PGPP – a new type of service that gives you private mobile connectivity
invisv.com
invisv.com
Answer found in the linked paper:
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For many devices, the IMEI can be changed through soft- ware, often without root access. We envision a PGPP MVNO would allow for subscribers to present their unchanged de- vice IMEI, giving the PGPP operator the opportunity to check against a EIR to verify the phone has not been reported as stolen. At that point, the IMEI could be reprogrammed to a single value, similar to our changes to the SUPI. Additionally, PGPP users can readily switch SIMs to different handsets (IMEIs) at-will. Note that different jurisdictions have differ- ent rules about whether, how, and by whom an IMEI can be changed, so only in some cases IMEI changes require cooper- ation with the MVNO.
...
A PGPP-based carrier is data-only, with voice and messaging provided by third parties.
"""
So, the next question is: if voice is provided by third parties (i.e., relies on the actual IMSI/IMEI), what stops the mobile operator from correlating the presence of the IMSI/IMEI to the ephemeral IMSIs/IMEIs, so as to infer the real network identity behind the randomised IDs?
"In addition, law enforcement has long demanded backdoor access to private user devices and user data [61]. We do not believe that users of PGPP, in its current form, would be capable of withstanding targeted legal or extra-legal attacks by nation-state organizations (e.g., the FBI or NSA)"
Randomizing the IMSI is great and all, but it only protects against >20-year old interception techniques (e.g. Stingrays). Nothing to see here.
Law enforcement has long demanded all sorts of things, but the presence of such a demand doesn't mean that they have the backdoors which that statement insinuates. If anything, the fact that law enforcement is having to publicly beg for private access suggests that they don't already have it (unless you believe that is a bluff).
> capable of withstanding targeted legal or extra-legal attacks by nation-state organizations
If your threat model includes "nation states are going to break their own laws to attack me" then you're not safe even if you never use a phone. In fact, you're not safe even if you never commit a crime.
Various “secured” encrypted phones have been sold as “PGP phones” for years now regardless of underlying the technology having anything to do with PGP.
But I'm one of those strawmen on the other side of this debate (a journalist) and such a product is appealing to me. If it's not appealing to the general public that is IMO a lack of education on the topic.
That said, I have not reviewed how this is particular thing is supposed to work, and my assumption is that it is An0m v2 until proven otherwise. Additionally, doesn't Signal require a phone number to sign up? If this service provides no phone number how does that work?
Yeah, you might sell to a few rich nerds from HN. But for each of those you’ll get tens of drug dealers and other organised crime.
Are you affiliated with any of the authors or developers of "the original PGP"? To be precise, Phil Zimmermann, PGP Inc, Network Associates, PGP Corp, or Broadcom Inc?
Can you explain how this follows? It sounds like you're claiming that the only people who have an interest in privacy are drug dealers? Which would be a pretty ridiculous take, if that's what you're implying.
There’s been a bunch of companies selling “PGP phones” specifically to drug dealers. Many of these have been shut down by LE. If you look, you’ll find that most of them unsurprisingly maintain physical storefronts in drug dealing hotspots like Marbella.
The idea isn’t that only drug dealers care about privacy, it’s that they’re the people with enough disposable cash and few enough brain cells to buy this stuff.
Ok, that's cute. I hope you know how hard it is to setup an MVNO these days.
It also kind of rules out that little thing called roaming, which is kinda popular these days.
You miss the point entirely.
Of course traditional MVNOs don't rule out roaming.
The problem comes when you think you can hide behind a fancy privacy-preserving MVNO.
Due to the very fundamentals of how roaming works ... that...aint ..gonna ...happen.
Also - what happens if you're on a low traffic cell site and make the change. Suddenly a new IMSI appears on that tower (With a big jump from it's last location). I'm pretty sure I could track someone with this service.
There are fundamental tradeoffs here, so it's good for users to know what they're interested in protecting against, compare against the security model that the system provides, and determine if it works for them and their needs.