s worth doing if only to appreciate what an incredible accomplishment all of the formal set theory work is in unifying and attempting to define meta concepts like “proof” itself.
For such proofs to be contained in a finite space, the verifying person or machine needs to be able to distinguish between arbitrarily minute differences between proofs.
Again, that doesn’t really count as a “proof” by modern standards, but it’s how the ancient greeks thought (they used more than just visual intuition/they also used more rigorous and formal propositions than that water thing, but they were visual and didn’t involve finite sets)
Of course, this is not an argument that our brains are absolutely finite and classical. Perhaps analog computations is required for an appreciation of beauty, or quantum physics is necessary for us to fall in love. But we seem to be able to check math proofs without them.