One thing that's interesting is that the author doesn't really disagree about the political nature of science but rather looks for degrees of objectivity within what he acknowledges to be an already political field. This sets up a pretty big strawman because everyone agrees that, to pick his example, Lysenkoism is hogwash but that does little to address the contentious and serious political issues we grapple with, or the larger question of the proper nature of science.

I'd rather take up the second point, namely that the author almost takes it as a given that politicized science is bad. He puts forward this idea that science ought to be bureaucratic, ideally all scientists ought to be disinterested, universalist, apolitical monks who try to improve reproducibility, and so on.

To chain science to objectivity or to any kind of formulaic process may help everyone to agree on results, but it impedes the evolution of the scientific process (or better, processes) itself. There's nothing wrong with methods that in different places drift into different directions, because overall this makes for a more competitive field of methodologies. in fact something even as stupid as Lysenkoism serves a purpose, it's in itself part of the scientific map of ideas that need to be discovered before they could be disregarded.

So if you want to do insular corporate science, and someone wants to do militaristic science, and someone else wants to do cooperative 'objective science', all of this is valid and in fact useful, not despite, but because it creates conflict. To do ideological science is simply to run an experiment on the scientific method itself, it's what Feyerabend called 'epistemic anarchism' which he identified as the only thing that avoids limiting the potential of science.